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INTRODUCTION

The criminal law attributes major significance to the harm
actually caused by a defendant's conduct, as distinguished from
the harm intended or risked. If, for example, a person attacks
his wife and tries to kill her, he will be guilty of assault and
attempted murder even if she escapes unharmed. He will also
commit a battery if she is injured, mayhem if the injury is of
certain especially serious types, and murder if she dies. The
applicable penalties generally increase accordingly.
Yet both the defendant's state of mind and his actions
may have been identical in all four of the cases supposed. The
precise location of a knife or gunshot wound, the speed of
intervention by neighbors or the police, these and many other
factors wholly outside the knowledge or control of the defendant may determine the ultimate result. Accordingly, the differences in legal treatment would seem at first blush inconsistent with such purposes of the criminal law as deterrence,
rehabilitation, isolation of the dangerous, and even retribution
-in the sense of punishment in accordance with moral blame.
The illustration given is nevertheless typical of the many
instances in which every American criminal code relates the
gravity of the offense to the actual results of conduct. In most
states, attempts are punished less severely than the completed
crime,' and the same pattern of emphasis on harm prevails
See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy (pts. 1-2), 61
COLUM. L. REv. 571, 957, at 1022-24 & nn. 289-316 (1961).
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if the result is greater than that intended. 2
This pattern of emphasis on the actual result likewise
permeates the Model Penal Code. Reckless conduct creating
a risk of serious injury is a misdemeanor if no harm occurs,
or even if bodily injury occurs, but it is manslaughter-a felony of the second degree-if death results. 3 Negligent conduct,
not criminal in the absence of harm, becomes a misdemeanor
if bodily injury occurs under some limited circumstances, and
a felony of the third degree if death results.4 In addition to
different grading of the same underlying conduct, according
to the result, the Code thus teaches that "negligently" causing
death, a felony of the third degree, is a more serious crime
than "recklessly" placing a person in danger of death, which
is only a misdemeanor even when serious injury (short of
death) in fact occurs. The Code does eliminate most of the
traditional importance of the result in the law of attempts, by
providing that attempts are generally subject to the same penalties as the completed crimes. An attempt to commit a felony
of the first degree, however, is only a felony of the second
5
degree.
Emphasis on the harm caused can, of course, be understood as a vestige of the criminal law's early role as an instrument of official vengeance. 6 Actual damage was once prerequisite to the existence of a crime, 7 and the doctrine that an
attempt to commit a crime was in itself criminal developed
slowly. 8 The "eye for an eye" principle was sometimes carried
2 A defendant who causes death while committing a felony can be guilty of
murder without regard to his intention to kill, even if the death is purely accidental.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waddy, 447 Pa. 262, 290 A.2d 238 (1972). Reckless or
"criminally" negligent conduct is at most a minor offense unless injury occurs; then
it becomes assault and battery. See, e.g., Senters v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d 786
(Ky. 1955); State v. Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 114 S.E. 828 (1922). If the injury
proves fatal, the crime is manslaughter or negligent homicide, usually a felony. See
Note, Homicide by Motor Vehicle-A Survey and Proposal, 44 IowA L. REv. 558 (1959).
34 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 211.1(1)(a), 211.2, 210.3 (Official Draft 1962).

1d. §§ 211.1(1)(b), 210.4. There are numerous other examples. Conduct recklessly threatening major damage to property ("catastrophe") is a misdemeanor if no
harm is caused, but it is a felony of the third degree if the catastrophe occurs. Id.
§ 220.2. See also id. § 223.1(2) (grading of theft offenses).
51d. § 5.05(1).
' See J. MICHAEL & M. ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 340 n.7 (1933).
7 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 508 n.4 (2d ed.
1959); see J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 560-74 (2d ed. 1960).
8See Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REv. 821 (1928). It has, however,
been suggested that the development of a general law of attempts was retarded by
the availability of other devices for deterring those who exhibited dangerous tendencies and by the existence of many substantive crimes covering conduct that in
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to shocking, if logical, extremes; the ancient penalty for mayhem was mutilation, with the defendant being maimed to the
same extent as his victim. 9 It may be that even today's law can
be justified only in terms of vengeance. Glanville Williams has
written: "The only theory of punishment that explains the
present law [punishing attempts less severely than the completed crime] is a crude retaliation theory, where the degree
of punishment is linked rather to the amount of damage done
than to the intention of the actor." 10 But retaliation in this
sense has been widely rejected as a legitimate purpose of the
criminal law.* Commentators'I and judges12 have denounced
it as an unacceptable policy, and the draftsmen of legislative
codes have excluded it from consideration.' 3 A few state coneffect was an attempt to cause some more serious harm., J. HALL, supra note 7, at
573; 2 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 223 (1883).
9 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 188 (2d ed. 1969).
10G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw-THE GENERAL PART § 49, at 136 (2d ed. 1961).

Similarly, in discussing the difference between manslaughter and third degree assault
under New York law, the New York Law Revision Commission wrote:
Save for the actual result in the particular case, the elements of both crimes
are identical . . . . It is difficult to escape the feeling that in this instance,
at least, criminal justice is retributive, that in a measure the punishment
inflicted is the price of the life that was lost.
N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N,

COMMUNICATION

AND

STUDY

RELATING

TO

HOMICIDE

267 (1937).
'1 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 130-31 (1968); O.W. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 37 (M. Howe ed. 1963); J. MICHAEL & M. ADLER, supra note 6,
at 352; Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pts. 1-2), 37 COLUM.
L. REV. 701, 1261, at 730 n.126 (1937).
12 Collins v. Brown, 268 F. Supp. 198, 201 (D.D.C. 1967); Abernathy v. People,
123 Ill.
App. 2d 263, 271, 259 N.E.2d 363, 368 (1970); Gabriel v. Brame, 200 Miss.
767, 773, 28 So. 2d 581, 582-83 (1947); Aabel v. State, 86 Neb. 711, 721, 126 N.W.
316, 320 (1910); People ex rel. Carter v. Warden, 62 Misc. 2d 191, 193, 308 N.Y.S.2d
552, 555 (Sup. Ct. 1970); People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 134 N.E. 2d 197,
201-02, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373 (1956); Tuel v. Gladden, 234 Ore. 1, 6, 379 P.2d
553, 555 (1963); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 580 n.1, 155 A.2d 825,
827 n.1 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960); Wilson v. State, 220 Tenn. 565,
571, 421 S.W.2d 91, 94 (1967). Cf. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112 (1958) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
"I MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Official Draft 1962) (by implication); NATIONAL
COMM.

ON

REFORM

OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL

LAWS,

STUDY

DRAFT OF A NEW

FEDERAL

CRIMINAL CODE 2-3 (1970). See also SPECIAL COMM. OF THE MICH. STATE BAR FOR THE
REVISION

OF THE

CRIMINAL

CODE,

MICHIGAN

REVISED

CRIMINAL CODE:

FINAL DRAFT

3-4 (1967); N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 10, at 17; id. pp. 156-57; JOINT
STATE

GOVERNMENT

COMM'N,

PA.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

PROPOSED

CRIMES

CODE FOR

PENNSYLVANIA 16-17 (1967).
For statutes which appear to exclude retaliation from the permissible purposes
of the state's criminal law, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-102 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4601 (Supp. 1973); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.01 (1964); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 1967). Proposals to
enact the Model Penal Code provision to similar effect are presently pending in a
number of other states.
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stitutions explicitly prohibit reliance on it.1 4 Despite all this,
the basic pattern of attributing importance to results remains
largely unchallenged. Some efforts have been made to formulate theories to replace the vengeance rationale, but occasionally even then refusal to reject the present pattern of the law
and inability to develop a convincing rationale for it are, almost apologetically, admitted. 5
The problem, moreover, is not simply one of theoretical
inconsistency; the law's emphasis on the occurrence of harm
has major practical consequences. This is particularly clear in
the case of conduct involving relatively slight culpability-for
example, careless'driving that may be found "criminally" negligent or reckless. Emphasis on results has meant that such
conduct is subject to little or no penalty in the absence of harm.
But where a death occurs, the penalty frequently amounts to
five years in prison or more.16 Dangerous driving has even
been the basis for second-degree murder convictions in numerous cases,' 7 and in at least a few of these cases, the "reck8
less" motorist found himself sentenced to life imprisonment.'
The structure of the law thus not only makes harsh punishments possible but may even encourage them by mandating
e.g.,

1, § 18; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 24; ORE. CONST.
art. I, § 15.
11H.L.A. HART & A. HONOR1, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 355 (1959): "To this
obstinate sense of a difference the law should defer .... See also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.03, Comment at 134 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Weinreb, Comment on Basis of
Criminal Liability; Culpability; Causation, in 1 NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 105, 147 & n.14 (1970).
"6Sanford v. State, 38 Ala. App. 332, 83 So. 2d 254 (1955) (8 year sentence);
Patton v. People, 114 Colo. 534, 168 P.2d 266 (1946) (6-8 year sentence); Anderson
v. State, 150 Neb. 116, 33 N.W.2d 362 (1948) (5 year sentence); State v. McLean,
234 N.C. 283, 67 S.E.2d 75 (1951) (5-7 year sentence); Long v. State, 154 Tex. Crim.
587, 229 S.W.2d 366 (1950) (5 year sentence). Cf. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316
Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944) (reckless disregard of fire hazard resulting in several hundred deaths; defendant sentenced to 12-15 years at hard labor).
Of the 59 defendants convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Philadelphia
during the period 1948-52, only 17% were placed on probation; 83% received some
sort of prison sentence, and 15% received a sentence of two years or more. See M.
WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 306 (1958). Such data are imprecise
14See,

IND. CONST. art.

for present purposes, however, as they do not indicate to what extent reckless or

negligent conduct may have led to conviction for a higher degree of homicide and
(perhaps more importandy) to what extent the "involuntary manslaughter" convictions were based on instances of essentially intentional homicide.
17E.g., Nestlerode v. United States, 122 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Smith v.
State, 204 Ga. 184, 48 S.E.2d 860 (1948); Staggs v. State, 210 Tenn. 175, 357 S.W.2d
52 (1962). Other cases of this kind are collected in Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 116 (1968).
See also O.W. HoLMs, supra note 11, at 50.
'" Woods v. State, 222 Ga. 321, 149 S.E.2d 674 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
994 (1967); Powell v. State, 193 Ga. 398, 18 S.E.2d 678 (1942); State v. Patterson,
172 Ohio St. 319, 175 N.E.2d 741 (1961).
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low penalties in the absence of harm. The resulting severity
is not always tolerated by the appellate courts, but cases reversing convictions of this kind are nevertheless revealing. The
law is clear, for example, that a defendant who fails to conform
to the applicable standard of conduct should not avoid-conviction because of "contributory negligence" on the part of his
victim.1 9 Yet many courts have reversed convictions on something approaching this basis, 20 one court even going so far as
to state that "the deceased when crossing the highway was
charged with the exercise of such care as was necessary for her
own self preservation. ' 2 1 Manslaughter or "reckless" murder
cases likewise are the setting for decisions adding no little
confusion to the law of principals and accessories, 22 not to
mention that of proximate cause. 23 Even when death occurs
in the course of a major crime-armed robbery, burglary, and
the like-the same phenomenon can be observed; witness the
chaotic state of the law with respect to implied malice, trans24
ferred intent, and the felony-murder rule.
19Penix v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 587, 233 S.W.2d 89 (1950); Commonwealth
v. Atencio, 345 Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 223 (1963); R. PERKINS, supra note 9, at 701-02.
20 Smith v. State, 65 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1953); Thacker v. State, 103 Ga. App. 36,
117 S.E.2d 913 (1961); People v. Crego, 395 Ill. 451, 70 N.E.2d 578 (1946); Idol
v. State, 233 Ind. 307, 119 N.E.2d 428 (1954); State v. Oliver, 107 N.J.L. 319, 153
A. 399 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931).
21 Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 224, 191 So. 296, 299 (1939).
2
E.g., People v. Marshall, 362 Mich. 170, 106 N.W.2d 842 (1961). Compare Stacy
v. State, 228 Ark. 260, 306 S.W.2d 852 (1957); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2)(a), Comment2 3at 17 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
E.g., Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961).
24 The felony-murder rule is still alive and well, even in courts that recently
implied its imminent demise. Compare Commonwealth v. Waddy, 447 Pa. 262, 290
A.2d 238 (1972) with Commonwealth ex reL Smith v. Meyers, 438 Pa. 218, 225-27,
261 A.2d 550, 553-55 (1970). The rule is supposedly inapplicable when the fatal
shot is fired by someone acting in opposition to the felons. Commonwealth ex reL
Smith v. Meyers, supra; People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44
Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965). But the felons may be viewed as having provoked such shots
by simply carrying out the felony in a "reckless" manner, and this may support a
finding of the "implied malice" sufficient for murder. Taylor v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970). The typical degrees-ofhomicide statute will then make this first-degree murder without regard to premeditation or even an intent to kill. Id. at 583 n.2, 477 P.2d at 134 n.2, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 278
n.2.
Even stranger is the so-called merger doctrine, which bars use of the felonymurder rule where the underlying felony is not "independent" of the homicide,
as in the case of an assault with intent to kill. E.g., People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100,
158 N.E. 35 (1927). Contra, State v. Harris, 69 Wash. 2d 928, 421 P.2d 662 (1966).
The limitation has been considered necessary to preserve the distinctions among
the degrees of homicide. But as a result, if a woman dies at the hands of a wotuld-be
rapist, the attacker is automatically guilty of first-degree murder, while if the attacker
had intended to kill, the crime may be only second-degree murder or even man-
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Such confusion and inconsistency seem due less to the
intrinsic difficulty of the concepts than to the fact that courts
will often reject retaliation in practice as well as in theory,
and that other reasons for attributing any significance to the
actual results of conduct have not been convincingly articulated. A full-scale rethinking of this aspect of the criminal
law seems necessary. This Article can only attempt to set the
stage.
After a brief comment on previous efforts to come to
grips with this problem, and a section defining terms that will
recur throughout the Article, I will attempt to assess the arguments that have been or might be offered in support of relating punishment to harm caused, and to offer tentative conclusions as to the implications of the analysis for a criminal code
based on acceptable policies.
-The Literature on Harm and Punishment. The problem of
emphasis on harm caused has frequently been raised in discussions of criminal law theory,2 5 numerous articles on specific
issues have adverted to it,26 and a number of commentators
have written pieces addressed primarily to the question. 27 In
addition to all this, articles and cases involving the law of attempts or the question of strict liability must deal to some
degree with the problem, if only by implication. And it should
slaughter. See People v. Draper, 278 App. Div. 298, 104 N.Y.S.2d 703, aff'd, 303
N.Y. 653, 101 N.E.2d 763 (1951). In New York, the merger doctrine has been held
inapplicable where the death results accidentally from an assault upon someone other
than the homicide victim; such a case is automatically murder under a felonymurder theory. People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644 (1927). The California
courts reach the opposite result, finding it "anomalous to place the person who
intends to attack one person and . . . kills another inadvertently . . . in a worse posi-

tion than the person who from the outset intended to attack both persons and killed
one or both." People v. Sears, 2 Cal. 3d 180, 189, 465 P.2d 847, 852, 84 Cal. Rptr.
711, 716, (1970). But Sears simply shifts the anomaly to another point; it leaves the
person who enters a home intending merely to steal a TV set but who accidentally
kills an occupant in a worse position than a person who entered the home intending
from the outset to assault or kill anyone in the house. The New York and California
decisions are also in conflict on other applications of the merger doctrine. Compare
People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157, 344 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1973), with People v. Wilson, 1
Cal. 3d 431, 462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969).
25 See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 7, at 212-95; H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 234;
O.W. HOLMES, supra note 11, at 48-49; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, § 49.
26 See, e.g., Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1294-98; Mueller, Criminal
Theory: An Appraisal of Jerome Hall's Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory,
34 Irn. L. J. 206 (1959); Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773,
797-98 (1958); Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1170, 1174 (1957).
27 See, e.g., Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 262 (1974); Eser, The Principle of Harm in the Concept of Crime: A Coin-
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scarcely be possible to discuss causation without considering
why occurrence of a harmful result should matter, though a
surprising number of courts and commentators almost manage
28
to do it.

A detailed critique of this literature would provide fascinating insights into the ways legal thought grows or fails to
grow, and in some instances degenerates. Unfortunately, however, such an exercise would do little to illuminate the merits
of emphasis on results. The principal discussions have too
much in common to warrant separate analysis of each. Too
often a rationale is hinted at but never clearly expressed. The
same notions are mentioned time and again without being
fully developed, and frequently the author's treatment of the
21
subject adds nothing to work done decades before. 9 It will

therefore be more fruitful to proceed by an analysis of the
underlying arguments themselves, adding new arguments
where possible, paraphrasing and restating the old ones where
necessary to eliminate overlap or ambiguity. This presentation may do violence to the complexity of a particular scholar's
thinking, but should provide a better basis for evaluating the
merits of the various arguments and determining whether my
own framework omits any important consideration.
-Definitions. The pages that follow will focus upon the
question whether criminal punishment should appropriately
vary according to the harm that the defendant actually caused,
as distinguished from harm he may have intended or risked.
Though the central concern is with the notion of "harm," a
precise definition of that concept is for the most part unnecessary. The question is whether a defendant who caused harm,
however that "harm" is understood, should be treated differently from one who intended or risked the same harm without
actually bringing it to pass. Certain arguments for attributing
significance to the occurrence of harm are, however, built
parative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DuQ. L. REV. 345 (1966);
Smith, The Element of Chance in Criminal Liability, 1971 CRIM. L. REV. 63; Comment,
The Fallacy and Fortuity of Motor Vehicle Homicide, 41 NEB. L. REv. 793 (1962).
A major international symposium on criminal negligence included this as one
of the problems to be discussed in each of the papers presented. ASSOCIATION
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PPNAL, Les Problmes Poss dans le Droit P'nal Moderne par
des Infractions Non Intentionnelles, 32 REV. INT. D.P. 761, 793 (1961).
le Diveloppement
28
E.g., Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961); R. PERKINS,
supra note 9, at 685-738. Even Glanville Williams' useful article Causation in Homicide
(pts. 1-2), 1957 CRIM. L. REV. 429, 510, must be included in this category.
29 Compare the work of Ryu, supra note 26, and Smith, supra note 27, with Michael
& Wechsler, supra note 11.
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upon a particular notion of what "harm" means. It will therefore be convenient to have at our disposal terms that clearly
differentiate among various conceptions.
We will reserve the general term harm to describe the kind
of damage or injury to a legally protected interest which would
ordinarily be compensable in a civil action. This will usually
mean damage or injury to a specific individual, but it also includes for our purposes injury to the interests of the collectivity
-failure to pay taxes or conform to price control rules, pollution of the air, interference with the operation of government,
30
and so on.
Analysis of the criminal law and its functions often focuses
upon a specific kind of harm, the harm or injury that a particular criminal law is intended to prevent. The law against
murder is designed to safeguard human life, and the same is
true of the laws against attempted murder, the sale of impure
food or dangerous drugs, and many other crimes. The death
of a human being is the ultimate harm that all these laws seek
to prevent, even though less important sorts of harm may also
be associated with such crimes.
The concern of this Article is not necessarily limited to
what may be described as an ultimate harm, nor is it limited
even to harm in its more general sense. The same basic issue
is posed whenever the criminal law attributes significance to
the occurrence of a certain consequence, as distinguished from
the threat of the same consequence. The consequence in question may fall far short of a meaningful injury to a legally protected interest, but if the criminal law attributes significance
to the occurrence of such a result, it will be of interest to us.
Any consequence of conduct which is a necessary element of
a given offense, as defined by law, will therefore be described
as a statutory harm.3 1
A statutory harm may also be an ultimate harm, as with the
death necessary for murder. Characterization of a particular
injury as an ultimate harm depends, however, upon the way
in which the purposes served by a criminal law are evaluated.
30 Harm in this sense is a concept independent of particular laws defining
crimes and specifying punishments; its content is determined by the general principles which identify interests entitled to legal protection, invasions of which give rise
to legal injury.
31 A consequence is a "necessary element" in this sense if, in the absence of the
consequence, the conduct loses its criminal character under the law, remains criminal under an offense of a different name, or remains an offense to which the same
name but a different range of penalties attaches.
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In connection with burglary, for example, an entry into a
building might be considered the kind of injury sufficiently
important to be described as an ultimate harm. But since burglary usually requires an entry with intent to commit a felony,
it might seem more plausible to regard the harm associated
with that latter felony as the ultimate harm which the law
seeks to prevent. Whether or not regarded as an ultimate
harm, however, the entry clearly would be a statutory harm for
our purposes.
Not all crimes have a statutory harm; a criminal attempt is
one obvious example. In such cases the crime is defined as a
certain kind of conduct, without regard to its actual consequences. It is sometimes suggested that such crimes do cause
actual as well as potential injury, in that the attempt itself
upsets the social equilibrium, giving rise to a certain tension
or disorder. 2 This injury to the social fabric would not, however, be a statutory harm, since the legal definition of the
offense does not require proof that it actually occurred.
The term attempt will be used to designate any conduct
that is regarded as a punishable attempt under present law.
Where the result actually occurs, the case is often said to involve a completed crime rather than an attempt, but for our
purposes it will frequently be convenient to refer to such a
case as a successful attempt (or a completed crime) to contrast it to
the case of an unsuccessful attempt. Attempts may also be either
complete or incomplete. A completed attempt involves conduct in
which the actor has taken all steps that he believes necessary
to bring about the intended result without further action on
his part. In an incompleted attempt, the actor, though having
gone beyond "mere preparation," has yet to carry out some
step that he knows to be necessary in order to achieve the
forbidden result. 33 A completed attempt may of course be
successful (and thus a completed crime), but we will also be
dealing extensively with completed attempts that are unsuccessful and hence not completed crimes.
It will also be convenient to distinguish among the different
kinds of culpability associated with underlying conduct. The
3

2E.g., Becker, supra note 27; Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal
Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 969-71 (1930).
3
See R. PERKINS, supra note 9, at 557-61. The Model Penal Code definition of
attempts similarly differentiates between completed and incompleted attempts. See
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(1), 5.02 (Official Draft 1962).
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proscribed conduct will be referred to as intentional only if
the law requires that the defendant intend to bring about the
statutory harm. Thus, a statute making it an offense to drive
on the wrong side of the road punishes intentional conduct if
it must be shown that the defendant actually intended to drive
in this way. The conduct is intentional with respect to the
statutory harm, even though the acts might well be described
as "careless" or "negligent" with respect to the risk of death or
injury. Conversely, a statute defining murder to include any
killing in the course of a felony would not here be described
as punishing intentional conduct with respect to the statutory
harm of death; the law might require an intent to commit the
felony, but it does not require an intent to cause the death.
Similarly, conduct is reckless if the defendant must consciously disregard a substantial risk that the statutory harm
will occur, and negligent if culpability requires only that the
defendant should have been aware of such a risk. Conduct is
punishable on a strict liability basis if occurrence of the statutory harm is sufficient for conviction, without regard to the
defendant's intent, recklessness, or negligence with respect
to that harm.
II.

SOME BASIC JUSTIFICATIONS

Dozens of efforts to justify emphasis on results can be
found; dozens more can be conceived. Each rests ultimately
on a particular view of what the criminal law is supposed to
accomplish. The temptation is therefore great to begin with
a clear statement of my own conception of the legitimate aims
of the criminal law and the appropriate priorities among them.
It would then be possible to outline the structure of penalties
called for by these objectives and to determine the role, if any,
to be accorded the harm caused. Such an approach would be
tidy but in the end inconclusive, since disagreement would
inevitably remain over first principles.
Similar difficulties would attend an effort to approach the
problem in terms of the institutional process by which individual sentences are ultimately determined. It would no doubt
be instructive to establish guiding principles as to the responsibility of legislatures, prosecutors, courts, and correctional authorities for determining general categories of punishment
and fixing penalties in specific cases. The significance of the
actual result could then be assessed from the viewpoint of
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each decision-maker in the resulting structure. 3 4 Here again,
however, disagreement would remain over the appropriate
allocation of power among the institutions that do or could
play a part in the sentencing process. Our concern is with the
reasons that might lead any decision-maker, in any institutional
system, to attribute significance to the actual result. Consideration must be given to those institutional concerns (such as a
desire to minimize official discretion) that would make reliance
on the actual result especially useful, but a more systematic
treatment of the institutional aspects of the grading and sentencing process would only distract us from our primary task.
Of necessity, the analysis must be eclectic, considering,
without regard to any particular ideology or model, all the
reasons that might justify emphasis on results. For convenience,
the justifications are grouped according to the objective or
philosophy of criminal law that they purport to fulfill. We
begin with arguments based on the retaliatory and retributive
purposes of the criminal law, and then turn to several relatively complex arguments to the effect that emphasis on results
provides greater deterrence. Finally, we consider arguments
that seek to relate actual harm to the dangerousness of the
offender or his offense, a factor that may be relevant not only
to retribution and deterrence, but also to decisions concerning
the need for isolation and treatment of the offender.
A. Retaliation
The view that it is desirable for punishments to vary according to the harm caused should not be dismissed as simply
barbaric or medieval. Kant argued forcefully that "the Right
of Retaliation . . .is the only principle which . . .can definitely

assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty"; any
other approach would be inhuman, treating one man "merely
as a means subservient to the purpose of another.

' 35

Whether

Kant would have considered it permissible to base retaliation
on a purely fortuitous harm, whether-if so-he would have
described as 'just" a penalty which served no identifiable social
purposes, whether indeed Kant actually meant that an individual's interests could never be sacrificed for the social good,
these and other problems with the "Kantian" rationale have
34 Cf.

H.M. Hart, The Aims of the Ciminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROB.

401

(1958).
35

1887).

I.

KANT,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW,

pt. 2, § 49, at 195-97 (W. Hastie transl.
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been frequently aired. 3 6 Suffice it to say that such a categorical
refusal to tolerate treating human beings as "means to an end"
has been almost universally rejected as a requirement of legal
policy. 37 As Holmes put it: "No society has ever admitted that
it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence
....
[No] civilized government sacrifices the citizen more than
it can help, but [it] still sacrific[es] his will and his welfare to
38
that of the rest.
Some contemporary analysts of the criminal law have also
urged that a correlation between punishment and harm caused
is desirable for its own sake. Professor Jerome Hall has argued
that the principle of harm is "an essential organizational construct" of the criminal law; a theory emphasizing results permits "systematization" of the law by explaining causation and
the differentiation between punishments. 39 As a description
of the criminal law, Hall's theory is probably accurate in a
general way. Even so, it fails to account for the growing minority of States which hold that attempts should be punished as
severely as the completed crime. 40 It fails as well to account
for the many instances in which resistance to emphasis on
41
harm has produced confusion or inconsistency in the law.
More fundamentally, Hall's analysis is inadequate for present
purposes because it fails to do more than explain what exists;
it offers no justification why this pattern should prevail. "Penal
law theorists, who think that theory is the exposition of the
law, can hardly ask that legislation be so framed that it will
'6 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 244.
'7See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 11, at 37-41; J. MICHAEL.& M. ADLER, supra
note 6, at 349-52; E. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1966).
31 OV. HOLMES, supra note 1 , at 37.
31 J. HALL, supra note 7, at 221-22. See also Eser, supra note 27.
40 Prior to the completion of the Model Penal Code, only three states apparently
authorized equal penalties for attempts and completed crimes. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.05, Comment at 174-75 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). Since then several of
the States adopting new codes, patterned on the Model Penal Code, have followed
the ALI recommendation that attempts to commit crimes (other than felonies of the
first degree) should be graded as seriously as the corresponding substantive offense.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-51 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1, pt. IV
(Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 905 (1973).
More commonly, however, the ALI proposal has been rejected. See COLo REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40-2-101 (1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1006 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3301 (Supp. 1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.065 (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.17 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-28-1 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05
(McKinney Supp. 1973) (the commentary notes that the new provision brings punishment for attempts and completed crimes closer than did the prior law); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 161.405(2) (1973).
41 See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
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simplify their work. 42
When all is said and done, the support for retaliation as
an affirmative value remains rather thin, and this is so despite
the continuing debate over the legitimacy of retribution, a debate recently revived in Furman v. Georgia.43 References to
retribution or "retributive justice" are seldom precise about
the meaning of the term. Often it is associated with the concept
of vengeance or retaliation for injuries caused, the "eye for an
eye" principle. 44 The term retribution is also used to refer to
a theory of punishment based upon moral blameworthiness, 45
which is quite another matter. In this latter sense, retribution
has found thoughtful defenders, 46 while many others would
accord it little place in our penal system 47 or none at all. 48
Although many judicial statements express approval for "retribution," it is difficult to find ones in which the idea of retaliation is clearly intended. In some cases courts have recognized
the ambiguity and specified that while retribution in some of
its senses may be a permissible goal, its retaliation element is
not.

4.

This is not to deny that retaliation for its own sake might
still be considered legitimate in some jurisdictions. No useful
purpose would be served, however, by re-opening here the
much-debated question whether such a judgment is morally
sound or constitutionally permissible. For present purposes,
we may assume that in any such jurisdiction, the pattern of
emphasis on harm could be defended. 5 The fact remains that
most American jurisdictions exclude retaliation from the legitimate goals of the criminal law, and legal theorists are virtually
42 Wechsler,

Foreword-Symposium on the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM.

L. REV.

589, 593 (1963).
43 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
44
E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1972); H.L.A.
HART, supra note 11, at 233-34; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
37-39 (1968).
15E.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 9, 231; H. PACKER, supra note 44, at 37.
46 H. PACKER, supra note 44, at 62; H.M. Hart, supra note 34.
4 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949); People v. Brust,
47 Cal.2d 776, 791 n.8, 306 P.2d 480, 488 n.8 (1957).
4 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343, 363 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting);
J. MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 10-1 1 (1940).
4, People v. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 843, 856 n.3, 350 P.2d 705, 713 n.3, 3 Cal. Rptr.
665, 673 n.3 (1960).
50 It would remain necessary, in such a jurisdiction, to determine that the value
of the retaliation policy in this context was sufficient to offset its costs in terms of
other policies and interests that such a jurisdiction might recognize as legitimate.
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unanimous in applauding the judgment.5 a Our problem, therefore, is to determine the extent to which the pervasive pattern
of emphasis upon harm caused can be justified consistent with
this widespread view.
B.

Retaliation as a Means to an End

Most of the proponentg of a retaliation theory do not
argue that retaliation is affirmatively desirable. They rather
suggest that deference to desires for vengeance, on the part
of victims or the public generally, is necessary to promote some
other value. Thus it is claimed that official retaliation may be
52
necessary as an alternative to the greater evil of mob violence.
The argument is first and foremost a plea for a legalized death
penalty. But even where the most heinous offenses are involved, the death penalty does not appear necessary to prevent
private lynching. 53 And if life imprisonment is sufficient to
forestall mob action in this class of cases, particularly life imprisonment "as presently administered, ' 54 there is little basis
for believing that lynch-law, or even more subtle forms of
private vengeance, would break out in response to moderate
adjustments in the maximum prison sentence.
When we turn from the very few crimes of this type, the
"lynch-law" danger becomes increasingly unrealistic. Penalties
we consider appropriate for other reasons would almost certainly satisfy enough of the appetite for vengeance to forestall private retaliation. 55 Indeed the "breaking-point" level
5' See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.

.52
O.W. HOLMES, supra note 11, at 36; H.M. Hart, supra note 34, at 401. Cf.,
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring).
" See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring). Cf. Eacret
v. Holmes, 215 Ore. 121, 333 P.2d 741 (1958), where parents of a murder victim
sued for a declaratory judgment limiting the grounds upon which the Governor
might exercise his discretion to commute the death sentence of their son's killer.
In denying relief, the court held:
It must be at once apparent that the plaintiffs have no standing to maintain this suit. The wrong of which they complain-if there be a wrong-is
public in character ....The fact that it was their son for whose murder Nunn
has been sentenced to die does not alter the case, even though it be natural
that they should feel more deeply upon the subject than other members of
the general public. Punishment for crime is not a matter of private vengeance,
but of public policy.
Id. at 124-25, 333 P.2d at 742-43 (alternative holding).
54Cf.Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
55Or at least so much of such retaliation as can be forestalled by adjustments of
the applicable penalty. The possibility of impulsive vengeance by private parties
would be present to some degree even when the law permits or requires the death
penalty.
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of punishment, below which mob violence could become a
problem, is probably rather low. Most European countries
treat involuntary manslaughter with far less severity than we
do; "6 this does not appear to have prompted private retaliation,
even under the most tragic circumstances. 5 7 Even if popular
resentment would not lead to mob violence, it can be argued
that giving an outlet for this rese'ntment will contribute to the
psychological health of the community. The argument is somewhat complex, involving both the need to reinforce the citizen's
repression of his own impulses to do wrong, and the need to
satisfy the instinctive urge to strike back at an attacker. 58 For
many purposes these two elements point to consistent policies,
but in the present context they seem rather to conflict. The
latter notion, the urge to strike back, truly supports a retaliation approach, while the former element suggests instead that
it is the decision to do wrong which must be punished.59 The
psychologically disturbing effects of allowing the distribution
of severe penalties to be affected by factors that may be perceived as capricious might or might not offset the psychological
benefits of retaliation; in the final analysis the psychological
argument, at least in its present state of refinement, provides
little firm guidance for the solution of our problem. 60
" See, e.g., M. ANCEL, LES CODES PENAUX EUROPEENS 680 (4 vols. 1956-7 1) (French
Penal Code art. 319-maximum sentence of two years for involuntary homicide by
negligence); id. 7, 55 (German Penal Code arts. 16, 222-maximum of five years
for homicide by negligence); id. 1836 (Swedish Penal Code ch. III, art. 7-maximum
of two years for involuntary homicide by negligence; four year maximum if by gross
negligence); id. 1926, 1949 (Swiss Penal Code arts. 26, 117--maximum of three years
for homicide by negligence).
., See Schulhofer, The Vagaries of Vengeance: A Case Study (on file, Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania).
"'See F. ALEXANDER

& H. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC

214-33 (1956).
59 Thus, "the power of the Superego over our instinctive life is undermined,
not only when someone is punished unjustly and too severely, but also when the
offender escapes punishment and thus fails to pay for his offense." Id. 214.
60 Survival of the present pattern of penalties may suggest that the net psychological impact is not seriously adverse, but would not seem to permit an inference
of affirmative psychological benefit. In any case such benefits, if any, could probably be attained by less wasteful means. Liability in tort may have the same psychological effect and would also help repair some of the physical harm. If the defendant
cannot respond in damages, a period of probation to enable him to make reparation,
see Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect upon Systems for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 495 (1958), might do much to
assuage the feelings of both the victim and society at large, and would do it in a far
more constructive way. Even a state-financed system of compensation would provide a more meaningful response to resentment by the victims of crime. See generally
Symposium-Governmental Compensation for Victims of Violence, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1970). Victims were paid $4.9 million under a British victim-compensation program
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Deference to popular desires for retaliation has also been
urged on the ground that adherence to the common sense of
justice is necessary to maintain respect for the law. 6 1 But this
should prompt inquiry into just what this common sense of
justice is. The fact that criminal codes presently emphasize
harm is, of course, relevant; the typical reaction of victims is
also important.62 But such indications of public feeling are
relatively unfocused. Popular tolerance of emphasis on harm
caused may simply be due to a failure to perceive that lack of
success in certain cases was due to a fortuitous rather than a
relevant factor. 63 Moreover, attitudes undoubtedly vary depending on the particular penalties involved. A legal system
which imposes the same criminal penalty on two equally negligent defendants, while requiring the one who has caused greater harm to pay greater compensation to his victim, 6 4 may well
satisfy the public desire for retaliation and win respect for "the
law" as a whole.
In addition, attitudes which once justified the present pattern of law may no longer be prevalent. 65 If, for example,
there ever was a feeling that those who commit strict liability
crimes were somehow morally responsible for the harm they
caused, that feeling has probably been dispelled today: if anything, punishment of these crimes may tend to weaken respect
for law6 6 and must be justified on other grounds. Likewise,
with increasing general understanding of the causes of automobile accidents, public reaction may now frequently depend
in the 1970-71 fiscal year, and a total of $3 million has been paid under a similar
program in New York, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1972, at 2, col. 4. At least seven other
states have enacted victim-compensation programs. Id.
61E.g., Goodhart, Note, 80 L.Q. REV. 18 (1964).
62 See id.
63 See Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1297-98 n.87.

"' The argument that it is unjust to base the extent of liability on the harm
actually caused could also be raised in the law of torts. Theoretically, it would be
more appropriate for everyone to pay into an insurance fund a premium based on
the risks he creates in the course of his activities. Those who suffer injury would
then seek compensation from the fund rather than attempting to impose the entire
loss on the negligent defendants who happened to cause their particular injuries.
We in fact approximate this result in connection with automobile accidents, as insurance premiums commonly vary according to the degree of risk creation (frequency
of driving, safety record, etc.). In the absence of such a framework, however, the
law of torts can properly treat those who cause harm differently from those who do
not, in order to allocate fairly the loss which has befallen the victim. This allocation'
of the loss, fortuitous as between risk-creators, is preferable to an allocation of the
loss which would be fortuitous as between faultless victims.
65 See N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 10, at 17.
66G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, § 89, at 259; H.M. Hart, supra note 34, at 422-25.
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more on "the intrinsic nature of the act of negligence than
67
[on] the results that it may happen to have produced.
Accordingly, there is reason to believe that abandoning
emphasis on the harm caused, at least for most crimes, would
not significantly dissipate public respect for the law and would
in many instances enhance it. And this exposes the most -basic
weakness of the "respect" argument, for even respect for law
is not an end in itself. Those who urge maintenance of such
respect do so primarily so that the criminal law can play an
affirmative role in "sharpening . . . the community's sense of
right and wrong, '6 8 drawing on its store of respect-dissipating
some of it where necessary-to obtain compliance with socially
established norms. Unless it can be shown that a departure
from emphasis on results would substantially undermine respect for the law, it would seem that popular attitudes as such
should be ignored, and the approach adopted should be the
one that is considered sound in principle.
C. Retribution
A number of commentators have sought to justify the
law's emphasis on the occurrence of harm by arguing that
moral fault, the touchstone in the retributive grading of offenses, cannot be measured exclusively by an actor's conduct
and state of mind. Resort is had to the "largely intuitive judgment" that "[t]he successful criminal and the person who engaged in an unsuccessful attempt are in some sense not of
69
equal culpability.
The argument is troublesome on several levels. Not the
least is its basic anti-rationality. A policy so pervasive and important as the law's emphasis upon results might reasonably
be expected to stand upon some fairly weighty reasons capable
of coherent explanation. Still, conceding that it might be a
mistake to insist on a full articulation of the reasons for every
67G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, § 42, at 116. Accord, Lebret, Les Rapports Poses dans
le Droit Pnal Moderne par le D~veloppement des Infractions Non-Intentionnelles (Par Faute),
32 REV. INT. D.P. 1059, 1061-62 (1961); Salingardes, Les Probl~mes Posgs dans le
Droit Pbnal Moderne par le Dveloppement des Infractions Non Intentionnelles (Par Faute),
32 REV. INT. D.P. 1193, 1199 (1961).
61 H.M. Hart, supra note 34, at 401. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 134 (1947). Respect for law may also lead to some marginal improvement
in voluntary compliance. See Fried, Moral Causation, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1258 (1964).
To the extent that this is a factor, the present pattern of law may tend to impede
rather than promote voluntary compliance.
69 Mansfield, Hart and Honori, Causation in the Law-A Comment, 17 VAND. L.
REV. 487, 495 (1964). See also note 15 supra.
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social policy, and conceding that intuitive notions, if widely
felt, could sometimes be taken as valid answers to a human
problem, there nevertheless remains a major difficulty. The
"intuitive judgment" as to culpability cannot claim anything
approaching widespread appeal. As we attempt to fill out the
fact situations upon which the judgment is made, the notion
of a difference in culpability seems more and more implausible. For example, suppose that A and B both shoot their wives,
intending to kill. The bullets lodge in precisely the same area
of the brain in both cases, but while A's wife dies, B's wife is
saved by a miraculous feat of surgery. Is A more culpable
than B? More to the point, can we say with any confidence
that there would be uniform and fairly widespread agreement
with the intuitive proposition that A is more culpable than B?
Surely not.
The example, moreover, is far too kind to existing law; we
might well have supposed quite different conduct by A and B
after the shooting. Suppose that A, who intended to kill at
the time he shot, suddenly decides he has done a terrible thing,
immediately calls a hospital for help, has the country's best
neurosurgeon flown in from a great distance to perform the
operation, and does all else in his power to save his wife. In
spite of everything, she dies. B meanwhile does everything
possible to prevent his wounded wife from being discovered
or treated. But neighbors have heard the shot, the police get
her to the hospital in time, and she recovers. Is A still more
culpable than B? Insistence that there simply is a difference
in culpability will not convince those who neither "feel" this
difference nor comprehend the basis of this feeling in others,
7
and this group is altogether too large to be ignored. 1
Doubts about the soundness of the "intuitive judgment"
are in any event only half of the story. The proposition that
if A is more culpable than B, he should be punished more
severely than B (other things being equal), can be valid only
if retribution (in the sense of condemnation of moral fault)
is accepted as a legitimate function of the criminal law. 7 1 And
even for those who believe that moral culpability should affect
7 See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 11, at 39; N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note
10, at 262; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3, Comment at 44 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)
(criticizing misdemeanor-manslaughter rule); Goodhart, supra note 61, at 19 (quoting
Streatfeild, J.); Comment, The Fallacy and Fortuity of Motor Vehicle Homicide, 41 NEB.
L. REV. 793 (1962). See also text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
71 For the large body of opinion which rejects retribution, the culpability theory
obviously cannot provide a satisfactory explanation. See notes 47-48 supra.
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the severity of punishment, it seems far from evident that this
particular moral judgment, the judgment that A is more culpable than B, is one deserving of propagation and reinforcement through the office of the criminal law.
Where we are dealing with the notion that it is wrong to
steal, or the notion that it is even more wrong to steal by the
use of force, it may make sense to use the criminal law for
"sharpening . .. the community's sense of right and wrong. '7 2
Perhaps there is a value in teaching that it is wrong to cause
harm, and that those who do are blameworthy. But the proposition that A is more culpable than B says much more than this.
It says that of those who commit the same acts, with the same
intentions and the same perceptions as to the risks and consequences of their conduct, the one who actually causes harm
is more culpable than the one who, for whatever reason, does
not. It says, in effect, that the moral quality of an act is determined not only by factors within an actor's knowledge and
control, but also by unseen and unseeable circumstances, by
tle invisible hand of Fate.7 3 To stress the role of an uncontrollable Fate in determining our moral accountability for the
harms we cause seems an unlikely way to serve the utilitarian
objective of preventing harm and the conduct that causes it.
But even in strictly retributive terms, it would seem a perversion of a theory conceived out of concern for moral judgments
of some moment, to use the criminal law for "teaching" the
soundness of a concept of this sort.
One effort to give content to notions of a difference in
culpability has been made with respect to crimes based on reckless or negligent conduct. The argument is that an actor who
creates a risk "ought to pay if the gamble with the lives of
H.M. Hart, supra note 34, at 401.
that this formulation of the proposition is too highly
refined, that the average citizen is unlikely to draw from the criminal law more than
the crude principle that it is wrong to cause harm. It would in fact be useful to have
a study of public perceptions with respect to this point, as well as other moral "lessons" which are said to be communicated by the criminal law. Such a study could
have interesting implications for the "retributive" theory of the criminal law. In the
absence of such a study, it seems reasonable to assume that in the concrete factual
settings in which the problem of emphasis upon results is presented, a good many
of those involved will perceive, however inarticulately, the importance of fortuitous
circumstances in determining legal consequences.
As to the efficacy of the criminal law in changing public morality, or its outward
manifestations in behavior, see P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965);
Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 588 (1968);
Zimring & Hawkins, The Legal Threat as an Instrument of Social Change, 27 J. SOCIAL
IssuEs, No. 2, at 33 (1971).
72

73 It might be objected
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others does not come off," but if his gamble proves successful,
he cannot fairly be subjected to the same penalty. 74 In one
sense this suggestion may be taken to state simply that the
governing test of fair punishment is proportionality to the
harm done; in this sense the argument adds nothing to the
retaliation theories already considered. But viewed as an independent guide to fairness, the argument seems misconceived.
The creation of crimes based on recklessness or negligence
must involve a judgment that the advantages of leaving people
free to create certain risks are outweighed by the inevitable
social costs. Whether varying policy reasons prompt us to subject the underlying conduct, in the absence of a harmful result,
to substantial penalties, to only light penalties, or to no penalty at all, the decision is the same-that these risks ought not
to be taken. Accordingly, the actor cannot be regarded as morally free to determine for himself whether the danger is worth
risking.7 5 When viewed in this light, the culpability of the actor
must stem from his having taken the forbidden risk, and he
cannot claim that fairness requires imposition of a milder penalty simply because the ultimate harm did not materialize.

III.

THE DETERRENCE JUSTIFICATIONS

A number of arguments have been advanced to establish
that emphasis on the harm caused is desirable in terms of
deterrence. An effort to assess these arguments in any but the
most speculative terms faces enormous difficulties, for there is
no solid proof of even the most elementary propositions concerning deterrence. Whether punishment deters certain kinds
of crimes at all, whether more severe penalties produce greater
deterrence, even these basic questions cannot be answered
with confidence. 76 Nor is it clear, even on a purely theoretical
74Goodhart, supra note 61, at 21; Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law,
12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 743 (1960).

75Whatever the merits of the "bad man" theory in an area such as contract or
tort law, see, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897), true
criminal penalties are not ordinarily regarded as merely the price of engaging in
forbidden behavior. And it would be particularly inconsistent to view criminal penalties in this way for purposes of a theory in which punishment is determined by
moral culpability rather than utilitarian considerations. Possible utilitarian arguments
for a criminal penalty which is simply the price of causing a particular harm are considered below. In the case of strict liability crimes, for example, the underlying
conduct is often not condemned as such, and if monetary penalties, whether denominated 'civil' or 'criminal', are properly calculated, they may appropriately serve to
fix a price
for engaging in the activity. See note 291 infra.
6
7 See F. ZIMRING,

PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 10-13 (1971);

Bailey & Smith,

Punishment: Its Severity and Certainty, 63 J. GRIM. L.C. & P.S. 530, 530-31 (1972).
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level, how we should decide just what level of deterrence is
optimal; and if we knew that, we would still face an infinity
of choices as to how to attain it, each option involving a particular penalty or set of different penalties and a particular
distribution of these penalties over the group of all offenders.
Different principles might in turn guide our choice from among
this multiplicity of alternatives-we might choose the one that
minimizes public expenditures (including police, court, and
prison costs), or the one that minimizes inequalities in punishment, or the one that will most easily win legislative approval.
Even if a single principle of selection could be chosen, we might
and probably would find that a number of different deterrence
strategies would be equally "optimal" in terms of this principle.
Present law embodies just one of these strategies. It may
be viewed as a specification of three ranges of penalties for
any type of crime (a high range for causing harm, an intermediate range for attempting or risking the harm, and no
penalty for offenders not apprehended or convicted) together
with a tacit decision as to the proportion of offenders in each of
these categories. We have no assurance that this particular
strategy could qualify as an optimal one, and indeed it would be
rather surprising if it did. In any event, a strategy not involving
the distinction based on harm (but some other mix of penalties
and distributions) could well be every bit as close to optimal, and
the theory would provide no basis for preferring one of these
strategies to the other. It therefore seems unlikely that any
rigorous analysis of deterrence policy could clearly favor (or
disfavor) emphasis on results, or provide any theoretically
satisfying overview of optimal policy on this issue.
Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of present
law and the arguments for emphasis on results must therefore
proceed on a level more akin to minor tinkering with thirdrate equipment. Deterrence strategies of all kinds presumably
seek to influence potential offenders at a point at which they
embark on a certain course of conduct, with certain perceptions
as to the likely consequences of that conduct. There is therefore at least some basis for starting with an assumption that
where the conduct and the actor's perceptions as to its consequences are the same, the penalty should be the same. The
present section aspires only to examine with the limited tools
available the possible reasons for departing from this assumption, in an effort to determine whether the arguments are at
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least valid in their own terms or whether they instead suggest
reasons for ignoring rather than emphasizing the actual result.
A.

"Characteristicalness"

Though of little practical importance, a point made by
Bentham deserves brief mention. He argued that punishment
should, where possible, have the attribute of "characteristicalness": a penalty analogous to the harm done to the victim will
be less easily forgotten and thus will better serve as a moral
lesson, reducing the likelihood of repetition. 77 As Bentham
himself conceded, however, imposition of an "analogous" penalty is likely to be impractical or too harsh in most cases.7 8 And
although penalties will perhaps be forgotten if they are too
mild, it may be doubted whether a criminal will forget more
quickly the experience of being imprisoned or of paying a
substantial fine merely because it is unlike the experience suffered by his victim.
B.

The Incentive to Desist

A more substantial argument is that by punishing more
severely when greater harm is caused, the law provides an
incentive for the actor to desist from his unlawful course of
conduct. This argument is most often advanced to justify higher penalties for completed crimes than for incompleted attempts. 7" The argument might also be thought to justify less
severe punishment for reckless or negligent conduct that does
not produce harm, and even for completed but unsuccessful
attempts. In both cases the law would provide an incentive,
even at the last moment, for the actor to change his course of
action in order to avoid or mitigate the harm-by restraining
a blow, shifting his aim, or taking other steps that might in
themselves be too ambiguous or imperceptible to prove a
change of purpose.8 0 The incentive would also be preserved
7

J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION
192-93
(Oxford ed. 1876).
7

TO THE. PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

8 Id. 193.

7'

See text accompanying note 33 supra.

80 The possible ambiguity of such actions might also suggest that the conduct

of an unsuccessful actor was less dangerous from the viewpoint of the actor himself
than the conduct of the successful actor even though the discernible facts (apart
from the result) indicate that the conduct was the same. The implications of this
reasoning are explored below. See text accompanying notes 293-334 infra. The

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1497

beyond the "last" moment, giving the actor a reason to aid his
own victim, as in the case of our attempters A and B, 1 at a
time when the attempt itself might be considered "complete"
and punishable regardless of any change of heart by the
actor.

82

Although it is desirable that there be some incentive to
desist, considerations other than the potential penalty already
provide very substantial incentives. For some types of crime
(violation of health and safety regulations, for example) the
occurrence of harm can greatly increase the chances of apprehension and prosecution. Similarly, potential liability in tort
may be a significant deterrent for some types of conduct and
for some kinds of actors. Most important of all, when the
decision to desist can actually be proved, the actor will usually
have a corhplete defense to the charge of attempt; he is then
subject to no criminal penalty at all.8 3 In view of these factors,
the additional incentive provided by differences between the
penalty for the successful crime and the unsuccessful attempt
may have very little impact on conduct. 4 Moreover, whatever
present argument focuses not on the question whether the successful actor or his
conduct can be considered more dangerous, but rather on the question whether
the structure of penalties can itself influence the likelihood of success.
"' See text accompanying note 70 supra.
82 Perkins urges recognition of "abandonment" of purpose as a defense to a
charge of attempt, provided the abandonment is voluntary and not prompted by
external factors such as discovery by the police. But he notes:
There are definite limitations of course. Attempted murder cannot be purged
after the victim has been wounded, no matter what may cause the plan to
be abandoned. And probably the same is true after a shot has been fired
with intent to kill.
R. PERKINS, supra note 9, at 590. The Model Penal Code defense of "renunciation of
criminal purpose," § 5.01(4), could be read as available even after shooting or
wounding of the victim, but the commentary states:
[Blecause of the importance of encouraging desistance in the final stages
of the attempt, the defense is allowed even where the last proximate act has
occurred but the criminal result can be avoided-e.g., where the fuse has
been lit but can still be stamped out. If, however, the actor has gone so far
that he has put in motion forces which he is powerless to stop [wounding??],
then the attempt has been completed and cannot be abandoned. In accord
with existing law, the actor can gain no immunity for this completed effort
(e.g., firing at the intended victim and missing); all he can do is desist from
making a second attempt.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4), Comment at 73 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) (footnote
omitted).
8See R. PERKINS, supra note 9, at 589-90; MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (Official

Draft 1962).
84Each added incentive should make it somewhat more likely that the actor will
desist. Cf Wdlder, The Principle of Multiple Function: Observations on Over-Determination,
5 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 45 (1936). For present purposes, however, the crucial question
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impact may exist must be considered in light of the possibility
that mitigation of the penalty where noharm occurs could
85
tend to decrease deterrence under some circumstances.
Whether this effect will outweigh the tendency of the lower
penalty to induce a decision to desist under other circumstances
is by no means clear as an intuitive matter, and empirical evidence as to the net impact of a lower penalty is lacking.
These weaknesses in the incentive-to-desist rationale may
not be conclusive in the case of the incompleted attempt. The
inducement has a direct impact upon conduct because the
actor can easily take it into consideration when deciding whether to take the final necessary 'step; the deterrence sacrificed
by treating such cases less severely is probably minimal since
those who do not desist will pass this stage and hold no hope
of qualifying for its milder penalties.
Mitigation in this case cannot, however, be attributed simply to the lack of harm; rather, the differentiating factor is
the lack of an act that the defendant knows to be necessary.
Although the defendant cannot prove actual renunciation of
purpose, his conduct is less dangerous and his intention to
complete the crime necessarily less definitely fixed when he
86
has not carried out the final essential act.
Where this final'step has been taken, the justification for
a lower penalty as an incentive to desist becomes much weaker.
In cases of so-called "extrinsic impossibility"-such as the attempt to pick an empty pocket-failure could not be ascribed
to a last-minute decision to desist under any circumstances.
With respect to reckless or negligent conduct, the motivation
to desist is probably very strong in any event; the actor, to the
extent that he is aware of the danger at all, will still wish to
avoid tort liability for injury to others, not to mention the possibility of injury to himself. And even if recklessness or negligence is a crime as such, the chances of apprehension and
prosecution no doubt increase substantially when harm is
caused. For some purposeful crimes, perhaps murder under
some circumstances, the actor's chance of avoiding detection
may be greater if he is successful and there may accordingly
is whether the added likelihood is significant enough to offset the disadvantages of
leniency.
8See text accompanying note 149 infra.
86
See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543-44 (1968) (Black, J., concurring);
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, §§ 1,2 (general reasons for the requirement of an act).
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be a special need to provide an inducement to desist. But on
the whole such situations are likely to be rare. 7 Unless .workable categories can be pinpointed, it would seem better to
treat all completed attempts as a group for grading purposes,
and a lower penalty for this group would on the whole be
unnecessary (if not counterproductive) as an incentive to desist.
In spite of the relatively concrete factors that could justify
a distinction between completed and incompleted attempts for
grading purposes, present law does not appear to make this
distinction. 8 The same is true even under the Model Penal
Code, which treats both completed and incompleted attempts
as equal in seriousness to the completed crime in most instances.8s9 A lower penalty for completed but unsuccessful attempts than for successful attempts seems even less justified
as an incentive, in view of the potential adverse effects in terms
of deterrence and the highly speculative possibility that a decision to desist was made when no evidence apart from the lack
of harm supports this inference.
C. Jury Nullification
Probably the most important justification based on deterrence is the one advanced by the American Law Institute in its
Model Penal Code. The argument deserves careful attention
and is worth quoting in full:
How far a Model Code ought to attribute importance in the grading of offenses to the actual result
of conduct, as distinguished from results attempted
or threatened, presents an issue of some difficulty
which is of general importance in the Code. It may
be said, however, that distinctions of this order are
to some extent essential, at least when the severest
sanctions are involved. For juries will not lightly find
convictions that will lead to the severest types of sentences unless the resentments caused by the infliction
of important injuries have been aroused. Whatever
abstract logic may suggest, a prudent legislator cannot
disregard these facts of life in the enactment of a
penal code.
8"

See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 1, at 572.

88See R. PERKINS, supra note 9, at 557-61. The soundness of this position is a

question beyond the scope of this Article since the two categories do not involve
conduct that is (from the actor's perspective) identical.
89 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(1), 5.05(1) (Official Draft 1962).
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It may be added that attributing importance to
the actual result does not substantially detract from
the deterrent efficacy of the law, at least in dealing
with cases of purposeful misconduct. One who attempts to kill and thus expects to bring about the
result punishable by the gravest penalty, is unlikely
to be influenced in his behavior by the treatment that
the law provides for those who fail in such attempts;
his expectation is that he is going to succeed. 90
The first paragraph of the ALI argument asserts that a
penal code should not establish standards that may be nullified
in practice by the jury, and that in order to achieve the necessary level of deterrence while avoiding jury nullification, heavy
penalties must be limited to cases in which harm occurs. This
position requires some comment. After all, still greater deterrence might be achieved by authorizing the heavier range of
penalties across the board; frequent nullification would not
prevent occasional convictions even when no harm results.
But nullification would generate disrespect for the law, disguise the standards that are operative in practice, and could
lead to acquittals where conviction on a lesser ("attempt")
charge might have been had. 9 1
Where nullification did not occur, moreover, the unsuccessful attempters singled out for punishment might tend to
be members of particular racial or social groups. If the element of harm is no more relevant to punishment than the
color of the defendant's skin, penalties imposed on the basis
of harm would be as discriminatory in principle as those imposed according to racial prejudices of the jury. An uneven
distribution of penalties, even if purely random, raises difficult equal protection problems, which cannot be casually relegated to the domain of "abstract logic."' 92 And what we have
here is not entirely random, but rather the result of unleashing the jury's emotional response to an irrelevant factor. A
legislature that permits this to occur so that juries will "lightly
find convictions [sic]" should perhaps not be commended for
its prudence. There is, however, an undoubted difference of
degree. Discrimination on the basis of race or social class is
90 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03, Comment at 134 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (citation omitted). For a more detailed presentation of the argument, see Michael &
Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1295-98.
" See Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1265, 1268.
'2 See text accompanying notes 226-81 infra.
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discrimination of a particularly sensitive kind; in this context
it would universally be regarded as invidious. It therefore
seems appropriate, while seeking to increase deterrence, to
avoid any approach that would involve frequent jury nullification.
The ALI argument nevertheless turns upon two essentially
factual assumptions-first, that jury nullification would actually
become commonplace if penalties of the necessary severity
were applicable across the board; and second, that in these
cases, imposing the more severe penalty where harm occurs
will produce a significantly greater deterrent effect than imposing the milder penalty across the board. Both of these
assumptions must be valid in order to justify the ALI position,
yet virtually no evidence is offered with respect to either one.
It therefore seems worthwhile to examine each of them in some
detail.
The sections that follow consider these questions at length.
One conclusion that emerges is that additional deterrence can
often be gained, as the ALI claims, by imposing an added
penalty where harm occurs, and jury nullification is indeed
a serious problem in many areas of the law. To this extent the
analysis provides strong support for the ALI argument. But
we will also find that the nullification and deterrence assumptions are rarely satisfied simultaneously-in situations, for
example, where nullification does appear likely, added deterrence through the extra penalty appears relatively unlikely.
As a result, the analysis suggests that in only a few cases can
the ALI argument provide a satisfying justification for emphasis on results.
1. A Note on Nullification
The problem of nullification is probably most serious in
the case of crimes subject to the death penalty. During Coke's
time, efforts were occasionally made to punish unsuccessful
attempts to kill as murder, but this approach was considered
too severe and was soon abandoned. 93 The effort was apparently based on the doctrine that "the will was to be taken for
the deed when it was accomplished by overt acts clearly indicating the intention. ' 94 In effect, therefore, murder had been
equated not only with completed attempts, but also with in932 J. STEPHEN, supra note 8, at 222-23.
94Id. 222.
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completed attempts and perhaps even with conduct that would
today be considered "mere preparation." The feeling of excessive severity was probably due as much to the lack of suffi95
ciently dangerous behavior as to the lack of actual harm.
Today, the death penalty, particularly if mandatory, would
probably be thought too harsh a punishment for most serious
crimes, and frequent jury nullification might result unless its
applicability was limited to cases in which death actually occurred. A few crimes involving serious danger might be well
enough understood by the general public that juries would not
recoil from the death penalty, even in the absence of proof of
actual deaths. Espionage for a foreign power during wartime
has always been punishable by death; 96 the danger to the nation
and the risk that lives may be lost has been considered sufficient to justify the supreme penalty, in selected cases, even
in the absence of proof as to the actual harm. 97 But instances
such as these may be explained in part by an assumption by
judge or jury that deaths have in fact occurred. For example,
in imposing the death penalty after the espionage conviction
of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, the trial judge stated:
I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of
the Russians the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb has
already caused, in my opinion, the Communist agression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding
50,000 . . .. 98
Severe punishment for crimes such as espionage may
therefore reflect little more than a common retaliatory response, coupled with a desire to avoid the elusive problems
of causation and proof that would be presented if loss of life
were formally made an element of the offense. Where the
actual consequences of high-risk criminal conduct are readily
ascertainable-as in the case of "skyjacking," for examplejury resistance to the death penalty might still be significant
unless death has in fact resulted.
95 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
96War and National Defense Act, ch. 30, tit. I, § 2, 40 Stat. 218 (1917), as amended,
18 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (1970) (imprisonment for any number of years is also available).
97 Recent proposals that sellers of hard drugs be punished more severely than
murderers (although not by the death penalty, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1973, § 1,
at 1, col. 8) seem to embody a similar recognition that the magnitude of the danger
justifies the most stringent penalties, regardless of actual harm.
" United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605-06 n.28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 838 (1952).
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Apart from the capital crimes, there are few intentional
crimes for which jury nullification would be likely to pose a
significant problem in the absence of harm. The danger seems
remote where the statutory harm required for the completed
crime does not prompt the emotional response associated with
death or bodily injury; an attempt to bribe, for example, might
well arouse as much public resentment as successful bribery
later discovered. Moreover, in the case of crimes involving
serious moral fault, the defendant's culpability alone may
arouse sufficient resentment to permit imposition of most noncapital penalties. 99
Nullification is most often said to pose a significant problem when reckless or negligent conduct is made criminal. In
vehicle homicide cases, for example, the penalties imposed
for manslaughter were thought far too severe in relation to
the culpability of the defendants, and the reluctance of juries
to convict created serious enforcement problems. 0 0 The English experience was similar. 0 1 These, however, are situations
in which harm did occur. Far from supporting the ALI view
as to the likelihood of jury resistance in the absence of harm,
they suggest that the legislature's freedom to prescribe punishment is greatly circumscribed even for cases in which death
or serious injury results. Given these limitations, the extent
to which the penalties that can be imposed for causing harm
will exceed the penalties possible in the absence of harm may
have been exaggerated. Nevertheless, the penalties likely to
strike a jury as too harsh in a reckless driving case, if no harm
has occurred, are probably lower .than those that would represent the borderline of acceptability in a vehicle homicide case.
" Thus many statutes authorize very severe penalties for certain attempts, and
in numerous cases heavy penalties have been imposed under them. Indeed, defendants convicted of an attempt have sometimes received sentences in excess of those
authorized for the corresponding completed crime. See, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 252
N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 1969) (defendant sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for "entering to commit a felony"; maximum sentence applicable to the completed crime would
have been five years); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Ore. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955)
(defendant sentenced to life imprisonment for assault with intent to rape; maximum
sentence for rape was 20 years); cf. Dembowski v. State, 240 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 1968)
(defendant sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for robbery; maximum sentence
for armed robbery was 20 years). In both Hobbs and Cannon, the appellate courts
refused to allow the sentence to exceed the maximum applicable to the completed
crime, and in Dembowski the court refused to allow the sentence for a lesser completed offense to exceed the maximum for a greater offense.
100See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comment at 53-54 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
101See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, § 42, at 120 & n.20. See also Fitzgerald,
Crime, Sin and Negligence, 79 L.Q. REv. 351 (1963).
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Thus for many crimes involving recklessness or negligence,
the penalties possible without nullification probably are significantly greater for conduct causing harm.
A more comprehensive picture of the nullification problem
is provided by the Kalven and Zeisel study of jury trials in
criminal cases.10 2 Taking the disposition that the judge would
10 3
have made as a baseline that reasonably reflects "the law,"'
they found that the jury "nullifies" the law in twenty-eight
percent of all cases, being more lenient in twenty-four percent of
the cases and more severe in four percent. 10 4 Although significant differences among various crimes do appear, nullification
occurs frequently for almost all crimes.' 0 5 The study examines a
number of other factors, 227 in all, that might -account for
judge-jury disagreements. The factors fall into five broad
categories-evidence factors, facts only the judge knew, disparity
of counsel, jury sentiments about the individual defendant, and
jury sentiments about the law. All five seem to play some role in
accounting for judge-jury disagreements, with several different
reasons usually combining to help explain a given instance of
disagreement.' 6 The evidence factors were by far the most
important, but usually appeared together with some other
factor; apparently the "closeness" of the evidence frequently had
the effect of "liberating" the jury to respond to other elements in
the case.' 0 7 Of particular interest to us is the pattern of
nullification in cases involving certain jury sentiments about the
law, in particular notions related to severity of punishment, to
the absence of harm, and to the unpopularity of the crime.
102H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). The study, designed
specifically to yield information on the reasons why juries frequently decide cases
differently from the way the judge would have decided them, was based on an analysis of 3,576 criminal jury trials conducted during 1954-55 and 1958, and chosen
essentially at random. Id. 33 & nn.l, 34.

1iId. 10.
104
Id. 68.
1051d. 69-75. Judge-jury disagreement reaches 31% for drunken driving cases
(jury leniency respresenting 28%), id. 71, but where serious harm has occurred (the
penalties ordinarily being higher), the results are similar. Disagreement is 30% for
negligent homicide cases (jury leniency 28%), id. 69, and reaches 41% in both manslaughter and murder prosecutions (jury leniency 35% for each), id. 69. Kalven
and Zeisel conclude: "[W]hat disagreement exists today between judge and jury does
not arise because of the impact of one or two particularly unpopular crime categories. Rather, the jury's disagreement is distributed widely and diffusely over all
crime categories. The jury's war with the law is now a polite one." Id. 76 (footnote
omitted).
106See id. 104-16. On the possibility that disagreements were over-determined,
see id. 99-100.
07
' 1 See id. 163-67.
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Severity of the threatened punishment was found to be a
frequent reason for judge-jury disagreements. A factor for a
variety of crimes, it was particularly obvious in negligent homicide cases, and evidence that it played a role in drunken driving cases was found "substantial and striking."1 08 It was also
noted, however, that the jury's assumptions about the potential
penalty were frequently misguided. Ordinarily the jury was
not officially advised about the penalty, even in the rare trials
(one and a half percent of the total) in which specific inquiry
about it was made.'" In a group of negligent homicide cases,
the study found the jury to be guessing at the sanctions and
assuming, erroneously in fact, that "since death is involved,
[the penalty] will be serious." 110
The study unfortunately lumps together jurisdictions having a wide variety of potential maximum sentences. It does
not permit us to determine whether higher penalties for negligent homicide in some states were associated with a higher
incidence of nullification, and if so, how much the penalties
that seem acceptable exceed the penalties acceptable in drunken driving cases not involving harm. One very revealing indication, however, is provided by repeated evidence of jury
resistance to conviction in drunken driving cases if the sanctions included mandatory loss of the driver's license for a full
year. As drivers themselves, the jurors were generally aware
of this requirement and viewed it as a severe hardship, particularly where the defendant needed his car for work."' It
seems most unlikely that license suspension would prompt
jury resistance in negligent homicide cases, although even
here, nullification apparently did in some instances result from
jury feelings that a conviction would interfere with job or
12
education.1
Another jury sentiment that frequently helped account for
nullification was the notion that the wrong or injury in a particular case was de minimis. Surprisingly, however, cases in
which the jury apparently considered the harm trivial were
distributed widely over the various crime categories; about
seventy-five percent of these de minimis reactions occurred
in prosecutions for serious crimes (including murder, which
08
d. 308.
10 9 d. 307 & n.4.
0

' °Id. 308.

11'See id. 309-10.
...
See id. 306-07 & n.2.
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alone accounted for ten percent of the de minimis disagreements). 1 3 Nullification occurred where death or serious injuries resulted from drunken brawls, barroom fights, or even
where "one Indian kill[ed] another Indian."1 1 4 Nullification
where the victim was "contributorily negligent" or "assumed
the risk" 1 5 seems to reflect a similar view that the harm to the
community was trivial because of the character or behavior of
the victim.
Of special interest are the de minimis disagreements in
cases where the dangerousness of the act was high but the
actual harm was small or non-existent, for example, where
the defendant made restitution or where the charge was limited to drunken or reckless driving. In these situations significant nullification due to the lack of serious harm was observed." t 6 The de minimis disagreements did not, however,
show up very clearly in connection with unsuccessful attempts.
Although Kalven and Zeisel state that the no-harm rationale
might be expected to extend to such cases, "[i]n only an occasional case .

.

. can we detect this type of jury reaction."'

17

Only

three such de minimis disagreements are in fact noted, and in
two of them the attempt was not even "complete"; in one of
the incompleted attempts the judge explained the disagreement by noting "no harm done," but also observed, "Jury
8
felt that [victim] was not in real danger.""1
The final factor of relevance for present purposes is jury
dislike for certain laws. Here drunken driving is high on the
list."19 Laws punishing inadvertent conduct, such as vehicle
homicide statutes, also were subject to significant jury hostility. Occasionally this sentiment was mixed with a reaction to
the evidentiary problems of proving "wanton negligence," or0
2
with a lack of sympathy for a contributorily negligent victim.'

But frequently it was clear that refusal to convict resulted from
a more general jury hostility to condemning negligent conduct
13

1 Id. 260-61.

114Id. 282-84.
115 See id. 242-57.

116 See id. 263-64, 266-70.

117 1d. 267.
'I1 Id.

" 9 Judges reported that in 20% of the cases the law is regarded as "too severe"
in their communities. Id. 287. Excessive severity is apparently seen not only in the
penalties prescribed, but also in the low alcohol level considered sufficient to establish
"intoxication," in hostility to the use of drunkometers to obtain evidence, and in the
failure0 to require proof of actually dangerous driving. See id. 294.
12 Id. 325.
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as criminal, in a case of death or serious injury. 121
We have thus far discussed only the factors that help to
account for jury leniency. It is also interesting to examine the
cases in which jury "nullification" took the form of a verdict
more severe than that which "the law" (as seen by the judge)
called for. These cases of greater jury severity represented four
percent of all cases tried (jury leniency accounted for twentyfour percent and judge-jury agreement for seventy-two percent),1 22 and the severity usually stuck, since, surprisingly, the
more severe jury verdicts were only rarely set aside by the
23
judge.
The severity cases reveal an interesting ambivalence in the
jury's attitude toward inadvertent conduct. As previously mentioned, jury leniency in negligent homicide cases was frequently attributed to a reluctance to view such conduct as criminal.
But negligent homicide cases were also the occasion for jury
severity, usually in the form of convictions on evidence the
judge considered inadequate. "The circumstance in these cases
that alienates the jury is obvious: harm is done."' 2 4
Use of the Kalven and Zeisel findings for present purposes presents a number of difficulties.125 The study only describes reaction to existing laws; it does not and cannot provide
accurate data on what nullification would look like if existing
penalties for attempt, for drunken driving, or for negligent
homicide were radically changed. In addition, the study was
designed to provide systematic data only on the reasons for
disagreements. Many of the factors (such as contributory negli121 See id.326-28.

122
Id.68.
123Verdicts are set aside in only 10% of the jury severity cases, id. 412, possibly
because evidentiary factors are present in nearly all of them, id.378. Apparently,
the evidentiary doubts not only "liberate" the jury, as in the leniency cases, to respond
to legally irrelevant elements in the case, see id.495, but also tend to insulate even
this more severe "nullification" from correction by the judge.
124 Id.407.
125 First, of course, is the question whether the 3,576 cases studied present an
accurate picture of the roughly 60,000 criminal jury trials conducted in the United
States during the period studied. Id. 12. On this score, there is strong reason to believe that the sample is a valid one. See id.33-441. There is also a semantic question
whether the judge-jury disagreements reported by Kalven and Zeisel represent
"nullification" at all, since most of these disagreements involved close cases, not jury
defiance of the clear dictates of the evidence. Still, 21% of the disagreements came
in cases where the facts were clear, and another 45% involved evidentiary factors
that merely "liberated" the jury to respond to legally irrelevant factors. Id. 116.
These situations involve precisely the kind of jury resistance to conviction that was
of concern to the ALI.
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gence) may also have been present in agreement cases, but the
study does not indicate how often this was so, except where
the presence or absence of the particular factor is obvious from
the nature of the crime itself, as the factor of a death in a homicide case. 12 6 Thus we can get a rough idea of the portion of
the disagreement cases explained by a certain factor, but there
is generally no way to tell how often that factor will lead to
"nullification" rather than agreement in the cases where it is
127
present.
The Kalven and Zeisel findings nevertheless provide a
number of important insights into the nullification process.
Nullification is clearly not a phenomenon that occurs only
when pickpockets are subject to the death penalty or when
careless drivers are subject to long prison sentences. Nullification occurs with substantial frequency in virtually all crime
categories. It is not explained solely by penalties perceived
as too severe, but by a great variety of factors that evoke a
sympathetic or hostile jury response. Some of these factors,
such as the race of the defendant and victim, could not be
given explicit recognition in a civilized penal code. Other factors could conceivably be incorporated as aggravating or mitigating elements, but often are not. The occurrence of harm
is undoubtedly among these factors, as are a whole host of
others. Juries apparently will not "lightly find convictions"
where the victim was contributorily negligent or where the
defendant has made restitution, but we ordinarily proceed on
the theory that some nullification is better than a departure
from sound policy in all cases. Against this background, the
specter of nullification can hardly suffice, in and of itself, to
justify deference to community attitudes with respect to harm
caused. What is required is a careful evaluation of just how
often nullification is likely to occur, in cases not involving
harm, and in what ways it is likely to differ from the gardenvariety nullification that is such a common feature of the jurytrial system.
In this connection it seems significant that virtually no
nullification was attributed to lack of harm in prosecutions
126The study does not separately identify attempts in its analysis of specific
crimes. Attempted robbery would be included in the robbery category; attempted
murder, on the other hand, was probably listed in most instances as "aggravated
assault," a category that can include completed attempts to kill as well as serious
cases of assault and battery that do not actually endanger life.
127 See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 102, at 102 & n.33.
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for attempt.1 1 8 This could simply mean that the common practice of punishing attempts less severely is well attuned to community attitudes; but given the wide variety of approaches to
attempt penalties in the different states, we should expect on
this hypothesis to see some nullification emerging somewhere.
That we do not lends strong support to the intuitive conclusion1 29 that absence of harm is unlikely to lead to nullification
in the case of intentional crimes.
With respect to crimes of recklessness or negligence, the
Kalven and Zeisel findings tell a different story. Absence of
harm emerged as a definite obstacle to conviction in drunken
driving cases, particularly when lengthy license suspension
was involved; presumably the nullification rate would be substantially higher if the sanctions involved in negligent homicide cases were applicable. Even so, the sanction of license
suspension seemed to have particular impact because so many
jurors knew about it; the effect of longer prison sentences in
drunken driving cases might be less 30acute because jurors might
not be so familiar with the sanction.'
Attributing significance to harm caused in these negligence
cases not only prevented undue jury leniency in some instances
but, as we have seen, led to undue jury severity in others. The
incidence of these jury-severity cases was of course quite small,
only two percent of the negligent homicide cases, for example. 13 1 Yet only fifty-two percent of the negligent homicide
cases resulted in "proper" convictions, on which judge and
jury agreed.' 32 Even if we assume that reliance on the harm
that occurred was necessary to obtain every one of these convictions, we are in the position of convicting one "innocent"
defendant (one whom the judge would not have convicted) for
every twenty-six "guilty" defendants (those the judge would
128 The study unfortunately does not indicate whether a significant number of
attempts was covered in the sample, nor does it provide any comparison of completed to incompleted attempts.
2. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
,30 To the extent that this is true and that jurors would be at least as knowledgeable on this subject as the population as a whole, the deterrent efficacy of such sentences would, of course, be called to question.
tat H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 102, at 69. The result in this instance is
apparently not statistically significant, but since jury severity occurs in all crime
categories (averaging 4% overall) it seems plausible to expect jury severity of at least
this magnitude in the negligent homicide cases.
32
1 Id. The figure includes the 5% of the cases in which the jury convicted of a
lesser offense while the judge would have convicted on a more serious charge. Only
47% of the cases resulted, in complete judge-jury agreement for conviction.
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have convicted), 33 an uncomfortable ratio in terms of the lip
service usually given to the number of guilty people we should
be willing to let free to avoid a single unjust conviction. The
ALI's expression of a desire for juries that "lightly find convictions" thus turns out to be not simply an unfortunate choice
of words but rather an accurate and revealing indication of
what can take place when the law attempts to make use of the
13 4
resentments aroused by serious injuries.
This analysis of nullification suggests that the problem
is not likely to arise with any significant frequency in certain
important situations, notably prosecutions for unsuccessful
attempts, and the likelihood of nullification seems particularly
small where the completed crime would not involve serious
physical injury in any event. On the other hand, the nullification danger does appear serious in cases not involving major
harm, if the crime is based on recklessness or negligence, or
if the crime is subject to the death penalty. We turn now to an
examination of the second ALI assumption-that imposition
of an added penalty where harm occurs will yield greater
deterrence than imposition of the penalty applicable to cases
not involving harm.
2.

A Note on Deterrence

The ALI rationale set forth at the beginning of this section
argues that imposing a lower penalty in the absence of actual
harm will not substantially reduce the deterrent impact of
the law, "at least in dealing with cases of purposeful misconduct."' 13 The qualification is a curious one, since for most
cases of purposeful misconduct the penalty provided by the
Code does not vary according to the actual result; attempts
are generally made subject to the same sanction as the com36
pleted crime.'
,' For every 100 cases, there were 46 acquittals and 54 convictions, of which
two convictions were "wrong" in terms of what the judge would have done, and 52
were "proper." Thus two out of every 52 convictions (or one out of every 26) involved an "innocent" defendant.
"'Jury "severity" of this kind might persist, even if the actual result were made
irrelevant to the grading of the offense, so long as the jury continued to learn the
extent of the harm caused. Evidence of the actual harm could, however, be excluded
as immaterial, unless it was relevant in evaluating the dangerousness of the underlying conduct. Cf. text accompanying notes 322-34 infra.
135See text accompanying note 90 supra.
136 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (Official Draft 1962). The provision states,
however, that an attempt to commit a felony of the first degree constitutes only a
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Rather than focusing on possible inconsistencies in the
Code, however, it seems more useful to examine the deterrence assumption comprehensively. To do so we will refer to
the ALI view just stated as the equal deterrence hypothesisnamely, that imposition of a given penalty X for cases involving harm and a lower penalty (say !AX) for similar cases not
involving harm will yield substantially the same deterrence
as imposition of the same penalty X for all such cases, whether
or not harm occurs. It is apparent, however, that the ALI's
jury nullification argument can have force even if this stringent condition is not satisfied: so long as the higher penalty
X applicable where harm occurs yields more deterrence than
could be obtained by imposing the lower sanction ('/X) across
the board, there remains some reason for distinguishing on
the basis of results. The added deterrence hypothesis holds that
this less stringent condition can be satisfied. The confirmed
opponent of emphasis on results must deny the validity of both
the equal deterrence and added deterrence hypotheses. His
harm hater's hypothesis maintains that the, amount of deterrence
achieved is solely a function of the penalty applicable to the
underlying conduct in the absence of harm.
These warring views can be summarized by the following
table, which presents a hypothetical crime rate asserted to
result from each of three different penalty structures.

Table 1
Penalty Structure
Harm

P-1
P-2
P-3

2 years
2 years
1 year

No Harm

2 years
1 year
1 year

Crimes per 100,000 Population
Equal Deterrence Added Deterrence Harm Hater's
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Hypothesis

40
40
50

40
45
50

40
50
50

As the table shows, the ALI's equal deterrence hypothesis
asserts that P-2 yields the same deterrence as P-I and is thus
preferable (being less severe). But in the context of the jury
nullification argument, P-1 by hypothesis involves an unacceptfelony of the second degree. The rationale for this exception is discussed in connection with the "frugality" concept, at text accompanying notes 221-86 infra.
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able level of nullification and is thus excluded in any event.1 3 7
The issue is whether P-2 is preferable to P-3. Since the added
deterrence hypothesis provides a more general basis for believing that it is, this hypothesis must be our ultimate concern
in the present section. We will have occasion to focus exclusively on the more restrictive equal deterrence hypothesis
in considering the "frugality" arguments for preferring P-1
1 38
to P-2 in cases where P-1 is indeed a workable alternative.
For present purposes it is worth bearing in mind that despite
the notion of leniency implicit in the ALI rationale, the jury
nullification argument does not necessarily imply mitigation
of harsh penalties but rather a preference for P-2, with its allegedly greater deterrent effect (and greater severity), over P-3.
In view of the lack of firm knowledge as to even the more
elementary questions about deterrence, an evaluation of the
relatively complex added deterrence hypothesis can aspire
only to rather modest goals. Still, we can indicate those areas
in which the probable validity or invalidity of the hypothesis
is strong enough to serve as a basis for sensible judgment. The
pages that follow suggest that while the added deterrence hypothesis appears quite likely to be valid in the case of intentional crimes, it seems unlikely to hold for crimes of recklessness, negligence, or strict liability. These conclusions, together
with those reached with respect to nullification, provide the
basis for the overall assessment of the jury nullification argument that will be made in section 3.139
a. Deterrence and the Death Penalty
We begin our examination with the somewhat special
problem of capital punishment. Studies have usually focused
on the question whether the death penalty provides a more
effective deterrent than life imprisonment for a given type
of crime. For our purposes the issue is somewhat different,
since the claim is that whatever the penalty applicable to a
given type of conduct (life imprisonment or something less),
the deterrent effect can be increased by imposing the death
penalty where the conduct causes death. In these terms, however, the issue fails to focus on the special nature of the death
penalty-if there is an added deterrent effect, the same effect
might have been produced by a penalty of life imprisonment
M"
See text

accompanying note 92 supra.

'1 See text accompanying notes 282-86 infra.

139 Text accompanying notes 202-05 infra.
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where the conduct causes death. It will be convenient, therefore, to limit ourselves for the moment to the traditional question whether the death penalty-where harm occurs-yields
more deterrence than life imprisonment-where harm occurs.
We will then proceed to consider the question whether life
imprisonment or any other harsh sentence-where harm occurs
-can yield more deterrence than the more lenient penalty
applicable in the absence of harm.
The debate over the deterrent effect of capital punishment has been extensive and the conclusions are generally
well known.1 40 Intuitive reasoning strongly suggests that the
death penalty must be a more effective deterrent than life
imprisonment, at least for certain categories of offenders and
for certain types of crimes. Various surveys showing that convicted felons claim they went unarmed or tried to avoid lethal
actions, out of fear of the death penalty, tend to confirm this
view. 14 1 On the other hand, a great number of empirical
studies have been done on the question and not one of them
confirms this reasoning; the studies all fail to provide evidence
that the death penalty has a significant deterrent effect.142 It
has been argued that the studies provide affirmative evidence
to the contrary-that the death penalty has no deterrent effect, 143 but most observers refuse to go this far, stressing that
the studies are imperfect in various respects and cannot provide definitive conclusions.' 4 4 The studies, moreover, deal
almost exclusively with the effect of the death penalty on the
homicide rate. It has been noted that there is no research whatsoever on the possible deterrent effect of the death penalty
45
for such crimes as rape, kidnapping, or airplane hijacking.
With so many studies, done in so many different ways, all
pointing in the same direction, a majority of the Supreme
140

See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 345-54 (1972)

(Marshall, J.,

concurring); Bedau, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Reconsideration, 61

J.

CRINI.

L.C. & P.S. 539 (1970).
141 See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 120 n.1 (H. Bedau ed. 1964).
42
1 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 353-54 & n.124 (Marshall, J.,

concurring);

Bedau, The Question of Deterrence, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 258-74 (H.

Bedau ed. 1964). Recent research, as yet unpublished, may have detected a very
slight deterrent effect of the death penalty upon the rate of change in the homicide
rate. See Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence, 1973 (unpublished paper in
School of Business Management, University of Chicago).
14
a E.g., T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959); Bedau, supra note 140.

"I See, e.g.,

H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 54-89; Van den Haag, On Deterrence
and the Death Penalty, 60J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 141 (1969).
11 Bedau, supra note 142.
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Court concluded in Furman v. Georgia146 that the deterrent
effect of capital punishment, as then administered, could not
be regarded as significant for purposes of constitutional decision. Even many of those who question the propriety of the
Furman decision would agree that, from a legislative perspective, the death penalty should not be regarded as an effective
deterrent. 14 7 Whatever the need for more information and
more refined studies, this seems the only prudent course in
the present state of knowledge. Returning to our added deterrence hypothesis, therefore, for purposes of determining penal
policy we should assume that the death penalty, as administered at the time of Furman, provides no deterrent effect
beyond that produced by life imprisonment.
Whether the added deterrence hypothesis could be sustained under other systems of administering capital punishment is a different question. None of the empirical studies
indicates whether a mandatory death penalty would have a measurable deterrent effect. On this point we are therefore reduced to almost purely intuitive speculation. If a mandatory
death penalty were in fact imposed about as frequently as the
former discretionary penalties-either because of jury nullification or other resistance within the criminal justice system 148
-and if this were perceived by those who might commit capital
crimes, the deterrent effect would most likely be no greater
than that produced by the pre-Furman system. If, on the other
hand, the mandatory death sentence were frequently applied
in a given class of cases, the deterrent effect could conceivably
be greater than that produced by life imprisonment. For purposes of the present analysis, it will therefore be assumed that
a mandatory death penalty could have an added deterrent
effect, though the lack of any recent experience with such
penalties makes it impossible to know whether this would
prove true and if so, for which categories of crimes.
We turn next to a consideration of the factors that bear
on the validity of the added deterrence hypothesis in the case
of criminal sanctions generally.
146408 U.S. 238 (1972).

117 Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148 Such factors have been cited as major reasons for abolition or restriction of
the mandatory death sentence. See, e.g., R. BYE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 47-56 (1919); Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey, 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1, 28-35 (1964); Shapley, Does Capital Punishment Prevent Convictions?, 43

Am. L. REv. 321 (1909); Note, The Penalty in Pennsylvania for Murder in the First
Degree, 7 TEMPLE L. Q. 330 (1933).
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b. Deterrence and Intentional Crimes
The case of intentional crimes should be considered separately. Here the ALI and the Michael and Wechsler article
on which it relies espouse the extreme equal deterrence hypothesis-that imposition of a lower penalty for the unsuccessful attempt will not weaken deterrence to any substantial
degree since the actor expects to succeed. Undeterred by the
penalty applicable to the completed crime, he is not likely to
be deterred by the prospect of being punished just as severely
if he fails. Though intuitively plausible, the argument requires
a number of qualifications. For one thing, the penalty applicable to an attempt might prompt reflection that would otherwise be postponed until too late; or it might be influential if, as
is true in many murder situations, the chances of apprehen14 9
sion are low when the actor succeeds but high when he fails.
It is hard to know just how many murder situations present a higher risk of apprehension in the event of failure, but
in these cases the ALI approach would seem to yield less effective deterrence. Similarly, the risk of apprehension may
substantially increase with failure in the case of crimes frequently investigated by police decoys or related techniques,
crimes such as prostitution and drug offenses. Here apprehension may be unlikely unless the prospective "victim" turns
out to be a policeman or informant, but then there will be no
"harm," and the charge will have to be framed in terms of
attempt or a related inchoate offense. Again, the penalty applicable to the unsuccessful attempt could play a major role
in establishing the deterrent effect.
More generally, the penalty applicable to an attempt would
seem significant in any calculus of the benefits and risks of a
given criminal plan. An opportunity involving great benefits
and great risks in the case of success, with smaller risks in case
of failure, is obviously more attractive than an opportunity
involving great risks and benefits in the case of success and
equally great risks in case of failure. Whether the logic of this
situation would have an impact on behavior in many cases
may be questioned, but the point probably has force for economic crimes, where it is perhaps more common for a plan to
150
be carefully thought out.
14. The ALI apparently was aware of the need for these qualifications, but considered them of minor importance, see Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 1, at 972.
190 See Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. Cms. L.C. & P.S.
176, 191-92 (1952).
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In light of all these possibilities, it seems most difficult to
accept the equal deterrence hypothesis-that a policy of more
lenient punishment for attempts would have no significant
cost in terms of deterrence. On the other hand, it does seem
reasonable to assume that such a policy would yield a considerably greater deterrent effect than a policy of imposing the
more lenient sanction for all intentional crimes, whether successful or not. The added deterrence hypothesis therefore
seems quite plausible for this category of crimes.
c. Deterrence and Crimes of Recklessness, Negligence, and
Strict Liability
It is sometimes argued that the equal deterrence hypothesis holds even when the actor is merely reckless, negligent,
or not demonstrably careless at all with respect to the possibility
of causing a statutory harm.' 5 ' This seems to overstate the
case considerably. Where the - actor behaves recklessly, consciously creating an unjustifiable risk but expecting that harm
will not result, he will also expect to avoid the penalty for causing harm. The severity of the latter penalty could affect his
willingness to take the risk, but as the risk of harm diminishes,
the actor's risk of suffering the penalty applicable in case of
harm inevitably diminishes too. Hence even an actor who is
fully aware of the applicable sanctions, and fully rational in
his response to them, will tend to be less affected by the penalty
for harm as the risk of harm diminishes.
Moreover, the tendency for the deterrent effect to diminish as the risk of harm diminishes is probably reinforced by
the natural inclinations of at least many people to discount
1

'E.g., 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 8, at 311-12; Goodhart, supra note 61, at 21.
With respect to "reckless" conduct, the position of Michael and Wechsler is unclear.
They begin by claiming that the equal deterrence hypothesis "holds to some extent
in the case of those who may consciously create unjustifiable risks of death, although
they do not intend to kill." They then divide this class of persons into two categories
-those who "act on the supposition that the result will be fortunate rather than
unfortunate," and those who "expect death to occur while hoping that it will not."
For the former group, Michael and Wechsler find a substantial loss of deterrence
in not punishing as severely in the absence of harm; for the latter group they find
no significant loss of deterrence. See Michael and Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1295-96.
But only the former type of conduct would be considered "reckless" as that term is
used here and in the Model Penal Code. Conduct of the latter kind is "intentional"
for purposes of our analysis ("knowing" under the Code). In present terms, therefore, the Michael and Wechsler argument simply reiterates their position with respect
to intentional conduct and does not claim validity for the equal deterrence hypothesis
in the case of reckless conduct. They do, however, assert that the equal deterrence
hypothesis holds with respect to negligent conduct. Id. 1296-97.
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even the perceived risks and to assume that they personally
will not be the ones to suffer misfortunes that are, for the
group, statistically inevitable. Their subjective perception of
the probability of suffering the penalty in question may be far
lower than the facts warrant. Deterrence theory has taken
account of this instinct at least since the time of Becarria, who
observed: "[I]t is the nature of mankind to be terrified at the
approach of the smallest inevitable evil, whilst hope, the best
gift of Heaven, hath the power of dispelling the apprehension
of a greater ....
-152 Of course, not everyone will react this
way; people may be naturally optimistic or pessimistic. The
way in which they evaluate or "discount" a potential sanction
may differ considerably.15 3 But many psychologists apparently
believe that true pessimists are relatively few, and that most
people tend to be overly4 optimistic in assessing their chances
15
of avoiding misfortune.
Some people, moreover, will regard the very absence of
severe penalties for the underlying conduct as authorizing
the commission of such acts by anyone willing to take his
chances on avoiding the ultimate harm. Indeed, this viewpoint
is implicit in the erroneous but nonetheless revealing argument
that an actor who takes his chances and luckily avoids harm
15 5
is somehow less culpable than the one who causes injury.
In view of all these factors, it seems clear that more lenient
treatment of reckless conduct when it does not cause harm will
have a definite cost in terms of deterrence.
A similar analysis would seem to apply to those who create
risks inadvertently. Michael and Wechsler considered it "hardly
likely that the legal threat will be a much more efficacious
deterrent if persons of that sort know that they will be punished as severely if their acts do not have fatal results as if they
do."' 56 This seems erroneous. Admittedly, the deterrent potential of legal sanctions is generally much weaker here than
in the case of reckless conduct. In the latter case the actor is
actually aware of the facts that would subject him to liability.
Critics of offenses based on negligence and strict liability have
152

C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 94 (1872).

53 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 101-04 (1973).
154See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYsIs 56-57 (1970). See also B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 190-91
(1953) on the importance of consistency and the consequences of imposing punishment only in an intermittent fashion.
155 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
156 Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1297.
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argued that if the actor does not advert to a given risk, penalizing his conduct cannot force him to be more careful. 157 But if
it is assumed that penalizing .carelessness can force people to
be more alert, 158 it seems likely that the deterrent impact of
a penalty would tend to be less when the penalty is contingent,
even in terms of facts the actor should have realized, than when
the penalty is certain from the same viewpoint. In addition, it
would seem that the deterrent effect of a penalty imposed
only for causing harm would tend to diminish as the risk of
harm (in terms of circumstances of which the actor should be
aware) diminishes and as the extent to which the actor actually
adverts to this risk diminishes. Finally, this tendency of deterrence to diminish as the degree of risk and the degree of the
actor's advertence to the risk diminishes will presumably be
reinforced by the natural tendency of many people to discount
such contingencies.

159

These principles apply with equal force in the case of
strict liability crimes.' 60 When the actor's failure to perceive
the risk of harm is altogether reasonable, it seems very doubtful (for the reasons indicated previously) that his conduct will
be affected by penalties imposed for causing harm. On the
other hand, the alternative of simply relying upon the penalty
applicable to the underlying conduct is not ordinarily available
here, as it was for reckless or negligent conduct, since the
apparently careful conduct may violate no definable legal
norm. As a result, the very small or even imperceptible gain
in deterrence could be thought preferable (apart from the
constraints of other principles) to the alternative of no deterrence at all for this class of cases.
Apart from this limited exception, however, the alternative
of punishing the underlying conduct will ordinarily be' avail5 E.g., G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 122-24; Hall, Negligent Behavior Should
Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 632, 641-42 (1963); H.M. HART,
supra note 34, at 421-22.
18 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment at 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955); Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 749-51; cf. Wasserstrom, supra note
74, at 735-37 (strict liability can add to deterrence).
159 See text accompanying notes 152-54 supra.
160 Strict liability penalties may be applicable to those who have consciously created
an unjustifiable risk, and the deterrent impact upon people in this class could be
even greater (due to ease in obtaining convictions) than that resulting from a crime
requiring proof of recklessness. But aside from the advantages of a less difficult
burden of proof, an issue that will be separately considered (see text accompanying
notes 287-91 infra), the deterrent impact upon conduct of this kind is analytically
much the same as the deterrent impact on penalties for recklessness.
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able, and it seems clear that punishing such conduct less severely, or not at all, will have a definite cost in terms of deterrence. The difficult problem is to determine just how great
this cost is likely to be.
As we have seen, the deterrent effect of a sanction applicable only when harm occurs appears likely to diminish as the
risk of harm and the extent to which the actor adverts to this
risk diminish. For a group of cases where the risk of harm (in
terms of the circumstances of which the actor should be aware)
is the same, the deterrent effect of such a sanction will tend
to be greatest upon reckless conduct, less upon negligent conduct, and still less upon conduct without fault. It is less easy
to generalize about variations in the degree of risk over various categories of crimes. It is instructive, however, to examine
two of the most important areas, vehicle homicide and felony
murder.
Felony murder is perhaps the one strict liability crime
for which we assume a high probability that one engaging
"carefully" in the underlying activity will nevertheless cause
harm. Here the activity, usually one of the particularly dangerous felonies, is thought to involve a special risk of killing even
though the actor (or even those who view the event after the
fact) may not perceive this risk as particularly high.
As Holmes somewhat half-heartedly put it:
If the object of the [felony-.murder] rule is to prevent
such [fatal] accidents, it should make accidental killing
with firearms murder, not accidental killing in the
effort to steal; while if its object is to prevent stealing,
it would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot.
Still, the law is intelligible as it stands. . . . If certain acts are regarded as peculiarly dangerous under
certain circumstances, a legislator may make them
punishable if done under these circumstances,
al16 1
though the danger was not generally known.
In fact, however, even those felonies that are supposed
to be "peculiarly dangerous" result in fatalities only very infrequently. Although national statistics on this point apparently
are not available, surveys by the District of Columbia Crime
Commission showed that only about one percent of all forcible
rapes, and less than one-half of one percent of all robberies
161

O.W. HoLMES, supra note 11, at 48-49.
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end in homicide. 162 With respect to burglary, figures on fatalities are not available, but the statistics show that nationally
only two and a half percent of the residential burglaries lead
to any confrontation with the occupant. 16 3 Even for those engaged in "dangerous" felonies, therefore, the risk of causing
a fatality, and thus facing felony-murder sanctions, seems quite
low.
The risk of harm is probably smaller still in vehicle homicide situations. An accident involving personal injury occurs
roughly only once in every 225,000 vehicle miles, and a fatality
only once in every 18,000,000 vehicle miles.' 64 The frequency
would no doubt be much higher in terms of fatalities per mile
of criminally negligent driving, but it still seems likely that the
odds of a fatality occurring are quite low. Drunken driving
alone led to roughly 556,000 arrests in 1970,165 and yet the
total number of traffic fatalities attributed to excessive drinking was estimated between 18,000 and 28,000.166 There was
thus at most only a five percent chance that conduct of this
sort would result in death, and this ignores all the instances of
drunken driving that did not lead to an arrest.' 67 Under these
circumstances, the deterrent impact of a sanction applicable
only when harm occurs would seem to be extremely attenuated.
The deterrent effect of criminal penalties is further attenuated by one other factor, probably unique to the traffic offense situation. In the event of a serious collision, the "punishment" to be expected includes, apart from any of the legal
sanctions, damage to the defendant's own property, and the
likelihood of serious physical injury to himself. In fact, the
driver who creates a homicidal risk ordinarily endangers his
162 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE,

THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 19 (1967).

16 3 Id. Another estimate, based on Philadelphia statistics for 1948-52, showed
that only 0.59% of all robberies, 0.35% of all rapes, and 0.0036% of all burglaries
ended in a homicide. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 201.2(1)(b), Comment at 38 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959).
164 See Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67
MICH. L. REV. 421, 431-32 (1969).
165 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED

STATEs-19 7 0, at 119 [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS].
166 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 343.
167 The 5% ratio of deaths to drunken driving is, of course, improperly understated to the extent that the arrests include instances of drunken driving that did
not present any risk of fatal injury. But it seems unlikely that such cases were more
numerous than the many instances of drunken and highly dangerous driving that
went undetected. In addition, the 5% ratio is overstated to the extent that single
instances of drunken driving caused more than one fatality.
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own life as much as that of third parties. Such a driver presumably considers the risk of an accident exceedingly remote, if
he thinks of it at all. 168 If these potentially disastrous consequences have been insufficient to deter him, it seems most implausible that he could be influenced by any additional sanction, even lengthy imprisonment, also applicable only upon
the occurrence of harm.' 69 Under these circumstances the
extreme harm hater's hypothesis appears to hold-penalties
applicable only in the event of a fatality seem to add virtually
nothing to the deterrence achieved by penalties applicable to
the underlying offense.
It is much more difficult to reach firm conclusions as to
the validity of the added deterrence hypothesis with respect to
crimes of recklessness, negligence, and strict liability in general.
In effect, the issue is an aspect of the broader question of the
importance of certainty and severity in determining the deterrent effect of sanctions. Research on this problem has not
reached anything approaching a precise answer, but it is worth
outlining briefly the extent to which the available information
bears on the special problem of emphasis on results.
d. Certainty vs. Severity
Deterrence theory has generally assumed that more severe
sanctions yield greater deterrence, other things being equal.
Likewise, more effective methods of detecting and solving
crime, of proving guilt, and of obtaining convictions are assumed to increase the perceived certainty of punishment and
thereby increase the deterrent impact of the law. The problem
is to determine the relative importance of these two clearly
significant factors.
To facilitate the analysis, we will draw upon recent efforts
to specify with greater precision the variables that should affect the deterrent impact of a sanction under classic deterrence
theory. An individual's personal evaluation of the seriousness
of a particular legal threat can usefully be viewed as his expected
disutility from the threatened sanction. Classic deterrence
theory assumes that the greater the expected disutility, the
greater the deterrent effect. The expected disutility is assumed
to depend in turn upon at least two factors: the individual's
168Cramton, supra note 164, at 432.
169Significantly, one very thorough analysis of the factors contributing to deterrence of dangerous driving does not even mention the sanctions applicable for
manslaughter or vehicle homicide. See id.
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perception of the severity of the sanction (perceived severity),
and his perception of the probability of its imposition (perceived
certainty). Recent theory introduces a third factor, the individual's personal attitude toward risk (risk preference). Two legal
threats, one perceived as involving a one-tenth chance of a
ten-year prison sentence and the other perceived as involving
certain imposition of a one-year prison sentence, may not be
viewed as equally undesirable (that is, having equal expected
disutility) by all individuals. Those who prefer the one-tenth
chance of a ten-year sentence are thought of as risk-preferring,
those who prefer a one-year sentence for sure are thought of as riskaverse, and those who are indifferent between the two threats
are thought of as risk-neutral.'7 0 The final factors are the two
most subject to manipulation by public policy-the actual severity and actual certainty of the threatened sanction. Perceived
certainty and severity are usually assumed to depend upon
actual certainty and severity,' 7 ' but the concepts are by no
means identical.
The claim of the equal deterrence hypothesis is, in these
terms, that imposing a sanction only when harm occurs can
produce essentially the same expected disutility as punishing
the underlying conduct to the same extent in the absence of
harm. The actual severity under the two alternatives will be
the same, and it seems reasonable to assume that the perceived
severity will also be the same. The actual certainty is not the
same. In the case of attempts, the perceived certainty could
be the same (in some situations) 1'7 2 since the actor "expects to
succeed." But with respect to nonintentional crimes, the actor's
expectation is not to cause harm, and therefore, whatever the
relation between actual and perceived certainty, it seems necessary to suppose that the perceived certainty would be greater
when the additional penalty applies in all cases than when it
73
applies only if harm occurs.'

M70

See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
178 (1968). In some analyses, an attempt is made to compare the severity of sanctions
in terms of their effective monetary cost (representing lost earnings and other factors). E.g., Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES
259, 262-63 (1972). Risk preference is then determined with reference to the monetary severity of the sanction.
17' Becker appears to ignore the distinction altogether. Becker, supra. note 170,
at 176-79. Ehrlich assumes that actual and perceived certainty are linearly related.
Ehrlich, supra note 170, at 263 n. 11.
172 See text accompanying note 149 supra.
173 See text accompanying notes 151-55 supra.
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Since perceived severity is the same for the two alternatives, while perceived certainty is greater when the penalty
applies in all cases, the expected disutility must also be greater
in the latter situation, other things being equal. The conclusion
holds, moreover, regardless of the actor's attitude toward risk
-even the risk-averse individual presumably prefers a situation offering greater hope of avoiding a given penalty to one
offering less hope of avoiding the same penalty.
While the implausibility of the equal deterrence hypothesis
is easily seen when it is put in these terms, it is not so simple
to evaluate the added deterrence hypothesis and determine the
extent to which imposition of relatively severe penalties, on a
relatively infrequent basis, can have a meaningful deterrent
effect. Three sources help shed light on this question-historic-al evidence, statistical analysis, and risk preference analysis.
(i) Historical Evidence
Past experience in observing the effects of changes in
enforcement policy has repeatedly suggested that actual certainty of punishment is far more important than actual severity
in achieving effective deterrence. In nineteenth century England, for example, inefficient law enforcement provided significant chances for pickpockets to avoid apprehension. Petty
crime multiplied even though anyone who was caught faced,
and often suffered, the death penalty. The solution apparently
17 4
lay in making the penalties milder but less easily avoided.
The importance of certainty was dramatically exemplified in
Denmark during the Second World War. German occupation
forces arrested the Copenhagen police en masse, and citizen
groups then established vigilante committees to detect and
apprehend offenders. Although the penalties either remained
the same or increased, the crime rate soared. This was particularly true in the case of crimes such as robbery and burglary,
where the victim could rarely identify the offender, making
apprehension difficult. The crime rate for categories in which
the offender was more easily identified did not increase markedly. 175 Several other experiences that similarly support the
importance of certainty have been recorded, although none of
74
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them permits a full understanding of the variables that might
7 6
account for the changes observed.1
(ii)

Statistical Analysis

Recently, a number of studies have made use of statistical
techniques in an attempt to determine with greater precision
the relative importance of severity and certainty. These
studies have engendered further skepticism as to the value
of severity and prompted recommendations of much greater
reliance upon certainty of punishment to achieve desired levels
of deterrence.17 7 The studies therefore warrant careful consideration in terms of the present problem, although they
prove in the end somewhat inconclusive for our purposes.
The essence of the approach, known as regression analysis,
is to postulate a precise mathematical relationship among the
variables to be studied and then compute the degree to which
the postulated relationship fits the actual data.' 7 8 The statistician obtains an index, called R2 , of how good this approximation or "fit" is, with R 2 close to 1.00 for a very good fit and close
to zero for a very poor fit. An R2 of 0.20 would mean, for example, that a postulated equation explains at most only twenty
percent of the observed changes in the crime rate; the equation
thus must omit significant variables or misrepresent the way
they interact.
Among the first of these attempts was a series of studies
of certainty, severity, and the crime rate for murder. 17 1 All
the studies found an inverse correlation between murder rates
and both certainty and severity; higher indices of severity and
certainty tended to be associated with lower murder rates,
& G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 68-70.
17"E.g., Wilson, If Every Criminal Knew He Would Be Punished If Caught ...
N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 1973 § 6 (Magazine), at 9.
,M8For example, one might suppose that the crime rate C for a given offense
could be determined by an equation in the form:
C = a + bP + dS
where P is the probability of punishment (certainty), S is the severlty of punishment,
and a, b, and d represent constants (b and d determining the relative weights of
P and S). Using the observed values for C, P, and S, the statistician then computes
the values of a, b, and d for which the equation will most closely approximate the
observed data. See generally J. JOHNSTON, ECONOMETRIC METHODS (2d ed. 1972). A
cogent summary of the procedure appears in Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1442, 1444-45 (1973).
176 F. ZIMRING

"9 Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 SOCIAL SCIENCE Q. 515 (1968);

Gray & Martin, Punishment and Deterrence: Another Analysis of Gibbs' Data, 50 SOCIAL
SCIENCE Q. 389 (1969); Bean & Cushing, Criminal Homicide, Punishment, and Deterrence: Methodological and Substantive Reconsiderations, 52 SOCIAL SCIENCE Q. 277 (1971).
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and the certainty and severity variables were found about equal
in importance. But the correlations were only of moderate
strength-high indices of severity and certainty were by no
means consistently and invariably associated with low crime
rates.
In a 1969 study, Tittle attempted to apply a similar approach to an analysis of the seven FBI "Index Grimes"murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and auto
theft.18 0 This time the results were more surprising, for while
the study confirmed the negative correlation between certainty
and the seven crime rates, and between severity and the murder rate, it found a positive correlation between severity and
the rates for all six of the other index crimes. The greater the
severity, in other words, the higher the crime rate was. At least
four follow-up studies, employing a variety of statistical refinements, sought to pin down these conclusions and to explain
the surprising results obtained with respect to severity. 1 8 ' The
confusing and often contradictory conclusions of these studies
may stem in part from their use of relatively simple linear
equations'8 2 and from their narrow focus upon only two of
the many factors that could influence crime rates. R 2 values
for these models are uniformly low, generally less than 0.30.
Policy recommendations can scarcely be drawn from such inconclusive studies.
Standing on somewhat firmer ground is the work of Isaac
Ehrlich.18 3 Ehrlich develops an economic model of criminal
behavior, analogizing the offender's decision to commit a crime
to a business firm's decision to supply a product. He then postulates an equation in the form of a non-linear "Cobb-Douglas"
production function, 8 4 as a model of the "supply of crimes"
function, and includes a great variety of factors that could
180 Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 409 (1969).

181Antunes & Hunt, The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment on
Levels of Crime in American States: An Extended Analysis, 1972 (unpublished
paper of the Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University); Bailey & Smith,
Punishment: Its Severity and Certainty, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 530 (1972); Chiricos &
Waldo, Punishment and Crime: An Examination of Some Empirical Evidence, 18 SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 200 (1970); Logan, General Deterrent Effects of Imprisonment, 51 SOCIAL
FORCES 64 (1972).
182In a few instances, somewhat more complex relationships were investigated.

E.g., Logan, supra note 181, at 65-66.
183Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973). See also Ehrlich, supra note 170.
184 See generally J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 79-88 (2d ed. 1971).
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influence differences in crime rates among the states.18 5 Perhaps surprisingly, Ehrlich's econometric model actually seems2
to work. Using 1960 statistics, for example, he reports an R
of .87 for murder and .70 for the seven Index Crimes combined.1 8 6 In view of these results, Ehrlich's computations deserve careful consideration. His figures are summarized in
Table 2, which sets forth the coefficients (or relative weights)
18 7
associated with the certainty and severity variables.

Table 2

Coefficients Associated with Certainty and Severity
by Offense, 1960 data.
Offense
Murder
Rape
Assault
Robbery
Burglary
Larceny
Auto Theft

Certainty
-0.85
-0.90
-0.72
-1.30
-0.72
-0.37
-0.41

Severity
-0.09
-0.40
-0.98
-0.37
-1.13
-0.60
-0.25

As the table shows, the coefficients for severity are quite
low for several crime categories, but they are substantial for
many others-the coefficient of -0.60 for larceny means, for
example, that for every ten percent increase in the average
penalty for larceny, the crime rate should (according to the
model) decrease by six percent. The coefficients for certainty
are more uniformly substantial and are far greater than the se185 In addition to differences in certainty and severity, Ehrlich considers levels

of income, unemployment, and education; racial, age, and sex composition of the
population; as well as regional and urban/rural variables. Ehrlich, supra note 183,
at 544.
86

1 Id. 546.
187 Id. 550-51. The coefficients presented are those resulting from the "two-stage

least-squares" (2SLS) analysis. Technically speaking, the R 2 figures cited in the text
are derived from an "ordinary least-squares" (OLS) analysis and apply only to the
coefficients reported for this analysis. The 2SLS procedure introduces refinements
that make its coefficients more reliable than those of the OLS, but it is not possible
to obtain an R 2 measurement for this approach. Note also that these coefficients do
not represent simple linear coefficients of the kind discussed in note 178 supra. Here
each coefficient represents an "elasticity," or percentage change in the dependent
variable that will result from a given percentage change in the independent variable.
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verity coefficients in the cases of murder, rape, robbery, and
auto theft. But it appears difficult to generalize. The importance of severity seems roughly to equal that of certainty in the
assault category, and it substantially exceeds that of certainty
for cases of larceny and burglary.
Even the relatively successful Ehrlich model must, in any
event, be approached with great caution. Like all the studies,
its data are drawn from the Uniform Crime Reports. The statistics
thus suffer from understatement, improper categorization,
lack of comparability between states, and other imperfections. 8 8 The ratios used to measure certainty and severity are
imprecise in other respects.18 9" "Spurious" and "serial" correlations '90 may also render the results misleading; the Ehrlich
study goes to great lengths to filter out these effects, but it is
impossible to know whether all possible causal interrelationships have been properly accounted for. Under these circumstances it is difficult to have confidence in the precise values
of the certainty and severity coefficients.' 9 1 It nevertheless
seems possible to conclude, contrary to some of the previous
statistical studies, that severity does have a significant deterrent
effect (and one more important than that of certainty) for
several of the crimes examined. To this extent, the added
'See Wolfgang, Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal, 111 U. PA. L. REv.
708 (1963).
"I See Bailey & Smith, supra note 181, at 533-35.
:"Spurious correlations arise when systematic relationships among the variables result from the arithmetic alone. The crime rate C, for example, is computed
by dividing the number of crimes Q by the population N. But certainty P is computed
by dividing the number of convictions K by the number of crimes-the same Q.
Thus, an underestimation of Q necessarily lowers C and raises P; lower crimes rates
will tend to be associated with higher certainty rates without regard to any causal
connection between the two.
As the result of a serial correlation, an observed correlation may be the net result
of relationships between cause and effect running in two opposing directions, not
simply one causal effect in the direction supposed. For example, a high crime rate
might itself be a cause of low certainty rates. As more crimes are committed, the
additional burden on police, prosecutors, and courts could cause the percentage of
offenders apprehended, tried, and convicted to fall; the higher crime rate would
be associated with a lower certainty rate even though the drop in certainty of conviction did not, by weakening deterrence, "cause" the rise in crime. Similarly, a high
crime rate could cause low severity rates. Rising absolute numbers of convictions
might lead to overcrowding in the jails and pressure on judges and parole boards
to impose shorter average sentences. The resulting lower index of severity would be
correlated with the higher crime rate, but the leniency did not "cause" crime to
increase.
"' Not only do the 2SLS and OLS techniques, see note 187 supra, yield differing
values for the coefficients, but Ehrlich makes use of a third technique, apparently
a refinement on the 2SLS procedure, that produces still different figures. The orders
of magnitude are generally (though not uniformly) consistent.
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deterrence hypothesis finds important confirmation. On the
other hand, there are several crime categories for which certainty does appear far more important, and for which drastic
increases in severity would seem necessary to produce a meaningful decrease in the crime rate.
Unfortunately, none of the studies considers crimes other
than the seven FBI Index Crimes. There remains an acute
need for direct focus upon crimes of negligence and strict
liability.19 2 One approach would be simply to replicate the previous statistical studies, using data for negligent manslaughter
or any other non-intentional crime for which statistics could
be obtained. It would be of great interest to determine the
extent to which a behavioral model like that used by Ehrlich
retains its explanatory power when applied to crimes of negligence, and to consider in this light the relevance of deterrence
theory for conduct of this kind. Such a model could also be
compared to one in which an offense like vehicle homicide is
treated as sui generis, with the "crime" rate postulated to be
a function of factors specially related to highway safety. Analysis of this kind might provide a basis for confirming the intuitive conclusion' 9 3 that penalties applicable to vehicle homicide
can add little or nothing to whatever deterrence may be
achieved by the certainty and severity of punishment for the
19 4
underlying risk-creation offenses.
(iii)

Risk Preference Analysis

The concept of risk preference provides another basis
for studying the relative importance of certainty and severity.
It can be shown that a fifty percent increase in perceived severity, together with an equivalent decrease in perceived certainty,
will decrease the expected disutility for a risk-preferring individual while increasing it for a risk-avoider. 9 5 Accordingly,
by investigating the attitudes of potential offenders toward
risk, we can obtain useful information as to the likely relative
effectiveness of increasing certainty or severity.
192 The social toll exacted by'such crimes is substantial in relation to other criminal activity; traffic fatalities attributable to alcohol are estimated, for example, to
represent twice the number of all non-vehicle homicides. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 343.

'93 See text accompanying notes 164-69 supra.
154 For a comprehensive discussion of research possibilities in this area, see F. ZIMRING
& G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 343-46, 356-59; Cramton, supra note 164, at 449-52.
195Becker, supra note 170, at 178.
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One effort to apply such an approach is a recent analysis
of the question whether more effective antitrust enforcement
could be achieved by raising fines or raising the probability
of conviction. 196 The authors, both economists, survey the
literature from Schumpeter to Galbraith, dealing with the
evolution of the entrepreneurial spirit in corporate managers.
They note the recurrent conclusion that today's businessmen,
particularly in the larger firms, are primarily concerned with
minimizing risk, not embarking on bold adventures with the
hope of fabulous returns. Sociologists and political scientists
who have made similar findings are also cited. On this basis,
the authors conclude:
In terms of our earlier analysis, these factors have
caused the risk preferrers of the late nineteenth century to become the risk avoiders of the 1970's.
The implications of this attitudinal change for
antitrust policy are clear. Policy designers should be
highly sensitive to this change in risk attitude, realizing in line with our earlier analysis that a risk averse
management is more likely to be deterred by high
financial penalties than by a high probability of detection and conviction with accompanying penalties
not severe. Thus, in the framework of current attitudes toward risk, the deterrent benefits of a policy
of raised fines far outweigh the deterrent benefits
97
of expending additional enforcement resources.'
Unfortunately, as a guide to enforcement policy, such an
analysis seems seriously flawed. A trend toward more and
more cautious attitudes cannot tell us whether corporate managers have passed from a state of risk preference, over the
line of risk neutrality, to a state of risk aversion in its technical
sense. Conceivably nineteenth century managers could have
been very strongly risk preferring while those of today could
exhibit attitudes only slightly to the risk preference side of
perfect neutrality.
Even if we can assume that corporate managers do indeed
exhibit attitudes of risk aversion in the technical sense, there
remains a basic non sequitur, for few if any individuals are
risk averse in all ways and at all times. Risk aversion is defined
196Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic
Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1973).
197Id. 705-06.
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with respect to a particular set of penalties or rewards. There
is no guarantee that an individual who is risk averse in his
attitude toward one set of consequences will be risk averse in
his attitude toward all others, or even that someone risk averse
with respect to very large monetary losses will also be risk
averse with respect to small ones. A single individual may, for
example, purchase insurance against fire (thus exhibiting risk
aversion) and at the same time buy a state lottery ticket (thus
8
exhibiting risk preference).1'
Accordingly, even if corporate managers are indeed risk
averse with respect to the behavior studied (presumably their
investment decisions in pursuit of business profits), the sources
relied upon cannot tell us whether these managers will also
be risk averse with respect to different behavior-compliance
with legal rules in order to avoid criminal fines. There may
even be reasons for risk attitudes to be quite different-the
corporate community may not condemn failure to avoid antitrust violations as severely as failure to avoid costly mistakes
of business judgment, or antitrust penalties (at least for some
kinds of violations) might come home to roost much too slowly to jeopardize the careers of the corporate managers involved.t""

Another difficulty results from the failure of this sort of
risk preference approach to consider the relationship between
perceived and actual certainty and severity. As previously indicated, an individual is defined to be risk averse if an increase
in the perceived severity of punishment produces a greater
deterrent effect (greater expected disutility) than an equal increase in perceived certainty. Individuals who are risk averse
in this technical sense are by definition more effectively deterred
by a given increase in perceived severity than by the same
increase in perceived certainty. But the risk preference analysis attempts to move from this tautological truth to the further
"9s If the insurance company has properly computed its premiums, the amount
paid for insurance should exceed the discounted value of potential loss. Similarly,
in a properly managed lottery, the amount paid for a ticket should exceed the discounted value of the potential prize.
,9 The authors themselves argue for fining the company rather than the individuals responsible for the violation, because the latter might be too difficult to
identify. Breit & Elzinga, supra note 196, at 709-10. This difficulty of pinpointing
responsibility could substantially affect the risk attitudes of the individuals concerned. If individual penalties were contemplated, the risk preference analysis would
again need to be refined, since a manager's risk attitudes in acts potentially affecting
his employer could be quite different from his risk attitudes in actions that might
affect him personally.
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proposition that for proportionate changes in actual certainty
and severity, risk-averse individuals are more effectively deterred by changes in the latter. This second proposition is
valid only if perceived certainty and severity respond in the
same way to changes in actual certainty and severity, and we
have strong grounds for believing that this is not the case.2 °°
It may be that significant increases in actual certainty generate
disproportionately large increases in perceived certainty. Similarly, where actual certainty is sharply reduced, perceived certainty may reach such a low level that, for practical purposes,
even risk averse individuals are virtually unaffected by changes
in severity.
If this is true, then the risk preference analysis remains
incomplete. An effort to evaluate deterrence policies on the
basis of attitudes toward risk would have to include careful
study not only of risk preference but also of perceptions as
to certainty and severity, 20 and the sensitivity of these perceptions to changes in actual enforcement policy. An analysis
of this kind might indeed indicate that where risk aversion
predominates, greater severity in sanctions would yield substantial additional deterrence. But it might also suggest that
such an effect is more likely to be achieved, even given risk
aversion, by small improvements in actual certainty or simply
by publicity and related measures designed to affect perceived
certainty directly. Studies of this kind would provide a promising avenue for evaluating alternative approaches to improving
the deterrent effectiveness of the law.
3.

Some Conclusions with Respect to Jury
Nullification and Deterrence

We have seen that a major rationale for emphasis on
results, the one we have called the 'Jury nullification" or "ALI"
argument, rests upon two factual premises. The first is that
200 See text accompanying notes 152-54 supra. Ehrlich assumes, in order to provide a basis for empirically testing his model, that actual certainty (for which there
is data) is linearly related to perceived certainty (which is the relevant concept in
his theory). See Ehrlich, supra note 170, at 263 n.11. If this assumption is false, his
conclusions as to the risk attitudes of various classes of criminals, see, e.g., Ehrlich,
supra note 183, at 552-53, could be erroneous.
201 See, e.g., Claster, Comparison of Risk Perception between Delinquents and NonDelinquents, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 80 (1967); Waldo & Chiricos, Perceived Penal
Sanction and Self-Reported Criminality: A Neglected Approach to Deterrence Research, 19
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 522 (1972).
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where severe penalties are applicable to conduct not causing
harm, juries will nullify the law by refusing to convict in a
substantial percentage of the cases. The second is that a policy
of invoking severe penalties in those cases in which harm
occurs will yield significantly greater deterrence than a policy
of applying only a milder sanction (one not likely to prompt
nullification) in all cases whether or not involving harm.
We have also seen that the nullification premise and the
added deterrence premise must both be valid in any given
situation in order to justify a result-oriented structure of penalties. If severe penalties across the board would prompt nullification, but severe penalties limited to cases of harm do not
increase deterrence, then the additional penalty for causing
harm serves no purpose. Nullification can be avoided, while
achieving the same level of deterrence, by simply applying
the milder penalty across the board.2 0 2 Conversely, if an additional penalty in cases of harm will provide additional deterrence, but extension of this penalty to cases not involving harm
will not prompt nullification, the rationale again fails to provide a reason for not treating both situations alike, here by
simply applying the more severe penalties across the board.
Some other reason would be needed to justify the distinction.
When our conclusions with respect to jury nullification
and added deterrence are studied from this viewpoint, the
lack of symmetry between the two premises is striking. If the
crime requires intent to cause harm, the additional penalty
can be efficacious in terms of deterrence, but this very intent
may arouse sufficient resentment to make nullification unlikely
(except where the death penalty is authorized). The difficulty
is just the reverse where the defendant is merely reckless,
negligent, or not careless at all with respect to the possibility
of harm. Here the resentments aroused by the occurrence of
harm will be helpful in preventing nullification, but the gain
in terms of deterrence is likely to be small.
As a result, the two crucial premises apparently can be
satisfied simultaneously only in a few special situations. This
can be seen in greater detail by examination of Table 3, which
summarizes the conclusions reached in the preceding pages
202 Purposes other than deterrence, such as rehabilitation or isolation of the
dangerous, might make use of the milder penalty unwise; but such purposes would
presumably make a longer sentence appropriate whether the particular offender
caused harm or not.
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with respect to the various categories of offenses. Column (1)
describes the risk of nullification in the event that the more
severe penalty were applicable to the underlying conduct,
whether or not harm occurred. Column (2) describes the additional deterrence gained, in comparison to a system of mild
penalties across the board, where the added penalty applies to
conduct resulting in harm. Column (3) states whether both

Table 3
Summary of Conclusions with Respect to ALl Premises
(1)
Risk of
Nullification
Intentional Crimes
-Mandatory death penalty
-Discretionary death
penalty
-Other penalties: crimes
against person or
property
-Other penalties: other
crimes
Crimes of Recklessness
and Negligence
-Vehicle Homicide
-Other

(2)
Added
Deterrence

(3)
ALl Assumptions
Satisfied?

Very High
High

Possible
Very Low
or Zero

Yes
No

Very Low
Very Low
or Zero

High
High

No
No

High

Very Low
or Zero
Low

No

High

Strict Liability-Felony
Murder
-Mandatory death penalty
-Discretionary death
penalty
-Other penalties

Very High
High

Strict Liability-Other20 3

-

Very Low
or Zero
-

-

Yes
(marginally)

Possible
Very Low
or Zero
Low

Yes
No

Low, Zero,
or Negative

No

No

203For crimes in this category, the risk of nullification cannot be evaluated
because by definition the underlying conduct is not culpable and cannot be made
subject to punishment "across-the-board." Added deterrence here refers to the
deterrence gained by the strict liability approach, beyond that which would result
from a policy of punishing negligent conduct by a milder penalty across the board.
For the possibility of a negative effect, i.e., a net decrease in the deterrent effect,
see text accompanying notes 290-91 infra.
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ALI assumptions are simultaneously satisfied to a significant
extent.
The table makes clear that the 'jury nullification" argument cannot claim general validity as an explanation of the
many instances in which the law presently relates punishment
to the harm caused. The argument does seem to hold for
crimes subject to a mandatory death penalty. Here the risk
of nullification is very high, and there could be some additional deterrent effect (though we have no evidence). The
argument may also hold for crimes of recklessness and negligence, other than vehicle homicide. Here too the risk of nullification is high, and available evidence does not exclude the
possibility of some added deterrence, though there is reason
to suspect that the effect would not be substantial. For these
two groups of cases, therefore, the jury nullification argument
is not demonstrably fallacious, though of course it remains necessary to consider whether the somewhat speculative possibility of a gain in deterrence justifies the burden of the added
penalty upon the defendants who cause harm. In any event
these two categories account for only a small part of the problem; mandatory death penalties remain rare, 20 4 and only a
tiny fraction of involuntary manslaughter prosecutions in20 5
volve cases other than vehicle homicide.
In all the remaining situations, at least one of the crucial
premises seems essentially erroneous. With respect to discretionary death penalties, available evidence suggests that additional deterrence is exceedingly low, if not non-existent. The
same appears to be true for vehicle homicide cases, and for
strict liability crimes (other than felony murder). This leaves
only the felony murder and intentional crime situations in
which penalties other than death apply, and for both of these
categories it is the danger of nullification that appears exceedingly low or non-existent. In all these situations, therefore,
the jury nullification argument falls far short of offering a
satisfying justification for emphasis on results.
D. Administrative Discretion
The requirement of harm may serve to prevent discrimination not only by juries but also by police, prosecutors, and
See note 253 infra.
note 326 infra. Conceivably, however, the negligence .category could include large numbers of situations involving some statutory harm other than death.
204

205 See
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others with discretion in the criminal justice system. Even when
206
the crime can be narrowly defined without a statutory harm,
budgetary and related constraints may prevent prosecution
of all known violaters.2 °7 Under such circumstances, the dangers are similar to those present when jury nullification is
likely; in particular, social prejudice or the whims of individual prosecutors could play an important role in determining
which violators are selected to suffer punishment. If, instead,
the heavy penalties on which society relies for deterrence
are applied only when harm occurs, the very fortuitousness
of the result will insure that punishments are distributed impartially., Of course such randomness raises problems of its
own,2 08 but it seems clear that if uneven law enforcement is
unavoidable, random inequalities are to be preferred to those
20 9
that reflect social or individual bias.
Even when prosecution of all offenders in a given category
is feasible, the absence of actual harm could prompt a kind
of "nullification" by victims, prosecutors, and even judges.
However irrational it might be for such people to be less concerned by certain cases of dangerous conduct not causing
harm, their likely reactions must be considered.
With respect to victims, it seems likely that a person exposed to a serious risk, or the object of an unsuccessful attempt,
would tend to be less insistent on prosecution when he has not
suffered harm. In some cases the potential victim may not even
be known, though the offender has been caught; this would be
true in cases of reckless driving, attempts to bomb buildings,
and so on. Much as we insist in theory that the victim has no
special rights or interests in the outcome of a criminal prosecution,2 1 0 the willingness of the victim to prosecute remains an
important factor in determining whether a prosecution is likely
2 11
to be brought.
The importance of this factor can vary considerably. Prosecution of an unsuccessful bombing or hijacking attempt is
unlikely to be deterred by the lack of a specific victim. In other
200 See text accompanying notes 322-26 infra.
207 See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process, 69 YALE L.J.

543, 560-62 (1960).
208See text accompanying notes 226-81 infra.
209See text accompanying note 92 supra.
210 See, e.g., S. v. D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
211Goldstein, supra note 207, at 573-74 & nn.63-64. Only a few police departments indicated a policy of willingness to prosecute despite an uncooperative victim.
Id. 577-79.
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instances the victim may have suffered very serious injuries,
though not the statutory harm that would have made the
"attempt" successful. Here failure of the attempt will hardly
mean the lack of a seriously concerned victim. But there certainly would be many instances in which the lack of a victim
would prompt a higher incidence of non-prosecution.
Unlike the jury nullification problem, however, the likely
reaction of the victim does not in itself seem to warrant special
treatment by law in cases involving harm. Even though no
harm has occurred, some threatened "victims" may well be
anxious to prosecute, especially where the threatening conduct
could be repeated with greater chances of success. Distinctions
that might result from greater desires of the victim to prosecute in such cases would seem legitimate in terms of the "general" and "special" deterrence purposes 21 2 of the criminal
law.
With respect to the official participants in the system--'
police, prosecutors, and judges-the danger of "nullification"
poses a more serious problem. Decisions whether to drop
charges, accept a plea to a lesser charge, recommend a light
sentence, or, at the judicial level, set a light sentence, all could
be influenced by an emotional response to the actual harm.
Leniency may therefore be less likely in cases involving serious
injuries, even though responsible public officials should ideally
be just as concerned by cases where only a chance factor caused
similar injuries to be averted. If leniency would become common in cases not involving harm, then there is a serious danger, as with respect to jury nullification, that those denied
leniency would be the victims of social prejudice or individual
whim. Limiting the more severe penalties to cases in which
serious harm occurs could provide benefits in terms of deterrence while substantially reducing the occasions for such discrimination.
Although this argument seems defensible in some important areas, the difficulties considered with respect to the jury
nullification problem are equally relevant here. First is the
need to consider the likelihood of administrative "nullification"
if the harm requirement should be eliminated. The problem
would be a serious one for most crimes based on negligence,
where violations probably far exceed the enforcement capabilities with which police and prosecutors are ever likely to be
212

See note 254 infra.
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endowed.2 13 Where major sanctions are applicable to negligent
conduct, the nullification problem may be further aggravated.
Two studies of efforts to crack down on drunken or reckless
driving through short mandatory jail sentences found evidence
that prosecutorial and judicial leniency increased markedly
in response to the crackdown, in effect nullifying the sup21 4
posedly mandatory penalties.
Selective enforcement may also be inevitable for some
intentional crimes. Ordinary assault, for example, may be committed so frequently and prosecuted so infrequently 2 15 that
major penalties could well be reserved for the cases in which
serious injuries happen to occur. In the case of most major
felonies the problem is somewhat different. Here prosecutions
are much less likely to be dropped altogether, but substantial
scope for discrimination remains in connection with decisions
as to plea bargaining, sentencing, and the like.
The deterrent effect will, as previously indicated, vary
considerably according to the nature of the crime. 21 6 The
administrative discretion rationale therefore has its greatest
force with respect to intentional crimes. In other areas, a
harm-oriented penalty structure does cut down on discretion,
but provides little or no deterrence beyond that resulting from
the penalties applicable to the underlying conduct. If enforcement of these underlying sanctions is considered too haphazard or discriminatory, a number of solutions are possible.
More resources could be devoted to enforcement, or the scope
of the crime itself could be narrowed by more specific prohibitions and higher standards of culpability. 2 17 If neither of these
approaches seems feasible, then at the very least, efforts can
and must be made to develop rational enforcement priorities
and to ensure that these are observed by increasing the visibil213 H.M. Hart, supra note 34, at 423 & n.56; Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors'Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64, 83-84 (1948).
214 Campbell & Ross, The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time Series Data in
Quasi-Experimental Analysis, 3 LAW & Soc. REv. 33 (1968); Robertson, Rich & Ross,
Jail Sentences for Driving While Intoxicated in Chicago: A Judicial Policy That Failed, 8
LAW & Soc. REV. 55 (1973); cf. Little, An Empirical Description of Administration of
Justice in Drunk Driving Cases, 7 LAW & Soc. REV. 473, 486 (1973).
2'15 Goldstein, supra note 207, at 574-75.

216 Extra penalties in the event of harm should substantially increase deterrence
in the case of some intentional crimes, but seem likely to add very little, perhaps
nothing of significance, in the case of crimes of recklessness, negligence, or strict
liability. See text accompanying notes 149-60 supra.
217 See, e.g., COMM. ON ENFORCEMENT, PRESIDENT'S HIGHWAY SAFETY CONFERENCE,
REPORT 4 (1949); COMM. ON LAWS AND ORDINANCES, PRESIDENT'S HIGHWAY SAFETY
CONFERENCE, REPORT 26 (1949). See also text accompanying note 325 infra.
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ity and reviewability of prosecutorial decisions.2 1 8 Failing this,
we must be prepared either to continue tolerating possible discrimination in the enforcement of the milder sanctions or to
abandon entirely the effort to punish for mere negligence.
The harm-oriented structure of penalties itself affords little
or no advantage in terms of deterrence. At the same time, use
of more severe penalties where harm does occur introduces
dangers of its own with respect to the application of these
more severe penalties. It appears, for example, that only a
fraction of the automobile fatalities resulting from criminal
negligence actually become the subject of a homicide prosecution.21 9 Selectivity in enforcement therefore remains high
even after the harm requirement has narrowed the class of
offenders, while the increased penalty only renders far more
serious the impact of any abuse of discretion.
Even in the area of intentional crimes, where the policy
of focusing on harm can be most effective, it scarcely seems
realistic to regard such a policy as helping in any meaningful way
to solve the underlying difficulties of discretion. Uneven enforcement, the haphazard or inequitable results of plea bargaining, disparate and discriminatory sentencing, these are
all commonplace even where a required statutory harm is
present. Again, these problems may even be more acute in
such cases, since under present law the maximum punishment
is more severe and the scope of discretion ordinarily wider.
As with the problems of selective prosecution, a number of
ways can be found to deal with excessive discretion in the
charging and sentencing of those who are prosecuted. 220 In
the context of such efforts, the occurrence of harm could conceivably be made one of the factors that would determine,
more or less automatically, whether a certain specific penalty
was applicable. But short of a major change in our methods
of administering the criminal justice system, emphasis on harm
2"1 Goldstein, supra note 207, at 586-88.
219 It has been estimated that of the 55,300 deaths from automobile accidents

in 1970, between one-third and one-half were attributable to excessive drinking,
and traffic violations were said to be involved in eighty percent of all fatal accidents
(based on 1968 data). F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 343, 356. Yet
there were only 4,190 arrests for negligent homicide (including non-vehicle cases)
in 1970. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1970, supra note 165, at 119.
220 The incidence of plea bargaining can be reduced, and where it exists it can

be made subject to standards and review. Sentencing discretion can be drastically
curtailed and again subjected to review. Whether such reforms should in fact be undertaken is not our concern here. The point is simply that ways such as these represent

the only meaningful approach to the problem of administrative discretion.
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caused, even with respect to intentional crimes, makes little
or no contribution to solving the problems of discretion.
E. Frugality in Punishment
Another argument of major importance is based on the
"frugality" principle, probably first stressed by Bentham. Since
punishment is conceived to be undesirable for its own sake, it
can be justified only by necessity and should be no greater than
is required to achieve its goal. 22 1 Hence, assuming that no
deterrence is sacrificed, a moderate penalty for those who do
not cause harm would be preferable even if juries were willing
to cooperate in the imposition of a more severe sanction. This
argument has been mentioned by the ALI only in its discussion
of attempts to commit first degree felonies, where "the heaviest
and most afflictive sanctions [the death sentence or life imprisonment]," would otherwise be applicable. 222 It has been
advanced by others to justify mitigation of punishment in the
case of attempts generally 22 3 and in the case of negligent con2 24
duct not resulting in harm.
Even in Bentham's relatively abstract terms, the frugality
notion has great appeal; and in light of ever-increasing evidence that prisons serve far less to reform than to aggravate
anti-social propensities,2 2 5 the point takes on new importance
and urgency. Several facets of the argument nevertheless require careful exploration. The argument explicitly rests on
the assumption that mitigation of punishment where no harm
occurs will not diminish the deterrent impact of the law. This
factual question must be examined in detail. But it will also
be necessary to consider a more fundamental matter, for the
frugality approach involves at least one basic value judgment
that might not be universally shared-the principle of selective
frugality inherently conflicts with the principle of equal treatment for all who are similarly situated. The frugality argument
itself points to no relevant differences between offenders who
2I J. BENTHAM, supra note 77, at 194. See also Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889,
891 & n.7 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); C. BECCARIA, supra note 152, at 17-19.
222 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1),

Comment at 179 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960);

see Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 1, at 1029.
22.Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1295-97 & n.86; Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773, 797 (1958); Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal
Attempts, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1170, 1174 (1957).
224 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 8, at 311-13; Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11,
at 1296-97 & n.86.
22s See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (197 1).
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cause harm and those who do not. It simply maintains that the
ends of the law can be achieved without punishing all of them
severely, so some should be selected in a random way, here
by the fortuitous occurrence of harm, to be relieved of the
most severe penalty.
"Arbitrariness" of this kind might not be thought a subject
of serious concern since it is totally insulated from the dangers
of individual discretion and the possibilities of social bias which
give rise to most equal protection problems. Here, the arbitrariness has been "purified" by eliminating all human factors
from the process of choice. Nevertheless, even "pure" arbitrariness involves the treatment of two presumably indistinguishable individuals in different ways. The choice between
them is made not on the basis of any considerations rationally
related to a valid policy, but instead on the basis of pure
chance, the very antithesis of rationality. The legitimacy of
such an approach can scarcely be taken for granted. It therefore seems necessary to examine with some care the question
whether "pure" arbitrariness is compatible with constitutional
requirements, as well as with general ethical principles that
guide the ways in which criminal punishment ought to be
distributed.
The pages that follow suggest that despite the "arbitrariness" implicit in the frugality approach, the inequalities should
not ordinarily be regarded as contrary to the requirements
of due process or equal protection. The analysis also suggests
that even in terms of non-constitutional values, the notion of
''equality" in punishment remains rather poorly specified and
may be entitled to relatively little weight. In a final section,
however, the analysis focuses upon the assumptions about deterrence that underlie the frugality argument, and it is here
that the argument proves most vulnerable.
1. Frugality and the Problem of Equal Treatment
Despite frequent invocation of the frugality rationale by
thoughtful writers, little attention has been paid to its implications for the principle of equality.22 6 It therefore seems
226 The treatment of this problem by Michael and Wechsler probably represents
the high point for the level of discourse on this subject:
[Ilnequality of this sort appears to be justifiable only so long as treatment
involves a severity which is unnecessary as a means to incapacitation and
reformation and is therefore an evil inflicted upon the offender solely as a
means to the deterrence of potential offenders. The inequality may, in other
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necessary to examine the value of equality in this context and
the considerations that might justify the sacrifice of equality
rather than one of the other objectives at stake-maximum
22 7
deterrence and minimum severity.
a. The Minimum Requirements of Due Process and Equal Protection
The constitutionality of "pure" arbitrariness has been
the subject of virtually no legal analysis or judicial decision.
This is not surprising, however, in as much as our system rarely
uses overt lotteries as a decision-making mechanism, particularly where something of importance is at stake. 22 8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's approach to arbitrariness in general
casts serious doubt on the permissibility of pure arbitrariness.
The equal protection clause requires, in the language of
one classic statement, that classifications "must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. '229 Similarly, "the guaranty of due process . . . demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real
words, be preferable to an unnecessary sacrifice of actual offenders for
the sake of deterrence. But if that is the justification for tolerating the
inequality it follows that a mitigation of penalties on the ground that death
has not occurred should not be carried to the point where it disserves other
ends of treatment, such as incapacitation, unless it is necessary to go that
far to avoid nullification.
Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1297-98 (footnotes omitted).
227 In the sections that follow, the frugality approach is frequently discussed
as if it operated not through the presumably random element of harm, but instead
through a literally random mechanism such as a lottery. Holmes in fact proposed
that a genuine lottery be used as an alternative to reliance on harm caused. See text
accompanying note 161 supra. Where necessary, we will consider how the conclusions
applicable to a real lottery might be affected when the randomness results indirectly
from reliance upon harm.
228 Even the recent selective service lottery was in effect for only a short period.
See 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(d); Presidential Proclamation No. 3945, 34 Fed. Reg.
19017 (1969). Several courts rejected arguments to the effect that the drawings were
not in fact sufficiently random. United States v. Kotrlik, 5 SEL. SERV. L. RpTR. 3693
(9th Cir. 1972); Stodolsky v. Hershey, 2 SEL. SERV. L. RPrTR. 3527 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
But apparently no court reached the question whether perfect randomness would
itself be unconstitutional. Id. n.2. At least one court has upheld the constitutionality
of randomness in choosing subjects for a social experiment, Aguayo v. Richardson,
473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), though there the court regarded the effects of the
lottery in determining rights to welfare payments as not implicating a fundamental
interest. Id. at 1109.
229 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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23 0
and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.
It is unfortunately not feasible to do justice, within the confines
of the present study, to the implications of these constitutional
principles for the problem of pure arbitrariness. In a separate
paper I have attempted to indicate some of the broad outlines

of an approach to this question.2 31 A threshold matter for

consideration is the set of arguments that stresses the "purity"
of lotteries, their insulation from possibilities for human discrimination, and seeks on this basis to reconcile their use with
due process and equal protection requirements as a general
matter. One such argument is that lottery systems provide
''equal protection" because everyone involved is given precisely
the same chance, the condition sometimes referred to as "ex
ante" equality.2 32 A similar argument is that if a*lottery serves
the goals of administrative convenience and efficiency, then
the distinctions it produces are "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." These arguments prove to be overbroad
and unsatisfying as general propositions. Not only do they lead
to results that seem utterly unacceptable as an intuitive matter,
but they prove unresponsive to society's interest in ensuring
that governmental power make itself felt in accordance with
rational and predictable patterns, and that citizens be able to
plan their lives and their activities on the basis of reasonable
expectations as to the content of the legal order as it applies
to them.

233

The punishment lottery implicit in a frugality approach
need not, however, be defended in terms of unqualified approval for "pure" arbitrariness in all its forms. It can be contended, as Michael and Wechsler suggest, 2 34 that the resulting

inequalities are indeed undesirable, but constitutionally permissible in light of the alternatives of either less effective deterrence (when the extra penalty for causing harm is eliminated)
or greater severity (when the extra penalty is extended to all).
This approach, focusing on the particular advantages of the
20 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
23!See Schulhofer, Arbitrariness Purified: The Constitutionality of DecisionMaking by Lottery (unpublished paper in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania).
232 See, e.g., Breit & Elzinga, supra note 196, at 707-08.
233 Cf. H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 44-48 (need for foreseeability as a basis
for rules on mistake and other excuses); Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62
CAL. L. REv. 1,37 (1974). See also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971).
234 See note 226 supra.
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lottery in the punishment context, raises new difficulties with
respect to its special implications for the notion of "punishment. '2 35 But even in the narrower due process and equal
protection terms, the approach invites, at the very least, an
evaluation of the nature of the alternatives to inequality, and
their comparative costs and consequences.
As the basis for such an analysis, let us suppose that a
legislature, wishing to implement a frugality policy, decides
that of all those who attempt (successfully or unsuccessfully)
to commit murder, a given number will be spared the maximum
sentence authorized by law and instead sentenced in accordance with a much lower penalty range. Suppose the individuals
to benefit from the milder range of sanctions are selected at
random from all the defendants convicted of attempted or
successful murder each year. Suppose further that the legislature has the benefit of a remarkable study demonstrating, in
scientifically impeccable fashion, that the deterrent impact of
the law will be exactly the same regardless of whether the
maximum penalty is applied to all offenders or whether the
given number chosen at random face only the milder range
constitutional to.implement a frugality
of sanctions. Would it 2be
36
approach of this kind?
211See text accompanying notes 241-81 infra. Some of these problems may also
rise to the constitutional level, especially in terms of "cruel and unusual punishment."
2" There may be a feeling that a defendant lacks standing to seek reduction of
his sentence on the ground that others should have been punished with equal severity.
As a general proposition, however, this cannot be sound. A black defendant who is
concededly guilty and was concededly sentenced in accordance with statutory limits
can, for example, have his sentence reduced oftshowing systematic leniency in favor
of white defendants. See Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of
State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1961). The same principle should apply
for constitutional purposes even outside the especially sensitive area of race, whenever the difference in treatment is held to be without reasonable basis. Cf. Cannon
v. Gladden, 203 Ore. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955). For example, where property taxes
were attacked on the ground that other taxpayers were enjoying lower assessments,
the Court held:
[T]he right of the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100 per cent of
its true value is to have his assessment reduced to the percentage of that value
at which others are taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of statute. The conclusion is based on the principle that where it is
impossible to secure both the standard of the true value, and the uniformity
and equality required by law, the latter requirement/is to be preferred as
the just and ultimate purpose of the law.
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923).
The property tax situation differs because the relief given to some taxpayers
must in the long run result in higher taxes for the others if the same revenue is to
be produced. This is not true under our hypothetical deterrence study, but in reality
frugality ordinarily will have some cost in terms of deterrence, see text accompanying
notes 282-83 infra. Hence defendants who bear the greater penalties are punished
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To determine whether circumstances justifying pure arbitrariness are present, we should consider first the kinds of reasons that argue against equal treatment for all. Here it is not simply a matter of administrative convenience but rather a desire,
clearly legitimate in and of itself, to minimize the social costs
of punishment, combined with a desire, equally legitimate,
to attain the optimum level of deterrence. Exactly how great
these deterrence and frugality benefits would be, and exactly
what value we attribute to equality, are the core questions,
and they are not answered by the very preliminary analysis
attempted here. Instead, we can only move on to a second
aspect of the search for alternatives, namely whether selections
could be made in some non-random way.
We assume that selection of those who cause harm is a kind
of lottery, just as selection of those born on certain days, determined at random, would be a kind of lottery. But those
in the class who seemed least culpable, or least dangerous for
the future, could be selected for the milder penalties. A nonrandom approach of this kind seems clearly better suited to
achieving the usual objectives of the criminal law. On what
basis might the state want to reject it here? One possibility is
the ever-present "efficiency" rationale. It might be thought
too costly and time-consuming to conduct detailed inquiries
in order to make the necessary selection. Such an argument is
always a troubling one, but it proves particularly inapt in the
punishment context, where attention must in any event be
paid to questions of culpability and dangerousness at the sentencing stage, and where state policy continues to claim the
existence of relevant distinctions in these terms among offenders.
A more substantial reason for preferring randomness
could be that a non-random approach might not ensure against
a loss of deterrence. Conceivably under the non-random approach some offenders would hold out strong hopes of qualifying for the mild penalties, and the deterrent impact of the
law would therefore be diminished. As a practical matter, however, the deterrence consequences of non-random selection
are difficult to estimate. Refusing to differentiate between
murderers and attempters on arbitrary grounds, but instead
differentiating in terms of the intensity of the intent, the dansomewhat more than would be necessary to produce the same level of deterrence
under a pattern of equality.
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gerousness of the act under the known circumstances, and so
on, conceivably might even be more effective than an arbitrary
standard (including harm caused) in deterring the most dangerous kinds of conduct. A careful canvassing of this question
would be necessary.
The intensity of the search for alternatives is of course
affected by the consequences of the lottery for those subject
to it.23 7 Two situations are possible. The more troubling one,

which would be excluded if our hypothetical deterrence study
were valid, arises when the selective lottery fails to yield exactly
the same deterrent effect as imposing the maximum penalty on
all offenders. Since some deterrence is lost, it should be possible to achieve as much deterrence as under the lottery by
reducing somewhat the maximum penalty and then applying
it to all. This could be a disastrous policy from a frugality
perspective-suppose that instead of imprisoning a single
offender for twenty years and allowing a thousand other offenders to go free, we were required to imprison all 1,001
offenders for nineteen and a half years to achieve the same
level of deterrence. Nevertheless, a lottery approach in this
situation implies not only that the one chosen is less well off
than his lucky fellow-offenders, but also that he himself is
less well off than he would have been under a policy of equal
treatment. This feature adds a further note of potential unfairness, the special consequences of which need to be separately
considered.2 38
In the second situation, more easily defended, we can
assume that the lottery has no deterrence cost and that the
offender therefore suffers exactly the same penalty that he
would face if all were treated alike. It nevertheless remains
true that the offender chosen by lot is treated differently from
others similarly situated. To place our search for alternatives
in proper perspective, we must focus on exactly what this difference is.
At least in so far as we are focusing on prison sentences,
and this is after all the principal concern from a frugality perspective, it is clear that the penal lottery will always affect a
fundamental interest-liberty itself. 239 The impact could be de
237 Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Board of Elections,

383 U.S. 663 (1966).

238 See text accompanying notes 282-86 infra.
23

' But cf. Marshall v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 700 (1974), where the Court, in
rejecting equal protection attacks upon the Narcotic Rehabilitation Act, 18 U.S.C.
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minimis in some situations; the difference between a nineteen
and a half- and a twenty-year sentence might not seem. so
great as to call for close scrutiny of the reasons for inequality.
But such de minimis situations will rarely arise, for the frugality policy itself comes into play precisely where the differences are ones that count. In the twenty-year case previously
considered, for example, the difference determined by the
lottery was a difference between a twenty-year sentence and
no prison sentence at all. Indeed, the ALI deliberately confines
its frugality policy to the area in which "the heaviest and most
afflictive sanctions," death and life imprisonment, are involved. 240 Paradoxically, this is the area where inequalities are
most likely to seem offensive. The prospect of choosing one
offender to suffer the death penalty or even life imprisonment,
rather than some shorter term, by the mere spin of a wheel is
certainly not a pretty one.
The difficulty is that the very factors that call for closer
scrutiny simultaneously make the justifications more compelling. Certainly the prospect of equal treatment, imposing the
death penalty on all offenders, is not very pretty either. Here
again we remain faced with the need to evaluate the importance of frugality, deterrence, and equality and their relationship to one another. This can be attempted only by establishing
priorities among the objectives of the criminal law, a step I
have been reluctant to take in the context of evaluating emphasis on results under any acceptable formulation of the ends
of the criminal law. From this limited perspective, the frugality
argument does not seem to violate due process and equal protection principles, so long as certain factual conditions are
satisifed.
b.

The Implicit Value Judgments

(i) The Retributive Perspective
Though our overall approach has been deliberately eclectic, it seems appropriate to consider exactly what kinds of value
judgments are implicit in the frugality argument. Perhaps the
most perplexing paradox of the frugality approach is its acceptance, in the context of a system of punishment normally based
§§ 4251-55 (1970), assumed that assignment of offenders to prison rather than to
a treatment program (with a potentially shorter period of confinement) did not
implicate a fundamental interest.
240 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(l), Comment at 179 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
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on fault, of radically different penalties for two defendants
who are equally culpable and indistinguishable in terms of
other factors related to their personalities and actions. In spite
of prevalent inequalities in prosecution and sentencing in the
criminal law, non-random inequalities at that, the notion remains deep-seated that criminal punishment at least ought to
be rationally determined and deserved. Overt acceptance and
utilization of pure chance either to determine criminal liability vel non, or even to fix the amount of punishment, would
scarcely be understood as a feature of a humane and civilized
system of criminal justice.
The frugality approach based on harm differs significantly
from an overt lottery, since its random features are less readily
perceived. Indeed, in some contexts, the harm element might
be rationally related to acceptable criteria of punishment. But
we are dealing here, by hypothesis, with situations in which a
rational relationship does not exist, in which the harm element
is truly random. Frequently it will be perceived as such, by the
24 1
public as well as by students and analysts of the criminal law.
One observer studying the dangerousness of armed attacks in
fact suggested that homicide might be described as no more
than the result of a "lethal lottery. ' '242 The question in such
situations is whether reliance upon an obviously random mechanism, such as a lottery, should be viewed differently from
reliance upon a harm element that is equally random but less
often perceived to be so.
My own view is that we should not consider these two
systems as fundamentally different. This position could be
defended on the basis that management of public opinion and
popular perceptions is a job for politicians and legislators,
not for the theorist outlining the content of an ideal criminal
law. But this is very definitely not my perspective. The answers
I am seeking are ones suitable for actual implementation. In
the present context, public indignation over the use of an overt
lottery would probably bar adoption of this approach, while
a disguised lottery based on harm would not be utterly out
of the question-indeed we have one already in many areas.
But the question remains whether the disguised lottery should
in fact be used. If the instinctive disapproval of overt lotteries
241 See text accompanying note 67 supra; O.W. HOLMES, supra note 11, at 48;
Goodhart, supra note 61, at 19.
242 Zimring, The Medium is the Message: Firearm Caliber as a Determinant of Death
from Assault, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 97, 114 (1972).
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is in fact justified, it could hardly be claimed that the mere
political feasibility of the disguised lottery constitutes the reason for having it.
Part of the difficulty in assessing attitudes toward a punishment lottery may result from ambivalence about what we
mean by the retributive purpose of the criminal law. We have
already seen that retribution is sometimes used to describe the
243
notion that punishment should be related to the harm done.
We have used the term retaliation to identify this idea, and
restricted the use of "retribution" to the concept that punishment should be related to the culpability of the defendant.
Even in this narrower sense, however, retribution can have
a variety of meanings. 2 44 It may be only a negative, limiting
principle (that moral guilt is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for punishment) or it may be a rule of affirmative
action (that the morally guilty should be punished). In either
sense, retribution may apply only to questions of distribution
-who should be punished-or it may also apply to proportion
-how much punishment should be imposed. Those who have
sought to clarify this subject have taken a variety of positions
as to which of these senses for retribution would constitute a
legitimate purpose or theory of the criminal law.2 45 For our
purposes it seems sufficient to note that the distribution theory
of retribution2 46 would not be inconsistent with the frugality
approach, nor would a proportion theory of the negative type.
Only a theory of retribution holding that it should affirmatively dictate proportion, that offenders should be punished
with severity corresponding to the moral gravity of their offense, would tend to conflict with frugality. The clash does
not seem particularly troubling, since this version, though
2 47
usually taken to represent the classic retributivist position,
24
8
finds few advocates today.
The Benthamite notion of punishment as evil in itself, justified only to the extent necessary
to achieve particular social goals, 24 9 seems more congenial to
243

See text accompanying note 44 supra.
4
4
See generally H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 230-37.
24
5 Compare id. 8-13 with H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 16,
62-70 (1968), and Wasserstrom, H.L.A. Hart and the Doctrines of Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1967).
216 This seems, for example, to be the thrust of H.L.A. Hart's theory, H.L.A.
HART,
supra note 11, at 11, 24-27.
2 47
2

See id. 231, 233; H. PACKER, supra note 245, at 38; E. PINCOFFS, supra note 37,
at 3-4.
24
' See H.L.A. HART, Supra note 11, at 231-32.
2 49
See text accompanying note 221 supra.
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modern views of the purposes of the criminal law. If it is this
concept of retribution that accounts for aversion to a punishment lottery, then contemporary theorists would apparently
be led to conclude that the objection is essentially unsound.
Yet there remains something deeply offensive in the calculated use of randomness to assign criminal penalties, particularly severe ones. In Furman v. Georgia,2 " the Supreme Court
found capital punishment as then administered to be cruel and
unusual punishment, largely because of the arbitrariness that
seemed to determine its incidence. To be sure, this was not
arbitrariness of the "purified" kind, far from it, but Mr. Justice
Stewart remarked in a concurring opinion that "[t]hese death
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. ' 25 1 The analogy was
perhaps not intended to cast doubt on the validity of "pure"
arbitrariness in capital punishment, 25 2 but it seems altogether
proper that it should. A lottery, whether disguised or overt,
hardly seems a just or enlightened way to determine who shall
live and who shall be executed by the State. This may well suggest that even the affirmative proportion theory of retribution
still retains validity, that at least some penalties, such as capital
punishment, may be appropriate only if they can be considered
deserved in relation to the moral culpability of the offender and
as a morally necessary response to that culpability. These and
other implications of a penalty lottery for the theory of punishment do not seem to have been considered by those interested
in the philosophy of the criminal law. This is particularly unfortunate since capital punishment and other severe penalties
continue to be widely authorized on a lottery basis.2 5 3
The Deterrence Perspective

(ii)

Another way of looking at the same problem is to focus
on the deterrence rationale itself. The frugality argument
assumes that the non-deterrence objectives of punishment408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
252Justice Stewart mentioned the possibility that the selection for the death
penalty had been made on the impermissible basis of race but stated explicitly that
since racial discrimination had not been proved, he was not considering this aspect.
Id. at 310.
253 The clearest example is, of course, felony murder, though even where an
intent to kill exists in fact, an element of chance determines whether the crime will
be murder or only assault with intent to kill. See text accompanying notes 313-21
infra. As a result of Furman, the penalty in such cases ordinarily will not exceed life
250
251
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whether retribution, rehabilitation, isolation of the dangerous,
or any others-are satisfied by the penalty applied to the unsuccessful attempt. The additional penalty for the completed
25 4
crime is justified solely for purposes of general deterrence.
This might not seem to be a source of difficulty, for deterrence is probably the most readily accepted of all the goals of
the criminal law. Yet when other objectives are no longer
inextricably linked with it, when deterrence is stripped of the
support of other purposes and stands alone as the exclusive
reason for punishment, serious difficulties arise. The extra
sanction is applied to an offender who has already paid his
"debt" to society-a penalty suitable in terms of the moral
gravity of his offense, the possibilities of reforming him, the
need to confine him, and even the need to deter him from committing a crime in the future. It becomes clear that he must
suffer the extra sanction not for any of these reasons related
to his offense or his personality, but solely to prevent others in
society from violating the law. As Zimring and Hawkins put
255
it, "Why should his grief pay for their moral education?"
This is not an easy question to answer, but it is at least
equally troubling to reject general deterrence as a goal of the
criminal law. Zimring and Hawkins' resolution of the question
is indicative of its difficulty:
Our preliminary statement regarding this problem
is simply the rather weak one that if this is the only way
in which we can reduce the crime rate, the practice
seems inevitable, and can be more easily justified than
if alternative
methods of crime control were avail256
able.
The dilemma is of course presented not only in the case
of punishment lotteries, but whenever penalties are justified
imprisonment, but a number of states have enacted mandatory death penalty statutes
whose applicability will depend on this sort of "lottery." Capital punishment is also
authorized, on a lottery basis, under a number of pre-Furnam mandatory death statutes. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 265, § 2 (1968) (murder in the course of rape or
attempted rape); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (1970), as amended, R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1973) (murder by life term prisoner); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-553.1
(1962) (fourth conviction for crimes optionally punishable by death); VA. CODE
ANN. § 53-291 (1960) (killing of prison employee by convict).
2 4
1 "General deterrence" is used here to refer to the preventive effect of the
sanction upon the population at large. The objective of discouraging further crime
by the offender punished, sometimes called "special deterrence," would presumably
call for similar treatment of attempters and completers.
255 F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 38.

26 Id.40.
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solely for purposes of deterrence. 257 Yet the nature of a punishment lottery alters the dimensions of the dilemma in important ways and may ultimately render it more acute.
In the first place, the utter lack of nondeterrence justifications for punishment is starkly clear in the lottery context.
In other situations we may not know what the legislative justification in fact was, 258 and even from a normative viewpoint,
an assessment of the penalty required for adequate deterrence
is linked with the question of how hard we should try to deter,
and thus to the question of how costly an offense is to society,
and thus in turn to the question of how we should rank the
gravity of the conduct from a "moral" viewpoint. 259 As a result
it will seldom be clear, with respect to across-the-board penalties, that a part of the sanction serves only deterrence objectives and has no retributive underpinnings. 2 60 This feature no
doubt helps dampen our intuitive sympathy for the plight of
the offender-as-deterrence-object, and makes more tolerable
the pragmatic decision to ignore his complaint. The ethical
implications of punishing one offender solely to deter others
become much harder to ignore when, as in the lottery context,
there is no implicit blending of deterrent and retributive goals.
The most common philosophical defense of deterrence
appears, like the pragmatic defense, more difficult to accept
in the lottery context. Here again the concepts of deterrence
and retribution become interwined. For this school, retribution
should not by itself justify punishment; deterrence, with its
257 In this sense, the difficulty involved in the lottery case would only be exacerbated by eliminating inequalities and applying the more severe sanction across the
board-by hypothesis the non-deterrence goals of punishment had, for all the
offenders, been satisfied by the milder punishment.
258 Deterrence may appear the predominant motivation, at least if "the reasons
given for legislative and judicial change in policy are taken at face value." F. ZIIRING

& G.

HAWKINS,

supra note 153, at 39.

For this reason, the stock example of a case where utilitarianism in the grading
of offenses supposedly breaks down-capital punishment for parking violatorsseems misleading. Capital punishment in this context is not optimal, even in narrow utilitarian terms, because its costs presumably outweigh the social advantages
of improved or even perfect compliance. Conversely, if illegal parking came, for
some reason, to pose a serious threat to life (blocking the emergency entrance to a
hospital, for example), the offense would presumably be regarded as serious in moral
terms; both utilitarianism and retribution might call for a rather stiff penalty.
260 This is not to say that lotteries simply make manifest what is veiled when
deterrence penalties are applied across the board; I continue to assume that disguised
injustices are no less objectionable than the obvious ones. Across-the-board penalties
do not hide from the casual observer motivations that a careful student could discern, but rather render it virtually impossible for any observer to identify the actual
motivations with confidence, or even to be sure that he has successfully isolated
deterrence from retributive objectives in his own normative evaluation.
259
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utilitarian cast, can. But retribution can validly serve to limit the
penalties that society is entitled to impose in pursuit of its
deterrence objective. So long as the offender suffers no more
than his "just deserts," that is, the punishment corresponding to
the moral gravity of his offense, he cannot complain that his
penalty is excessive or unjust.2 I An important category of cruel
and unusual punishment cases reflects the converse of this
principle; penalties rationally related to the state's deterrence
objective are nevertheless unconstitutional when "disproportionate" to the gravity of the offense.26 2
This defense of penalties designed for deterrence encounters serious difficulty when invoked in the lottery context. To
be sure, it can still be argued that the just deserts concept is
only a limiting principle, that it in no way requires that an
offender in fact bear the penalty found to be the retributive
maximum. 26 3 But the argument nevertheless requires acceptance of the proposition that the highest penalty imposed by
the lottery does not exceed the just deserts limitation. If it is
the lower penalty that correctly reflects the moral gravity of
the offense, then the additional sanction imposed by lottery
not only reflects a "pure deterrence" motivation, but also ex264
ceeds the retributive maximum.
This difficulty is easy enough to avoid on the theoretical
level, since a frugality proponent need simply impose a condition that the highest penalty applicable under his lottery should
in no event exceed the just deserts for the conduct in question.
It then becomes necessary, however, to investigate the actual
situations in which punishment lotteries are being used (that
is, where disparities between the penalties for inchoate and
completed crimes are defended solely on a frugality basis), in
261 H.L.'A. HART, supra note 11, at 237; H. PACKER, supra note 245, at 62-70;
see F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 35 & n.41.
262 E.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
263 In these terms, the principle is equivalent to the "negative proportion" version
of retribution. See text accompanying note 244 supra. Hart argues that there is no
way of correlating the gravity of punishment to the gravity of an offense, and that
the only meaningful requirement is one of a correlation between the relative severity
of penalties for a series of offenses and the relative gravity of these offenses. H.L.A.
HART, supra note 11, at 233-34. On this view the defense of pure deterrence fails
altogether in the lottery context.
264 Curiously, Michael and Wechsler themselves seem to assume that something
approaching the just deserts concept is to be reflected in setting the lower penalty
(where no harm occurs) rather than the higher one, since the additional sanction is
"based upon factors which are unrelated . . . to the undesirability of the act ....
Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1297. If so, their version of the frugality theory
would appear unacceptable in terms of the just deserts analysis.

1576

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1497

order to determine whether the highest penalties invoked are
in fact within the just deserts limit. Can it be said, for example, that the "heaviest and most afflictive sanctions," distributed by the ALl on a lottery basis,2 6 5 in fact conform to our
notion of the moral gravity of the corresponding crimes? Perhaps it can. The just deserts notion is certainly vague enough
to permit a variety of responses to this question.2 66 It nevertheless appears to be a serious defect of the ALL formulation, and
of the frugality argument in general, that the need to confront
and answer this question is scarcely recognized. Severe sanctions are justified solely in terms of deterrence, the only limiting condition apparently being that the penalties not be more
than the public will tolerate, even for the wrong (retaliatory)
reasons.
This is not to say that public feelings are irrelevant in
seeking the appropriate just deserts limit. On the contrary,
community attitudes toward the gravity of offenses would be
entitled to considerable weight. The problem is that the mere
acceptability of the status quo conveys an ambiguous message.
It could be based on a well-informed evaluation of the seriousness of an offense, but other explanations are also possible.2 67
Once we do confront the just deserts issue squarely, with
these difficulties in mind, it is by no means clear that the
"heaviest and most afflictive sanctions" will conform to the
just deserts limit. They may do so, for example, in the case
of premeditated murder, where leniency for the unsuccessful
attempter can easily be viewed as punishment well below what
was deserved. But it is far more difficult to reach this conclusion in the felony-murder context, where a punishment
lottery may involve the death penalty or life imprisonment
if a death occurs purely by accident in the course of an ordinary burglary. In such a situation it would seem preferable
to reduce the penalty to the just deserts maximum (conceivably
2"See

text accompanying note 222 supra.
266 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 233-34; E. PINCOFFS, supra note 37, at 15.
267 Michael and Wechsler suggested some in a related context:
It would be informative to know to what extent this tolerance is due to a
failure to perceive that in the cases under discussion behavior which has
not resulted in death differs from that which has, in an accidental rather
than an essential aspect, [and] to what extent the popular demand for equality [or for present purposes the popular assessment of just deserts for the
underlying behavior] is merely subordinated to a popular sentiment in favor
of retaliation and, finally, to what extent there is some popular recognition
of the Benthamic point.
Michael & Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1298 n.87.
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eliminating the lottery entirely) even though this involves sacrificing deterrence that, given public attitudes, could have been
achieved.
(iii)

The Equality Perspective

Even a pure Benthamite, who attaches no importance to
retribution as an affirmative value or to just deserts as a limiting principle, still presumably attributes some value to equality itself. Faced with the concrete advantage of frugalitydiminished pain and suffering for those who benefit by more
lenient sentences-he may consider the principle of equality
as an abstract notion of little practical value in this context.
Moreover, the inequality here does not involve the kind of
uncertainty that ordinarily renders lotteries undesirable in a
well-organized legal system. 268 Here the randomness does not
interfere with the planning of legitimate activity but, on the
contrary, penalizes precisely those who have chosen illegal
lines of endeavor. If anything, the "uncertainty cost" for such
individuals contributes to the total sanctioning effect sought
26 9
by society.
Nevertheless, there are other kinds of costs associated with
randomness. Inequalities may make it possible for society to
accept a policy that is wrong in principle and would be readily rejected as intolerable if it were applied wherever logically
applicable. The inequality mitigates the essential "wrongness"
of the policy, but it may well postpone the day when the injustice is recognized for what it is and eliminated in its entirety.
In this sense a policy of strict equality presents certain risks to
frugality objectives, but does not inevitably clash with them. An
equality requirement may result in more severe punishment
for attempters, but it could also lead in the long run to less
severe punishment for both attempters and completers, making it the preferred approach even from a frugality viewpoint.
The ALI and other frugality advocates do not seem to
consider this possibility. Their position may simply reflect an
implicit judgment that the risk is not worth taking, a judgment
that might well be politically sound. Even so, it is by no means
clear that this will be true for all crimes and for all penalties,
See text accompanying note 233 supra.
The point, however, seems inapplicable in the case of most strict liability
crimes (other than felony murder) and probably even for many crimes of negligence,
since the activity involved is not illegal as such. The point also seems inapplicable
in the case of those who are risk preferrers. Cf. text accompanying note 170 supra.
268

269
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or at all times. Furman itself involved precisely the same choice.
Progressive introduction of greater and greater discretion into
the process of imposing the death penalty had gradually reduced its incidence to quite a low level; there was hope that
this process, if allowed to continue, would lead to the virtual
abolition of capital punishment in the United States within a
decade. The Court's decision restricting or perhaps eliminating
discretion brought an abrupt halt to this process, and aroused
fears, expressed by several of the dissenting Justices, that the
result would be an increase, rather than a decrease, in the
number of executions. 270 It is of course possible to read the
decision as treating such an increase as desirable, inasmuch as
it would establish a principled and even-handed distribution
of the death penalty. But in view of the expressed personal
27 1
opposition to the death penalty by all nine of the Justices,
it would be most surprising if they had not given considerable
thought to the possible "frugality" advantages of their judgment. Equality, in short, not only has independent value as a
social goal; it can serve in important ways to further the interest in frugality.
Apart from its implications for frugality, inequality is
thought to involve significant costs of its own. Perhaps foremost is the offense to a sense of justice entailed in allowing a
random or irrelevant factor to determine the punishment to
be imposed. We have already considered this point in terms
of the philosophies of deterrence and retribution, but the same
notion is often presented as an independent requirement of
justice-that like cases be treated alike.2 72 The Model Penal
Code emphasizes the point by including among its guiding
purposes the goal "to differentiate273on reasonable grounds
between serious and minor offenses.
Of course, the problem remains to determine what is a
"reasonable ground," or when we are dealing with "like cases."
It has quite rightly been pointed out that the commentators
who invoke the principle of equality are rarely clear about
what it means.2 74 But whatever the difficulties of definition,
270 408 U.S. at 397, 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 413 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
271 All of the dissenting Justices joined in the Chief Justice's statement to this
effect. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also id. at 406, 410 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
272 H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 24; H.M. Hart, supra note 34, at 439.
273 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(e) (Official Draft 1962).
274 F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 49.
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there would presumably be agreement that two cases, otherwise identical, would remain "alike" after one was selected
by lottery for special treatment. Whether two cases distinguished only by the occurrence of harm in one should be regarded as "alike" has been a concern throughout this Article,
but in the context of the frugality argument we are entitled to
assume that the occurrence of harm is essentially fortuitous
and therefore that the two cases do remain essentially alike.
There has not, in any event, been a serious effort to resolve
the equality issue on the ground that the two situations are
dissimilar.2 7 5 The commentary to the Model Penal Code provisions dealing with the grading of attempts makes clear, for
example, that the notion of equality is thought implicated
even where differentiation results from "purified" random
choice, and even where the differentiating factor is the occurrence of harm:
[W]hen the actor's failure to commit the substantive offense is due to a fortuity, as when the bullet
misses in attempted murder or when the expected
response to solicitation is withheld, his exculpation
on that ground would involve inequality of treatment
that would shock the common sense of justice. Such
a situation is unthinkable in any mature system,
de27 6
signed to serve the proper goals of penal law.
Despite the currency of such statements, there has been
little, if any, effort to explain precisely why such inequality
shocks "the common sense of justice," or should. This is all
the more unfortunate since the nearly universal acceptance
of the principle that like cases should be treated alike is accompanied by nearly universal acceptance of blatant violations of
this principle, not only with respect to emphasis on harm but
in a wide variety of other contexts.2 7" Often there is no recognition whatever of the inconsistency, or of the need to accept
trade-offs among competing values. The Model Penal Code
itself, after its ringing statement in support of equality, pro275 H.L.A. Hart dismisses as simply retributive the notion that the occurrence

of harm renders a completed crime greater in gravity than a similar attempt. H.L.A.
HART, supra note 11, at 234. Cf. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 47.
276 MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 5, Comment at 25 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
277 Examples include differences in sentence resulting from the attitudes of
different judges toward an identical case, and exemplary sentences to provide special
publicity and greater deterrence on a particular occasion. See H.L.A. HART, supra
note 11, at 24-25; F. ZIMRING & G. HAwKINS, supra note 153, at 46-50.
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ceeds in the commentaries to the very same section to defend
on frugality grounds the leniency for attempts to commit first
degree felonies, without even mentioning inequality as a drawback.2 78 In a few instances conflict between equality and some
other desirable value has been recognized, but conclusions
are then expressed as to which is more weighty without any
effort to elucidate the costs that inequality might entail.2 7 9
The problem of explaining the reasons for valuing equality
in punishment appears, therefore, to be a major unsolved
question in criminal law theory. Even in terms of its vaguest
general formulation, the notion of equality has not won universal acceptance-Thurmond Arnold dismissed the idea as
"essentially a religious one" 2 80 unsuited for consideration by
the practical social engineer. But more importantly for the
many who accept the notion as intuitively sound, we have no
basis for identifying the situations in which equality should
be sacrificed to some competing value.2 8 1
The notion of equality thus remains a troubling one. It
provides no firm basis for assessing whether the advantages
of a penalty "lottery" would outweigh its equality costs, but
it nevertheless leaves us in considerable discomfort concerning
the "justice" or "fairness" of randomness in punishment.
(iv)

Conclusion

We have attempted in the preceding pages to indicate
ways in which the frugality approach requires the sacrifice of
values often thought important in the administration of criminal law. From a retributive perspective, the approach is inconComment at 178-79 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
' See note 226 supra. To the same effect, see H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at

278 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05,
27

24-25; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 49. One effort to give content

,o the notion appears in H.L.A. Hart's treatment of the related principle that offenses of different gravity not be punished with the same severity-this, he notes,
would create "a risk of either confusing common morality or flouting it and bringing
the law into contempt." H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 25. But this concern would
hardly be a pressing one in all instances, and it seems fair to conclude, even without
knowing the essence of the notion of equality, that this somehow fails to capture it.
For an examination of the equality concept as a general requirement in a system of
law, see Winston, supra note 233.
280 Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1932).
281 One avenue for studying this question would be to examine the idea of equality
as a requirement that may emerge from a retributive or deterrent theory of puinishment. See text accompanying notes 241-67 supra. Another approach would be to consider the difficulties resulting when randomness confronts the citizen with uncertainty as to the legal consequences of his actions. See text accompanying notes 233
& 268-69 supra. But even this would not tell the whole story since some inequalities
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sistent with the notion that criminal penalties are a morally
necessary response to wrongful conduct. This notion no longer
commands wide support, but it may well retain validity in the
case of offenses to which the most severe sanctions apply. This
is of course precisely the area in which the frugality approach
is most often urged. From a deterrence perspective, the frugality approach requires acceptance of the troublesome position that general deterrence, unsupported by other goals, can
be the sole rationale for an additional sanction. And even if
this position is accepted, frugality will frequently conflict with
the view that deterrence ought not be pursued where it becomes necessary to make an offender suffer, as an object lesson
to others, more than his 'just deserts." Finally, from an equality perspective, the frugality approach involves offense, albeit
of uncertain content, to notions of justice, and could in the
long run disserve the goal of frugality itself.
These values sacrificed under a frugality approach may
not outweigh its benefits. If the alternative is more widespread
use of severe sanctions, it might be preferable to live with the
various costs outlined here. Another alternative, however, is
to achieve equality by reducing the higher penalty. This involves the sacrifice of some deterrence, but it is far from clear
that this is more costly than the various drawbacks of the frugality approach itself. Certainly there is widespread agreement
that pursuit of deterrence does not justify exceeding the just
deserts limits, and this may be true as well where other values
are placed in jeopardy. Assessment of such choices requires
at the very least a careful evaluation of the extent to which the
promise of greater deterrence central to the frugality argument is in fact fulfilled.
2. Frugality and the Equal Deterrence Assumption
We saw at the very outset of our consideration of the
frugality argument that its advocates base their view on the
assumption that leniency for those actors who cause no harm
will not diminish the deterrent impact of the sanction applicable to the completed crime. We have seen that the "pure"
arbitrariness implicit in the frugality approach raises serious
would not involve uncertainty costs, as where legislative categories differentiate
between two types of activity that are in fact "alike," any differences between them
being irrelevant to the purposes of the law. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1941).
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questions of fairness even if this assumption is in fact true.
It is now necessary to consider the factual validity or invalidity
of this crucial assumption.
We have already had occasion to evaluate the assumption,
in slightly different form, in connection with the jury nullification argument. We saw that this argument rests on an "added
deterrence" hypothesis-that use of a severe penalty where
harm occurs can add to the deterrence produced by the milder
sanctions applicable to the underlying conduct. In evaluating
this theory we were led to consider the more extravagant
"equal deterrence" hypothesis advanced by Michael and Wechsler and by the ALI-that the harm-oriented structure of penalties would produce substantially the same deterrent effect as
across-the-board imposition of the more severe sanction. It
is this equal deterrence hypothesis which must be valid if the
frugality argument is to be sustained.
As we have seen, however, the equal deterrence hypothesis
does not withstand analysis. With respect to intentional crimes,
the sanction applicable to the completed crime does add very
substantially to the deterrence produced by penalties for an
unsuccessful attempt; but even here, still greater deterrence
28 2
could be obtained by increasing the attempt penalty as well.
Or, to put it in terms of the frugality perspective, more lenient
treatment of unsuccessful attempts does involve a definite sacrifice of deterrence. With respect to crimes of recklessness
and negligence the equal deterrence hypothesis is even weaker.
Here, it is doubtful whether penalties applicable only when
harm occurs add significantly at all to the deterrent effect
of the underlying sanctions, and certainly it is clear that more
lenient treatment of conduct not causing harm has a very substantial cost in terms of deterrence. 283 Accordingly, the frugality principle, as usually formulated, cannot justify emphasis
on results.
The frugality argument might, however, be treated as a
more modest theory, calling only for recognition of the need to
weigh the advantages of punishment against social costs that
are too easily overlooked. In these terms the argument makes
a very important point, but even then the claim that leniency
should depend on the presence or absence of harm does not
fare especially well. Let us suppose that a reduction in the
22 See text accompanying notes 149-50 supra.
283

See text accompanying notes 151-60 supra.
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penalty applicable to an inchoate, crime will be less costly in
terms of deterrence than the same reduction in the penalty
applicable to the completed crime; the preceding analysis suggests that this is true in a number of important situations. The
frugality argument could then be presented as follows: First,
the penalty for the completed crime should be set at the optimal point, which (at least under certain simplifying conditions)
is attained at the level at which the marginal benefits of added
punishment (in terms of deterrence and other factors) no
longer exceed its marginal social cost. 28 4 To be sure, any attempt to determine actual marginal benefits and costs is almost
hopelessly speculative, but our desire nevertheless must be to
approximate this optimal point. Next, the frugality advocate
notes our supposition that a reduction in the penalty applicable
to the inchoate crime is less costly in terms of deterrence than
the same reduction in the penalty applicable to the completed
crime; in other words, the marginal benefits of punishment
(assuming that the non-deterrence benefits are constant) are
greater for completed crimes than for the corresponding inchoate crimes. It follows, therefore, that the optimal punishment level for the inchoate crime must necessarily be lower
than the optimum level for the completed crime, at least if
-- on the cost side-the social harm associated with punishment
is the same in the case of attempters as in the case of completers.
An important difficulty with this formulation of the argument is that the leniency for attempters not only implies an
"arbitrary" distinction between attempters and completers,
but also subjects the completers to more severe penalties than
they themselves would have faced if both attempters and completers had been treated alike. As previously noted, "pure"
arbitrariness seems particularly unfair under these circumstances. But even on a purely factual level, the reformulated
frugality argument still embodies serious weaknesses, for the
"cost equation" may very well be different for completed and
inchoate crimes. From a frugality perspective, a reduction in
a penalty reduces the overall social cost of punishment by an
amount that must be a function of the number of defendants
to whom the penalty applies. If the number sentenced for a
completed crime is greater than the number sentenced for an
inchoate crime, then the "marginal cost" of a given increase in
2'4

See generally Becker, supra note 170.
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penalty would be less for the latter. In other words, at a given
penalty level the lower marginal benefit from punishing inchoate crimes does not necessarily imply a lower optimal level
of punishment, because the marginal social cost of punishing
these crimes may be lower as well. Thus, even with all the
simplifying of assumptions our frugality advocate was forced
to make, he has still failed to establish that the optimal level
of punishment is necessarily greater for completed than for
inchoate crimes. It could be greater or the same, or it could
even be lower. The answer depends in part on whether completers outnumber attempters and if so by how much.
Although we have little hope for quantifying the marginal
deterrence benefits of added punishment, we can add some
additional perspective by considering differences in the numbers exposed to punishment for inchoate and completed
crimes. Intentional crimes are probably the group for which
success is most likely; the ratio of completers to attempters
should therefore be relatively high in this category. The ratio
of convicted completers to convicted attempters is probably larger
still since it seems likely that failure to report or to follow
through on prosecution is higher for the latter. Although comprehensive statistics are not available, 8 5 it seems quite possible
that convicted completers are in fact much more numerous
than convicted attempters.2 86 If this is true, the frugality argument suffers from a serious flaw, since the equal deterrence hypothesis was most nearly valid for intentional crimes.
Though a reduced penalty for the unsuccessful attempt costs
relatively little in terms of deterrence, it may be of little value
in terms of frugality because a relatively small group benefits
from the leniency. A smaller reduction in the penalty for the
completed crime could have the same deterrence cost but
make more sense in terms of frugality, because a much larger
group of defendants could benefit by it.
With respect to crimes of negligence, the difficulty is just
the reverse. Here, "attempters" (those who create the risk) are
no doubt far more numerous than completers. Although fewer
285 The Uniform Crime Reports, for example, report attempts together with
completed crimes as a single figure in the various offense categories. See, e.g., UNIFORM CRIME REPoRTs-1971, supra note 165, at 6, 10, 12, 14, 18, 25.
286The situation no doubt varies from crime to crime. In the case of murder,
fatal assaults may in fact be much less numerous than non-fatal assaults involving
sufficient intent to kill to be considered attempted murder. See text accompanying
note 318 infra.
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of the former are likely to be prosecuted, convicted "attempters" still far outnumber convicted completers. Here,
therefore, a lower penalty in the absence of harm produces a
very meaningful frugality gain, but it is precisely in this area
that the lower penalty also involves a very substantial loss of
deterrence. Here again, the frugality viewpoint might in fact
require lowering the very substantial penalties applicable to
the completed crime, penalties that have relatively little deterrence value.
This is not, of course, intended to suggest that the frugality argument is logically invalid under all conceivable sets
of facts and circumstances. Whether lower penalties for inchoate crimes are justified depends on an assessment of the
marginal deterrence benefits and marginal social costs of punishment, matters on which we can hardly claim to have precise
knowledge. The important point is rather the converse-that
there is nothing inherently valid about the frugality argument
either. As usually formulated, the frugality argument purports
to proceed from intuitively obvious premises to a logically
ineluctible conclusion, justifying milder sanctions in the absence of harm. The argument conceals debatable and perhaps
unacceptable moral judgments, but even more decisively, it
simply seems wrong on its facts. From a frugality perspective,
lower penalties for inchoate crimes could logically be bad or
good. In general, we lack sufficient facts to know, and in quite
a few instances such leniency seems much more likely to be
harmful.
F. Efficiency in Regulation
In certain limited contexts, punishment based upon actual
results might be viewed as a less intrusive or more efficient
means of regulating conduct than other means available to the
law. It could be claimed that this approach makes it possible
to achieve the desired level of deterrence without resort to
more restrictive techniques. Although the defenders of emphasis on results have not developed this argument, the notion
is occasionally implicit, particularly in connection with the
defense of strict liability offenses.
This type of argument is not, however, applicable in most
of the situations we have considered, since emphasis on results
rarely implies that the underlying conduct itself is not proscribed; rather the issue is simply one of the severity of pun-
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ishment. And even if the underlying conduct is not criminal
in the absence of a harmful result, as is sometimes true of
negligent homicide, a judgment is nevertheless involved that
the conduct is undesirable as such. 2 87 In the case of many strict
liability crimes, however, the conduct is not wrongful in itself,
and it may even have affirmative social value. It is positively
desirable, for example, that businessmen sell drugs to the
public, exercising due care to insure that they are not impure.
Only when harm occurs, when the drugs turn out to be adulterated, is the conduct condemned at all. 288 In this situation
the deterrence achieved by penalties requiring proof of negligence may be deemed insufficient, yet the underlying conduct
cannot be prohibited outright. And supervising the qualifications of all who engage in the activity, or excluding particular
groups considered dangerous, may be impractical.
One solution is to make the crime one of strict liability,
an approach that necessarily implies emphasis upon actual
results.2 8 9 Apart from its potential advantages in terms of deterrence, this approach could be viewed as a "less restrictive
alternative," allowing most people greater freedom to engage
in socially important endeavors than would be possible under
more direct means of regulation.
The argument is not fallacious as far as it goes-the strict
liability crime is indeed less restrictive than direct regulation,
and it could well prove more efficient than any available alternative. Nevertheless, the factual underpinning of the argument seems inadequate to justify a strict liability approach
with any generality. Those who continue to engage in the
See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
E.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
289 A form of argument in defense of such an approach has been suggested by
Wasserstrom:
To the extent to which the function of the criminal law is conceived to be
that of regulating various kinds of conduct, it becomes relevant to ask
whether this particular way of regulating conduct [strict liability] leads to
more desirable results than possible alternative procedures ....
* . * One of the deleterious consequences of strict liability offenses is
the possibility that certain socially desirable institutions will be weakened
or will disappear. The problem is twofold: first one must decide whether the
additional deterrent effect of the strict liability statutes will markedly reduce
the occurrence of those events which the statute seeks quite properly to
prevent. And second, one must decide whether this additional reduction in
undesirable consequences is more beneficial to society than the possible
deleterious effects upon otherwise desirable activities such as banking or
drug distribution.
Wasserstrom, supra note 74, at 738-39.
287

288
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activity may be those who believe they can be careful enough,
but there is no guarantee that these will be the ones who are
in fact the most careful. Indeed, there is some reason to suspect
that those who are most confident of their ability to avoid
causing harm may be just the ones who are most likely to be
especially careless..29 0 Thus, the strict liability crime may exclude a few accident-prone people from the activity, but it may
well fail to select out most of those about whom the law should
be most concerned. At the same time, it may exclude from the
activity many others who could play a valuable social role but
are unwilling to face the risk of suffering criminal penalties
for reasons beyond their control. Indeed, if the penalties are
serious, those who are careful and make provision for risks
may be the most likely to take the sensible precaution of not
2 91
engaging in this activity at all.
As a regulatory device, therefore, the strict liability approach is less restrictive only in a very mechanical sense; functionally it may tend to restrict precisely the wrong conduct.
Likewise, the effect in reducing harm is clear only in the short
run; the dynamic effect, under plausible assumptions about
human behavior, could be to increase the total harm caused
by increasing the proportion of those engaged in the activity
who are relatively careless. It would be of interest to study
from this perspective the effect of strict liability sanctions upon
corporate and individual behavior. For the time being, the
relevant empirical evidence remains unclear, and it would
perhaps not be unnatural for a legislature simply to assume
29 2
that the facts crucial to the validity of this argument are true.
Nevertheless, in the present state of knowledge, there appears
to be little basis for urging that a legislature should make such
an assumption.
290 This confidence may be one reason why such people are dangerous; if they
were concerned about the danger, they would not be inadvertent so often. The
argument does hold for those who are aware of their carelessness but are unable to
control their failing. Whether this pattern is more common among those who are
careless is a question on which psychological inquiry might be useful.
291 This defect would not be present if the only penalty were a monetary fine
calculated to approximate the total harm to society caused by the defendant's conduct.
In this case, the fact that "payment of fines [may be] treated merely as a license to
continue in operation . . ." would-far from being a drawback-ensure that the
most efficient and careful actors, rather than those most easily intimidated by the
threat of criminal sanctions, will survive and predominate. Wasserstrom, supra note
74, at 737; see Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Non-fault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965).
292 Wasserstrom, supra note 74, at 739-40.
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THE DANGEROUSNESS JUSTIFICATION

One justification for emphasis on results advanced by
many commentators is that the harm caused may provide
some indication of the dangerousness of the conduct. In the
case of reckless and negligent conduct, in particular, the risk
created can never be measured with precision, and the harm
actually caused may be an important measure of what this
risk in fact was. Packer, for example, argues that even the
much-criticized felony-murder rule at least embodies "a valuable insight drawn from common experience": that the felon
who shot his victim manifested extreme recklessness. 2 93 And
Glanville Williams suggests that the failure of an attempt may
reflect lack of cunning or careful planning; "a would-be criminal who constantly fails is less dangerous than one who constantly succeeds. 2 9 4 Sir James Stephen, on the other hand,
considers
the dangerousness argument but seems to reject
29 5
it.

Courts seldom consider the dangerousness argument,
since they are ordinarily content to apply present law without
seeking to justify it. Nevertheless, cases can be found in which
judges too have refused to regard the harm caused as a significant indication of dangerousness. 29 6 In other instances,
decisions reflect acceptance of the dangerousness argument,
at least tacitly. In Texas, for example, the Phrase "without
due caution or circumspection" has been held unconstitutionally vague as the standard of liability in a reckless driving
statute,297 but the same language has been held sufficiently
specific in laws proscribing vehicle homicide 298 and reckless
293 Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 598 (1963).
294 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, § 49, at 137. See also Note, Why Do Criminal Attempts Fail? A New Defense, 70 YALE L.J. 160, 166 (1960).
295 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 8, at 119. Looking to the result instead of to the
actor's intent "seems to be a far less satisfactory test both of the moral guilt and of the
public danger of an act of violence." Id. This criticism was directed to the French
Code, in which penalties were related to the harm caused to an even greater extent
than under the English law of Stephen's day.
296 In an English prosecution for reckless driving, the judge remarked: "The
fact that a death resulted from a piece of dangerous driving did not make the dangerous driving any more or less [so]. It would be quite wrong for the court to measure
a man's culpability by the amount of damage he did." Goodhart, supra note 61, at 19
(quoting Burns v. Currell, [1963] 2 Q.B. 433 (Streatfeild,J.)).
197Ex parte Chernosky, 217 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1949). This is, of course,
contrary to the great weight of authority. See, e.g., People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138,
183 N.E. 273 (1932); State ex rel. Zent v. Yanny, 244 Wis. 342, 12 N.W.2d 45 (1943).
See also Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-78 (1913).
298 Pehl v. State, 223 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1949).
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causing of a collision.2 '" ' The cases can perhaps be reconciled
on the ground that the decision as to when conduct involves
a lack of "due caution" becomes too open-ended when no harm
has in fact occurred.
A feeling that the harm requirement serves to confirm
dangerousness may also underlie cases treating contributory
fault of the victim as an "intervening cause" sufficient to exculpate the defendant. 30 0 This is certainly hard to justify in
terms of the traditional theory of criminal liability-the state
has an independent interest in preventing loss of life, and
conduct creating a foreseeable risk of injury should be deterred even if the victim has further accentuated the risk. In
fact, the great majority of the cases have taken this view and
rejected contributory negligence as a defense.3 0 1 But the minority viewpoint could be justified on the theory that a result
apparently within the foreseeable risk would not necessarily
confirm the dangerousness of the defendant's conduct if the
victim's behavior increased the likelihood of harm.
The validity of the dangerousness theory is in one sense
clear. Suppose we group together all those whose conduct
appears to have created the same risk, so far as this risk can
be estimated on the basis of actions alone, and then divide
this group into two classes-one consisting of those who have
caused harm and the other consisting of those who have not.
It is statistically inevitable that those who have caused harm
will on the average have created higher risks, in terms of circumstances of which they should have been aware, than those
who did not cause harm. The harmful result thus serves two
functions under the dangerousness theory. First, it confirms
the dangerousness of conduct so difficult to evaluate that we
would otherwise be reluctant to condemn it. Secondly, even
if we are confident enough of our appraisal to condemn the
conduct in both situations, it is relevant to the grading of the
offenses that those who did not cause harm had, as a class,
created lower risks than those who did cause harm.
2 09

Ex parte Dickson, 261 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953) (Chernosky,
supra note 297, involves "an entirely different offense which, insofar as the statute
is valid, is complete without the occurrence of any collision").
300 See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
301 See note 19 supra. It is sometimes stated that contributory negligence will
constitute an intervening cause if it "looms so large in comparison with the [negligence of the defendant], that the [latter] is not to be regarded as a substantial factor
in the final result." R. PERKINS, supra note 9, at 703.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1497

A slightly different dimension is added by psychological
theories concerning the interplay between conscious and unconscious intentions. Freud argued that divergence between
an actor's conscious purpose and the results he actually achieves
will often be explained by an unconscious intention to further
a different purpose.3 0 2 A defendant who attempted to shoot
his victim but missed may, of course, have failed because of
his inherent lack of skill or because the victim suddenly moved
away. But he also may have failed because an unconscious
desire not to kill interfered with his conscious purpose, causing him to aim poorly and miss a shot that would have given
him no difficulty under other circumstances. And even the
first group of explanations is not inconsistent with the possibility that the defendant's intention was ambivalent. If the
defendant had always been a poor shot, his decision not to
choose a weapon better suited to his talents may have been
influenced by an unconscious intention that the plan fail;
similarly, the victim may be lucky enough to move out of the
way only because the defendant waited unnecessarily long
before firing. Even if success is prevented only by police intervention at the last moment, it cannot always be said that the
defendant's intention was unequivocal; he may have purposely, though unconsciously, chosen to execute his plan at a time
30 3
when apprehension was especially likely.
The psychological implications of the harm caused are
relevant to punishment in some of the same ways as the purely
statistical implications. The occurrence of harm tends to confirm that the defendant intended to commit a crime, and those
who cause harm will, as a group, have had intentions less
equivocal than those who do not. But the psychological implications are different in a way that may be fundamental. While
the strictly statistical approach suggests that the intent or inadvertence of actors in the two classes may be different, it
does, not distinguish between conscious and unconscious levels
of thought. The Freudian approach, in turn, suggests that we
cannot generalize about a difference in the conscious intentions of the classes of successful and unsuccessful actors. It
could be, for example, that among the "successful" actors,
those who unconsciously desire to cause harm and do so with302 Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in THE COMPLETE INTRODUCTORY
LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 15-79 (J. Strachey ed. 1966).
303 Cf. E. STENGEL & N. CooK, ATTEMPTED SUICIDE, ITS SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE
AND EFFECTS 84 (1958); Note, supra note 294, at 166.
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out conscious intent are much more numerous than those who
unconsciously wish to avoid harm but succeed because of a
conscious purpose to do so; unconscious purposes might similarly tend to prevail in the class of unsuccessful actors.
If this is true, the conscious intentions of the successful
actors might not be more dangerous on the average than those
of the unsuccessful actors. To the extent that it is considered
appropriate to assess punishment solely on the basis of the
conscious state of mind, different treatment of successful and
unsuccessful actors would not necessarily be warranted. On
the other hand, the psychological insights reinforce the statistical implications concerning the dangerousness of the actor's
conduct. Accordingly, if it is considered proper to impose
greater punishment on those whose conduct was more dangerous (or who are believed more likely to be dangerous in the
future),30 4 both the psychological and statistical approaches
provide a basis for greater punishment in the cases where harm
occurs, 30 5 even though culpability and deterrability, if gauged
in terms of the conscious state of mind, would be considered
equivalent for the two classes.
Even if conscious intentions are not controlling, the dangerousness theory is not entirely satisfying as an explanation
for emphasis on the harm caused. In the first place, crimes
that require proof of harm are often graded as more serious
than those that do not, even when the culpability required for
the inchoate crime is significantly greater. Thus, in most states
the penalties provided for vehicle homicide caused by negligence are substantially greater than the penalties provided for
reckless driving that does not cause harm; 30 6 this is also true
3 07
under the Model Penal Code.
304 There is, of course, some question whether an exercise of unconscious controls in one instance can support a prediction that such controls will predominate
in the future. Apart from this, fixing punishment on the basis of dangerousness, in
the sense of predicted future dangerousness, could be attacked as an impermissible
form of preventive detention. For present purposes, however, the legitimacy of this
objective is assumed. See text accompanying note 335 infra.
305 It would also be possible to consider dangerous unconscious desires irrelevant to punishment when the conscious intentions are lawful, but to treat unconscious control as a mitigating factor when the conscious intention is unlawful.
306 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-605, 606 (1968) (up to three months-reckless and no harm; up to one year-careless and death).
307 Reckless conduct creating a risk of death is a misdemeanor if no harm results,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (Official Draft 1962), and even if bodily injury but not
death is caused, id. § 211.1(1)(a). Negligent creation of a homicidal risk is a felony
of the third degree if death results. Id. §'210.4.
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Similarly, penalties authorized for assault with intent to
kill are almost invariably lower than those provided for seconddegree murder.3 0 8 Yet the former crime requires a specific
intent to take human life30 :9 while the mens rea for second
degree murder is satisfied merely by a reckless disregard for
3 10
life, or even a reckless threatening of a serious bodily injury.
The differences in penalty cannot be justified on a dangerousness theory if we continue to take seriously the distinctions
between these descriptions of the underlying conduct.
Even if the law were adjusted to eliminate these glaring
disparities between dangerousness and the applicable sanction,
the dangerousness argument remains troubling. The argument
calls for more severe sanctions for the class that causes harm,
on the basis of its greater dangerousness on the average; but
of course we know that the class will contain some who were
no more dangerous, and perhaps much less dangerous, than
many in the "less dangerous" class. The use of harm as a sorting factor means, in other words, that the "less dangerous"
class will be at once overinclusive and underinclusive. Unfortunately we have little basis for judging the extent of this missorting. Criminology studies ordinarily focus on behavior that
results in harm; similar conduct not culminating in a completed offense is usually ignored.3 1 ' The F.B.I. crime statistics
do not even distinguish between attempts and completed
crimes in the various offense categories.3 12 This void must be
filled if we are to have any basis for judgment as to the dangerousness of various types of behavior and the actual value of
harm as a sorting factor.
A series of studies on fatal and non-fatal assaults in the
city of Chicago provides one source of information of this
kind. The first study compared the fatality rate in knife attacks
to that in gun attacks; 313 a second compared fatality rates in
308 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.05(1), 210.2(2), 211.1(2) (Official Draft
1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 905(a), 2502(b) (1973). See also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.05, Comment at 186-97 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
309 See, e.g., Regina v. Grimwood, [1962] 2 Q.B. 621; MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)
(b) (Official Draft 1962). See also R. PERKINS, supra note 9, at 573-74, 763.
3 10
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(b) (Official Draft 1962); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.25(2) (McKinney 1967). See also R. PERKINS, supra note 9, at 46, 763.
311 Zimring, supra note 242, at 109-10. An exception appears to be Pittman &
Handy, Patterns in CriminalAggravated Assault, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 462 (1964).
12

See note 285 supra.

313 Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent killings?, 35 U. CHI. L.

721 (1968).
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attacks with guns of various calibers. 31 4 In both cases it proved
true that the fatal attacks included a higher proportion of the
most dangerous types of attacks (wounds to vital areas, multiple wounds and more dangerous weapons) than the non-fatal
attacks. But surprisingly, most of the fatalities resulted from
attacks of relatively low dangerousness (such as single-wound
shootings), and when the attacks were analyzed by available
indicia of dangerousness, substantial percentages of fatal and
non-fatal results were found in virtually all categories. As a
result, the comparison of knife and gun attacks suggested the
conclusion that:
Many nonfatal attacks with knives and guns are
apparently indistinguishable in motive, intent and
dangerousness from many fatal attacks. Indeed, the
overlap between fatal and nonfatal assaults with knives
and guns is much more impressive than any differ31 5
ences that were noted.

Even more striking support for this observation is found
in the study of weapon caliber. The estimated death rate from
gun attack, by wound location, number of wounds, and gun
caliber, is shown in the table below.31 6
As the table shows, the type of attack that seems intuitively
most dangerous-multiple wounds to the head or chest with a
.38 caliber weapon-is indeed fatal much more often (sixtyeight percent of the time)-than an apparently low-dangerousness attack-such as a single .22 caliber wound to the abdomen, back or neck (seventeen percent). But what is striking is
that even these relatively precise tests of dangerousness still
fail to explain a great many of the actual outcomes; in one of
the most dangerous categories, thirty-two percent of the attacks
were not fatal, while in one of the least dangerous, seventeen
percent resulted in deaths. 3 17 Nor does Freudian theory pro314 Zimring, supra note 242.
3 15
Id. 97
3 16

Id. 104.

The categories could, at least in theory, be narrowed by specifying more
precisely the wound area and number of wounds, as well as by taking account of the
distance between victim and assailant, and so on. Conceivably, a more refined table
of this kind might explain, in terms of dangerousness, why at least some of the
attacks involving multiple head or chest wounds with a .38 caliber weapon did not
result in death. But the patterns revealed in Table 4 strongly suggest that no amount
of further refinement could ever perfectly separate the fatal and non-fatal assaults,
and that the bulk of the categories, no matter how narrow, would still contain some
cases of each type, differentiated solely by chance.
317
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Table 4
Estimated Death Rate from Gun Attacks by Wound Location,
Number of Wounds, and Gun Caliber
Single wound
Head and chest
Abdomen, back, neck
Shoulder, arm, leg

Total

Head and chest
Abdomen, back, neck
Shoulder, arm, leg

Total

.22
16%
(69)
17%
(52)
0%
(170)

.25
50%
(14)
13%
(15)
2%
(71)

.32
44%
(18)
4%
(24)
0%
(52)

.38
55%
(40)
20%
(25)
0%
(83)

>.38
63%
(8)
25%
(4)
0%
(11)

7%
(291)

10%
(100)

10%
(94)

18%
(148)

27%
(23)

.22

.25

28%
(19)
0%
(11)

25%
(4)
33%
(3)

0%
(6)

0%
(3)

14%
(36)

20%
(10)

Multiple wound
.32
.38
35%
(17)
18%
(11)

29%
(28)

>.38

68%
(25)
18%
(11)

100%
(2)
-

0%
(22)

-

40%
(58)

100%
(2)

vide any apparent basis for explanation; conflicting conscious
and unconscious intentions cannot explain why some shots
that find their mark in the head or chest prove fatal while
many others do not. Yet under present law the nonfatal attacks
would necessarily be treated as relatively "nondangerous"
attempts, while the others would presumably be the subject
of murder prosecutions. Though it has long been recognized
that such anomalies could arise, the Chicago studies emphasize
that they arise in very significant numbers. 318 As the guncaliber study concludes:
[T]here is a good deal of overlap between the
structure, intention and motivational background
318 The gun caliber study involved a total of 1,115 gun attacks resulting in 156
fatalities, all occurring during a period of a little over four months. Zimring, supra
note 242, at 98.
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of most serious but nonfatal attacks and most homicides in Chicago . . . . [W]hatever else may separate
fatal from nonfatal firearm attacks, the element of
chance must play an important role, because all attacks to the head and trunk can cause death (but less
than a majority do) and more than 60% of all lethal
attacks are single-wound shootings . . . . [T]here is a
strong suggestion that most people who attack with
guns act in ways
that are distinguishable only on the
319
basis of result.
It remains true, of course, that the class of cases resulting in
a fatality involves more dangerous conduct, on the average,
than the class of cases not resulting in a fatality. But even in
the former, "high-dangerousness" class, most of the conduct
in fact appears to fall in the "low dangerousness" category.
Conduct involving a relatively slight chance of death is so much
more common than conduct involving a high risk of death that
most homicides appear to be the result of the "low-risk" behavior. In other words, if we accept harm as a proxy for "high
dangerousness," we find ourselves misled more than half the
time. 320 Such evidence casts considerable doubt on the value
of harm as a sorting device, at least with respect to cases of
321
violent assault.
Even if harm can be shown a much more reliable guide
to the risk created, it would at best seem useful only as the
basis for a presumption that the defendant's conduct was especially dangerous and therefore warrants an aggravated
penalty. Indeed, present law could be viewed as adopting precisely this presumption, and endowing it with irrebuttable
status. If dangerousness is the concern, however, it seems
inappropriate to make the presumption irrebuttable, and it
322
might even be subject to constitutional attack in these terms.
Using harm as the basis for a rebuttable presumption of aggra319

Id. 110-11.
If absence of a fatality is assumed to be a proxy for "low dangerousness," the
assumption will of course prove accurate in a high percentage of the cases. The difficulty is that in both the harm category and the no-harm category, most cases appear
to involve low-risk behavior. Mitigation of punishment for the no-harm category
cannot be based on the characteristic of low dangerousness common to this class, if
the same characteristic is present in the majority of cases in the harm category.
321 It would be instructive to attempt a comparable study of dangerousness for
fatal and non-fatal motor vehicle accidents.
322 Cf Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
320
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vated dangerousness would give recognition to the legitimate
significance of harm 323 without stifling a complete and meaningful evaluation of the actual dangerousness of the defendant's conduct. It would become possible for a defendant to
avoid the most severe sanctions by showing that despite the
occurrence of death, his conduct was not of the most dangerous kind. It could also be made permissible for the prosecution to establish the aggravating factor of extreme dangerousness even where harm has not occurred.3 2 4 As the Chicago
studies show, such cases would be far from rare in connection with knife and gun assaults. Even for crimes based on
negligence, the difficulty of proving dangerousness by clear,
objective evidence is easily exaggerated; independent proof
of dangerousness is relatively easy to obtain in careless driving cases, 3 25 and these account for the overwhelming major323 Such a presumption would itself be subject to constitutional scrutiny, and
the Chicago studies suggest there might be doubt in some contexts as to whether the
"rationality" requirement would be satisfied. Cf. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S.
136 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The ALI proposal for a presumption of this kind in felony-murder situations, see text accompanying note 328
infra, could well be vulnerable in these terms. Cf. text accompanying notes 162-63
supra.
324 Formally, the aggravating factor might be defined as, for example, acting
"recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life." Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft 1962). A defendant
who acted with this state of mind and caused or attempted to cause serious injury
would be guilty of either homicide or aggravated assault, depending on whether
death occurred. The authorized penalties would in either event be the same, but
the occurrence of death would have the effect of raising a presumption that the
defendant had indeed acted "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life." The presumption could be rebutted in spite
of the occurrence of death (in which case the defendant would at most be guilty only
of a lesser degree of assault). Conversely the element of extreme recklessness necessary to establish the aggravated assault could be proved in appropriate circumstances
evgn in the absence of death.
Similarly, offenses might be graded by a variety of mixtures of intent, result,
and dangerousness, with dangerousness specified by "objective criteria" such as
weapon type, number of wounds inflicted or attempted, and so on. See Zimring, supra
note 242, at 113-18. Such an approach would, like use of a rebuttable presumption,
permit an offense to be treated as very serious even in the absence of death (where
objective criteria of high dangerousness were fulfilled) but require an offense to
be treated as less serious, even given a death together with an "intent to kill," where
all objective criteria of high dangerousness were absent.
Since wound location is itself a kind of result that may or may not reflect factors within the defendant's knowledge or control, it would not be made a "statutory
harm," with irrebuttable significance. Like death or any other result, wound location
would,
however, be relevant as evidence of dangerousness or intent.
' 25 See COMM. ON ENFORCEMENT, PRESIDENT's HIGHWAY SAFETY CONFERENCE, j.pra
note 217, at 12. It might be desirable to require, in the absence of harm, that the
evidence strongly corroborate dangerousness. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(a) (Official Draft 1962).
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ity of all manslaughter prosecutions. 2 6
A rebuttable presumption of the kind suggested would
hardly be a legal novelty. The law already presumes that the
defendant intended "the natural and probable consequences"
of his act, that is, the harm he caused, and this presumption
is generally rebuttable. 3 27 Similarly, the ALI, in recommending
repeal of the felony-murder rule, proposed that recklessness
be presumed (subject to rebuttal) where the actor is engaged
in committing a dangerous felony. 3 28 A shift from present
law to a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness would have
the virtue of eliminating rigid emphasis on results without
radically changing the contours of the criminal law. The change
would nonetheless be one of substance, permitting meaningful
inquiry into the precise nature of the act, allowing mitigation
in many cases where harm occurs, and permitting greater
severity, if deserved, where highly dangerous behavior fortuitously failed to cause harm.
It might be argued that such an inquiry into the precise
degree of dangerousness is difficult and a waste of time, since
most of those who cause harm are in fact sufficiently culpable
-whatever the objective dangerousness of their conduct, they
had the requisite intent to kill. But of course the same sort
of culpability is apparently present in most of those whose
behavior under similar circumstances does not cause death.
And in any case, the Chicago studies suggest that what the law
regards as the "intent to kill" is an indiscriminate guide to
the relevant state of mind. There is a wide difference in intention between the defendant who inflicts a single knife or gunshot wound to a non-vital area and the one who pumps six
bullets into his victim's brain. In the former case the intent
to kill may be fleeting and ambivalent, but the law considers
that culpability has been adequately established. And cases of
326 It has been estimated that vehicle homicides account for about 99% of all
cases of manslaughter by negligence. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comment at

53 & n.6 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
327 See Collings, Negligent Murder--Some Stateside Footnotes to Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Smith, 49 CAL. L. REv. 254, 264 (1961).
328 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2(I)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 9,

1959). The converse

problem arises in economic crimes when the defendant makes restitution prior to
initiation of a prosecution. Although the usual concern with the harm caused might
suggest that restitution would be allowed as a defense, the cases sensibly reject this
approach. See, e.g., Savitt v. United States; 59 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1932). At the same
time, however, it is recognized that repayment is relevant to the question whether
there was an intent to misappropriate funds in the first place. See, e.g., United States
v. Wicoff, 187 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1951).
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this type appear to be the predominant source of deaths from
violent attack. The knife-gun study found that "[m]ost homicide is not the result of a single-minded intention to kill at all
CoSt. ' 3 2 9 Similarly, the gun caliber study concluded:
[M]ost violent attacks with deadly weapons, wfiether fatal or nonfatal, are pursued with ambiguous intentions as to whether the victim should die . . . . In
62 percent of all fatal firearm attacks,... the offender
did not inflict more than
one wound, in spite of his
330
ordinary ability to do so.
As a result, there is little basis for assuming that the occurrence
of harm obviates the need for further detailed inquiry into
defendant's actual intentions.
In any event, evidence of this nature would undoubtedly
be introduced wherever intent or negligence is in issue. Even
if such evidence could be excluded at the trial, as would be the
case for strict liability crimes, it would have to be considered
in determining sentence, so that no time or trouble would be
saved, 331 while the scope for discretion in sentencing would
suffer further expansion. Finally, perhaps most fundamentally, careful inquiry into the defendant's state of mind and his
conduct should never be barred on grounds of inconvenience
in a system that supposedly punishes for fault and takes seri33 2
ously the presumption of innocence.
Another sort of objection to the rebuttable presumption
concept concerns its potential for aggravation of penalties.
When this approach permits a defendant who caused harm
to avoid the most severe penalties, the concept has great appeal. When it is asserted, however, that the same indicia of
dangerousness might point the way to an aggravated penalty
even in the absence of harm, objections are more likely to be
raised. The frugality element of this concern has already
329

Zimring, supra note 242, at 97.

330

Id. 111.

331See G. WILLIAMS, supra note

10, § 89, at 257. The prosecution, of course,
benefits by the relaxation of strict evidentiary rules at the sentencing stage. Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). This makes it all the more appropriate that dangerousness be aired in connection with the trial of guilt or innocence, since the
nature of the issue calls for a full adversary proceeding rather than an open-ended
sentencing inquiry.
332 In recommending repeal of the objective test of intention required by Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, [1961] A.C. 290, the British Law Commission noted
that "the inquiry into the state of mind of a man accused of such a serious crime
as murder must necessarily be a searching one and .. .its difficulties must be faced."
BRITISH LAW COMM'N, IMPUTED CRIMINAL INTENT
18(a), at 15 (1967).
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been considered. 33 3 But in terms of the dangerousness argument itself, such objections seem ill-founded. For present purposes there is no need to insist that differentiations in dangerousness ought to be made or that more severe penalties ought
to be imposed in cases of aggravated dangerousness. This
is indeed a troublesome position, 33 4 but it is not necessary to
argue it here. The point is simply that the law does make this
differentiation now, using harm as the determinant of aggravated penalties. This appears to be an utterly unsatisfactory
method of identifying the most dangerous sorts of offenders,
and for those who regard the objective as an important one,
the alternative of a rebuttable presumption is available. For
those who balk at the potential aggravation of penalties, it
seems fair to ask whether the dangerousness theory is indeed
the basis for their willingness to attribute significance to the
occurrence of a harmful result.
V.

A.

CONCLUSION

Limited Scope of the Study

Before summarizing our conclusions with respect to the
various justifications for emphasis on results, it would be well
to stress the very limited nature of the issue that has preoccupied us in this Article. We have ranged widely over the corpus
of the criminal law, touching on the vagaries of mens rea, the
law of homicide, attempts, causation, strict liability, responsibility for negligence, and many other issues that have concerned commentators for centuries and will likely be of interest
for centuries to come. We have considered many of the asserted
goals of the criminal law, some of them-such as retribution,
deterrence and isolation of the dangerous-highly controversial
in terms of their philosophical basis and empirical foundations.
Yet with the sole exception of the issue of emphasis on results,
this Article takes no position on any of the very live questions
that might be raised with respect to such matters. Our concern
has been to see whether there is any perspective (other than
the purely retaliatory one), no matter how controversial or
idiosyncratic, from which distinctions based on harm can be
335
justified.
333 See text accompanying notes 221-86 supra.

33' See Zimring, supra note 242, at 113-22. See also note 304 supra.
335 See text accompanying note 34 supra. An exception was made in the effort
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Similarly, no effort has been made to establish precisely
where emphasis on results involves penalties that should be
deemed excessively severe rather than excessively lenient. This
question can be thought of as one of choice among our three
paradigmatic penalty structures-P-i, involving severe penalties across the board; P-2, involving severe penalties only when
harm occurs; and P-3, involving milder penalties across the
board. 336 The analysis has centered on the question whether
P-2 can be considered preferable to either P-1 or P-3, and we
have found that in quite a number of instances, from quite a
number of different perspectives, P-2 in fact is demonstrably
inferior to both. This leaves for consideration the question
whether P-i should be preferred to P-3, whether rejection of
P-2 will or should lead to greater or less severity in punishment. In a few instances, the analysis has shed light on this
issue, but for the most part the question remains unanswered.
This lacuna may prevent some readers from deciding whether
they are happy or unhappy with the conclusions reached, but
it should not obscure the soundness or unsoundness of the
conclusions themselves. Whether P-i should ultimately be preferred to P-3, whether severe penalties are better than milder
ones, can ordinarily be determined only by fixing priorities
among goals, and even then the question will remain clouded
by uncertainties and differences in values. Here again, the
present Article refrains from taking a position on the issue,
important though it is.
In this sense, the focus of the present Article is exceedingly narrow. Many of the central questions concerning punishment and the grading of offenses remain to be considered.
The justification for emphasis on results is only one small
part of this larger problem.
B.

The Case for Equal Treatment

Our examination of the justifications for emphasis on results has placed the burden of proof squarely on the defenders of the status quo. We have noted that attributing importance to harm caused seems on its face anomalous, and we have
therefore simply assumed that emphasis on results requires
to explore the values implicated by the notion of frugality in punishment. See text
accompanying notes 241-81 supra.
z33See text accompanying notes 137-39 supra.
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some justification, without pausing to consider whether there
are any affirmative reasons for ignoring the actual result. In
fact, the affirmative reasons for equal treatment are rather
obvious ones, but it is nevertheless worthwhile to have them
clearly before us. First, of course, is the general principle that
like cases ought to be treated alike. This maxim, however,
proves a rather weak reason for equal treatment. It cannot
come into play at all until we are persuaded that cases differing only with respect to harm caused are indeed "alike," and
consideration of this question simply reopens all the arguments
for emphasis on results. In any event, even if we regard such
cases as essentially "alike," we are left uncertain whether the
maxim should be followed or, as in so many other areas,
politely ignored. 33 7 Perhaps the most that can be said is that
following the maxim enhances the apparent justice and fairness of the criminal law, and that this benefit ought not be
sacrificed without some compensation. The defenders of the
status quo may at least be asked what this compensation is.
The essence of the case for equal treatment rests not on
the precept of treating like cases alike, but rather on the objectives of the criminal law itself. These objectives are variously
formulated. They may include retribution (in the sense of
punishment in accordance with moral fault), general deterrence of the population at large, specific deterrence of the
individual offender, reformation and treatment of the offender, and isolation of dangerous offenders. 33 8 In pursuit of
any of these objectives, or of several in combination, the lawmaker might wish to make punishment turn on a variety of
factors. But the occurrence of harm would not seem, at least
at first glance, to be among those to be considered. The proper
disposition for purposes of specific deterrence or rehabilitation would presumably turn on the defendant's background,
personality, psychological problems, and related factors, not
even in part on whether harm was caused. Similarly, a sentence
designed to isolate a defendant thought potentially dangerous
for the future would be based on an evaluation of personality,
past conduct, and other factors related to predicting behavior.
Harm might be an indirect guide to future dangerousness, but
it is not obvious a priori whether a harmful result should be an
See text accompanying notes 277-79 supra.
Retaliation has been deliberately excluded. See text accompanying
50-51.supra.
'37
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aggravating or mitigating factor; 339 its significance must be
shown. For purposes of deterrence, sanctions are assumed to
influence people at the point at which they embark on a given
course of antisocial conduct, with certain perceptions as to
its potential consequences. Accordingly, there is again some
reason at least to begin with the assumption that where conduct
and the actor's perceptions as to its consequences are the same,
the penalty should be the same, regardless of the actual outcome. 3 40 Finally, in terms of retribution, the reasons for equal
treatment are clearer still. Moral culpability may turn on the
nature of the acts committed, the offender's motives and intent, extenuating circumstances, and so on, but the occurrence
of harm has no apparent bearing on the degree of moral blameworthiness.
When the law prevents imposition of the same penalty,
as present law ordinarily does, the objectives of the criminal
law are necessarily disserved. If, for example, the penalty for
attempted murder is appropriate in terms of rehabilitation,
or deterrence, or retribution, then the greater penalty for successful murder is necessarily too severe in terms of these goals.
Conversely, it could be that the penalty for murder is in fact
the optimal one for cases of this kind; then the more lenient
sanction for attempted murder would appear inadequate to
serve society's interests in retribution, deterrence, and rehabil3 41
itation.
Thus, the essence of the case for equal treatment is that
inequalities imply failure to pursue the goals of the criminal
law in the best possible way. In some cases the sanction will
be far too low for adequate deterrence, for example. In others,
perhaps more frequently, the penalty for causing harm, largely
a holdover from the days of retaliatory justice, is excessively
severe in terms of deterrence or any other presently accept339 The very failure of an attempt to kill may render a repeat attempt more
likely. Harm may, of course, be taken as an indication of the "objective" dangerousness of the act itself, but it proves a very crude guide for this purpose, see text accompanying notes 302-21 supra, and the dangerousness of the act is in turn only a crude
guide to the potential dangerousness of the actor in the future.
340 See text accompanying note 76 supra.
341 The authorized sanction must of course be viewed as reflecting the compromise of competing goals, but emphasis on results is still necessarily inconsistent with
whatever values and priorities have been established. If the penalty for attempted
murder reflects the proper adjustment of such objectives as deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution, and provides the optimum sanction for cases of this kind, then the
penalty for murder is necessarily too severe in terms of the relative values assigned
to these goals.

1974)

HARM AND PUNISHMENT

able objective. In either event, the inequalities necessarily frustrate the retributive objective of ensuring that differences in
punishment correspond to differences in moral blameworthiness. Such a situation is not only "anomalous" or "irrational"
but also extremely costly in impeding achievement of the goals
of the criminal law. The defenders of emphasis on results can
quite properly be asked to explain in what ways the distinctions
based on the occurrence of harm serve a useful purpose.
C.

The Justificationfor Emphasis on Results

Of the arguments we have considered, a number provide
no tenable reason for emphasis on results. These include the
justifications in terms of retribution, "characteristicalness,"
the incentive to desist, and retaliation as a means to an end.
The justification of efficiency in regulation could conceivably
provide a basis for emphasis on results in the very limited area
of strict liability offenses of a public welfare nature, but even
this rationale cannot be considered either sound or unsound in
the absence of studies of the actual impact of strict liability on
risk creation in this context. The dangerousness argument supports at most only a rebuttable presumption of an aggravated
offense where harm occurs, and even this presumption could
be challenged as irrational in certain contexts.
None of the remaining arguments-jury nullification, frugality, and administrative discretion-proves persuasive as a
general explanation for relating punishment to harm caused,
although some of them do seem valid with respect to some
crimes, under some circumstances and given some assumptions. From this it could, perhaps, be concluded that there is
something to the notion of emphasis on results after all, that
the various arguments do have a certain cumulative force, and
that the present pattern of the law is not so irrational as it
might appear. It seems unnecessary, however, to limit any conclusion on the matter to such general terms. Despite the
many questions left unresolved, either because more empirical
information is needed or because conflicting interests may
provoke legitimate differences of opinion, the proper approach
in some areas does emerge with reasonable clarity.
With respect to intentional crimes, we should consider
first the case of a mandatory death penalty. Because there has
never been experience with such a penalty's being truly mandatory, it is impossible to know to what extent it could be a
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better deterrent than any alternative sanction, but it seems
plausible to assume that such a penalty would provide significant additional deterrence. On this assumption, the jury nullification argument would justify limiting the penalty to cases in
which the relevant harm (presumably death) occurs. The applicability of the administrative discretion rationale is unclear,
since we do not know how the law can in fact ensure the truly
mandatory nature of the death penalty-excluding possibilities for plea bargaining, decisions to charge only a lesser
offense, and so forth. If all possible discretion can in fact be
eliminated, this rationale becomes irrelevant; if not, it would
of course offer a strong basis for limiting the supposedly
"mandatory" penalty to cases in which harm occurs. The relevance of the frugality argument is also unclear. From one perspective, emphasis on results appears to spare from the death
penalty those who attempt and fail; they may face only twenty
years' imprisonment or life imprisonment with the possibility
of parole. But if the same deterrent effect could be achieved
by punishing the attempters more severely, and completers
less severely (life imprisonment without parole for both), the
net result might be viewed as a frugality gain, especially if
completers outnumber attempters. Nevertheless, at least under
some assumptions, the frugality argument would support emphasis on results with respect to a mandatory death penalty.34 2
In the case of the other penalties applicable to intentional
crimes, neither jury nullification nor frugality provides a plausible basis for emphasis on results. Higher penalties where harm
occurs can have a significant additional deterrent effect (except
apparently in the case of a discretionary death penalty), but
juries are unlikely to resist conviction, and there is no necessary frugality gain since in many instances the larger group of
defendants may be the completers, who suffer penalties more
severe than they would have to face (to provide the same level
of deterrence) if attempters and completers were treated
equally. In these instances emphasis on results appears highly objectionable in terms of the concern for frugality in punishment.
342 Such a penalty would, of course, remain vulnerable under the eighth amendment. Apart from the cruelty of the death penalty itself, such a system of administering capital punishment might be deemed cruel and unusual because those subject to
the death penalty (having caused death) would be separated from those who were
not (non-murdering felons or unsuccessful attempters) solely by the arbitrary "lottery"
mechanism of harm. See text accompanying notes 250-53 supra.
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The administrative discretion rationale does justify emphasis on results with respect to petty intentional crimes, such
as simple assault. For more serious offenses, discretion in
choosing to prosecute is unlikely to be a factor. Discretion with
respect to plea bargaining and imposition of sentence may
be somewhat curtailed by emphasis on results, assuming equal
treatment would subject attempts to a more severe penalty,
but even then the contribution to solving the fundamental
problems of discretion seems rather minor. Moreover, where a
requirement of equal treatment would lead to less severe sanctions for the completed crime, emphasis on results serves only
to aggravate the problems of discretion.
With respect to crimes of recklessness or negligence, jury
nullification, frugality, and administrative discretion all prove
inadequate to justify emphasis on results. Additional penalties
where harm occurs could produce some additional deterrence,
but on existing vidence it seems most unlikely that the gain
is significant, particularly with respect to the motor vehicle
offenses that comprise the great bulk of such cases. As a result,
the additional sanction for causing harm appears, if anything,
to violate the frugality principle, and to exacerbate the dangers
of administrative discretion. Essentially the same deterrence
could be achieved, without risk of nullification, by simply eliminating this additional penalty.
For strict liability crimes, we should again consider first
the special case of a mandatory death penalty, a distinct possibility with respect to felony-murder. As previously mentioned,
such a penalty might have some additional deterrent effect,
though the gain, in terms of deterring either the underlying
felony or the loss of life, seems much more speculative here
than in the case of intentional crimes. If we do assume some
deterrence benefit, then emphasis on results in this situation
would be supported by the jury nullification rationale. The
administrative discretion and frugality arguments might also
be applicable, subject to the qualifications already discussed
in connection with use of the death penalty for intentional
crimes. Apart from the rather special case of a mandatory
death penalty for felony-murder, emphasis on results does
not seem justified for other strict liability situations. The gain
in terms of deterrence seems too slight to bring either the jury
nullification, administrative discretion, or frugality rationales
into play.
This somewhat sketchy review of the conclusions reached
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should make clear that emphasis on results appears justifiable
only in a very limited number of areas. Widespread changes
must therefore be made in the definition and grading of specific offenses in order to bring the content of the criminal law
into harmony with its stated goals. One example that emerges
with particular clarity is the case of the felony-murder rule.
Except with respect to mandatory death penalties, the emphasis on results implicit in the rule finds no support in any of
the arguments considered. And it seems fairly clear that the
appropriate way to eliminate the inequality here is by reducing
the penalty applicable for causing death, not by raising the
penalty applicable in the absence of death. The felony-murder
343
rule should therefore be abolished.
Another obvious candidate for immediate reform is vehicle
homicide by recklessness or negligence. Here too, emphasis
on results seems devoid of support in the arguments considered. While, as always, the relevant empirical information
remains imperfect, the available facts provide ample basis for
responsible judgment. In theory the inequality might be eliminated by authorizing substantial prison terms for reckless driving not resulting in death, but this approach is clearly foreclosed by the danger of jury and administrative nullification.
Equality should therefore be achieved by invoking only the
relatively mild sanctions now authorized for reckless driving.
Experiments might be attempted involving some increase in
these penalties, within the limits imposed by the nullification
problem, but distinctions should no longer be drawn solely
on the basis of death.3 4 4 The crime of vehicle homicide or involuntary manslaughter should for practical purposes disappear
from the statute books.
Total elimination of emphasis on results, along these lines,
appears appropriate for a great many other crimes. The precise form and direction of the changes required merits careful

'4'

The occurrence of harm could conceivably be made the basis for a presumption
of extreme dangerousness, or as in the ALI formulation, the mere act of engaging
in the felony might raise a presumption of "extreme indifference to the value of
human life." See note 324 supra. Both of these presumptions seem vulnerable to attack
on due process grounds, however. See note 323 supra.
341 It would presumably be proper to make the occurrence of death (or more
appropriately, the occurrence of a serious collision) the basis for a rebuttable presumption of extreme dangerousness, or reckless indifference to life. But the penalty
applicable when these elements are established should still be rather low, and it
should remain open to the prosecution to establish such elements even in the absence
of death.
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study. On the other hand, emphasis on results seems altogether
defensible in some areas and from some perspectives. In these
situations, reexamination of existing law, in terms of the present analysis, nevertheless remains a necessity. As indicated at
the outset, many problems associated with mens rea and the
law of attempts have never been resolved satisfactorily, due
to the absence of acceptable or coherent reasons for attributing
significance to the harm caused; the entire field of causation
3 45
in criminal law is utterly bankrupt for the same reason.
Identification of the precise policies served by emphasis on
results should provide a basis for more meaningful efforts to
tackle these problems.
"'

See Weinreb, supra note 15, at 147 & n.14.

